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This chapter argues that such judicialisation before the ICJ has not developed international environmental law in a way favourable to victims of environmental degradation. It first observes that certain promising human rights-focused environmental disputes were discontinued, indicating that other forms of peaceful dispute settlement remain significant in the environmental context. It then argues that raising arguments in certain incidental proceedings in environmental disputes, such as counterclaims, have limited the potential for certain decisions to develop peoples’ rights in environmental disputes. Finally, it argues that the Court’s perceived judicial caution has limited its ability to clarify the role of local populations in environmental impact assessments (EIAs) and develop certain environmental principles in light of populations, such as the precautionary principle or the principle of intergenerational equity.
It is widely accepted that we ought to avoid taking excessive risks of causing gratuitous suffering. The practical implications of this truism, however, depend on how we understand what counts as an excessive risk. Precautionary frameworks help us decide when a risk exceeds the threshold for action, with the recent Birch et al. (2021) framework for assessing invertebrate sentience being one such example. The Birch et al. framework uses four neurobiological and four behavioural criteria to provide an evidence-based standard that can be used in determining when precautionary action to promote invertebrate welfare may be warranted. Our aim in this discussion paper is to provide a new motivation for the threshold approach that the Birch et al. framework represents while simultaneously identifying some possible revisions to the framework that can reduce false positives without abandoning the framework’s precautionary objectives.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, governments worldwide invoked the ‘precautionary principle’ to justify policies designed to protect public health. This principle holds that the state may act proactively to avert harm where there is factual uncertainty about that harm and the efficacy of policies proposed to mitigate it. Many of the policies introduced during the pandemic limited citizens’ constitutional rights. This article accordingly analyzes how the precautionary principle can be integrated into the proportionality doctrine courts use to assess the validity of rights limitations. As our case study, we take the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada and its globally influential Oakes proportionality test. When articulating the test in the past, the Court has grappled with the need to defer to laws that pursue important public objectives when the evidence underlying those policies is indeterminate. However, it has been criticized for not creating detailed guidelines for when judges should defer, which is said to breed arbitrary, results-oriented decision-making. We update this criticism by showing that it continues to apply to judgments of lower courts in Canada that have followed the Court’s proclamations to evaluate laws that limit constitutional rights to combat COVID-19. We then construct the requisite guidelines by drawing analogies with existing legal principles found in tort and criminal law. We argue that in contexts of factual uncertainty, the degree of judicial deference should vary according to the gravity and likelihood of the harm the government seeks to prevent. This risk-based framework restrains judicial subjectivity and illuminates how precaution should operate at each stage of the proportionality test. We further argue that it can assist courts across jurisdictions when incorporating precaution within proportionality because, unlike approaches to this problem offered by other comparative constitutional scholars, it is suitably modest and avoids excessive revision of accepted proportionality principles.
This article considers the application of the precautionary principle as understood in EU law to EU decision-making on geoengineering, in particular solar geoengineering. It finds that the situation is riddled with more complexities than first appears; (i) the principle is used to argue against research, even though more research is usually itself seen as precautionary response; (ii) the risks of research are claimed to lie in its political impact, whereas the principle is traditionally applied to direct physical risks; (iii) while there are legitimate precautionary arguments against geoengineering, it is itself put forward as a precautionary measure and there are precautionary arguments in favour too. Drawing on case law and scholarship we conclude that the precautionary principle can nevertheless be applied and will lead to a procedural requirement to do comprehensive reviews of relevant scientific knowledge before decision-making. This leaves wide – but not unbounded – discretion but may still be valuable in providing a frame for reasoned public debate. We also apply our findings to the recent expert reports on Solar Radiation Modification and show that they have failed to apply precaution correctly.
Risk is a central concept in modern regulatory studies. In Chapter 2, the general idea of ’risk’ is introduced. The chapter helps readers grasp its scientific and practical relevance for regulation. The chapter also offers an overview of the importance of risk in scholarly work and policy-making. The chapter emphasizes the extensive and diverse nature of risk studies across different academic disciplines including ’technical’ quantitative methods and sociological critique. It explains how risk identification, risk assessment, and risk management are conventionally understood and highlights their shortcomings and complexities. Additionally, it discusses the trend of ’riskification’ – the tendency to frame a growing number of issues in the language of risk.
The authors critique the NY Declaration on Animal Consciousness, which does not denounce continued captivity and invasive research in the pursuit of animal consciousness markers. They argue that such research often increases animal suffering by accepting harmful practices. Instead, they propose a nonanthropocentric, ethical framework aligned with the Belmont Report’s principle of beneficence, advocating for noninvasive methods in natural habitats. This approach prioritizes animal well-being, recognizing and safeguarding the intrinsic value of all conscious beings.
A wide range of animal taxa, including vertebrates and invertebrates, are controlled or kept by humans. They may be used as pets, for recreation, sport and hobbies, as working animals, as producers of animal-derived (food) products or as biomedical models in research. There is a need for clear guidance on the treatment of animals, regardless of their phylogenetic distance from humans. Current animal welfare concepts, which emphasise animal sentience and the ability of animals to experience negative or positive mental states, are limited in scope to a small proportion of the animal kingdom, as the vast majority of species are (currently) thought to lack sentience. We discuss four options for addressing the question of which basic concept(s) could be used to derive guidelines for the treatment of animal species, sentient or non-sentient: (1) alternative concepts tailored to specific groups of species; (2) ‘welfare’ concepts not presupposing sentience; (3) the precautionary principle; or (4) the concept of animal integrity. Since questions regarding the appropriate treatment of animals, including species with a large phylogenetic distance from humans, have an ethical/moral dimension, we also address who counts morally and how much, and how animals should be treated given their moral status. We suggest that the concept of animal integrity, possibly complemented and extended by the concept of habitat/ecosystem integrity, is suitable for application to all species. However, a current concept of animal welfare should serve as the primary basis for guidance on how to treat species that are sentient and capable of experiencing emotions.
The intersection between energy and the environment is regulated on the basis of legal foundations that international economic law has developed on its own or ‘borrowed’ from (or otherwise relied on) such outside regimes as general international law and international environmental law. The borrowed principles, like sovereignty over natural resources or sustainable development, can find their reflection, directly or indirectly, in trade and investment agreements and case law and will continuously affect new developments in this field. This chapter will show that such foundations stemming from the external sources define the basic contours of State’s rights and duties associated with the energy–environment nexus. Moreover, the international trading and investment systems provide self-created legal foundations for environmental policy space as will also be discussed in this chapter. They define the extent to which energy-related restrictive measures driven by environmental considerations can be accepted. The case of the ECT presented at the end of this chapter is a striking example for demonstrating that the legal foundations are not static and may undergo important changes.
We argue that vaccine regulation in a number of European countries can be defined as following an ‘erring on the side of rare events’ (ESRE), namely a form of extreme implementation of the precautionary principle that arises when misinformed public opinion places disproportionate attention on small and rare risks in making risk benefit assessments. ESRE has been amplified by media (including social media) reporting, which has contributed to exaggerate the risks of rare vaccine side effects. Government decisions regarding SARS-CoV-2 vaccines have responded to an ESRE criterion and have had far-reaching consequences for vaccine hesitancy globally.
The development of the precautionary principle by the EU Courts has often been interpreted by scholars as inconsistent with another trend in EU risk regulation: one that is evidence-based and relies on impact assessment. This article argues that the two trends – precaution and regulatory impact assessment – are not mutually exclusive. Together they may, in fact, act as a procedural safeguard against discretionary decisions that have an impact on fundamental rights, especially under conditions of epistemic uncertainty. The article illustrates this claim by looking at the decisions to close schools in Ireland during the pandemic.
Our book was written during the COVID pandemic. As a result, it was natural to include a chapter on this topic. In line with the overall theme of our book, we highlight aspects close to the understanding and communication of risk. Topics included in more detail are the inherent danger of exponential growth and the need for adhering to the precautionary principle when faced with a new, possibly catastrophic and hence not yet widely understood, type of risk. The precautionary principle enables decision-makers to adopt measures when scientific evidence about an environmental or human health hazard is uncertain and the stakes are high. A question we address to some extent is whether this pandemic happened totally unexpectedly; was it a so-called Black Swan? We present evidence that it most certainly was not. We give examples of early warnings from scientific publications, highly visible presentations in the public domain as well as regulatory measures in force to absorb the consequences of a possible pandemic. In discussions around risk, numbers, especially large ones, and also units of measurement play an important role; we offer some guidance here.
The Precautionary Principle has primarily found a place within the international environmental law regime, and to some extent, the international human rights regime. It is also, arguably, considered to be a principle of customary international law. While the international investment law regime has traditionally resisted (and still does) incorporating principles from other regimes, a few innovative International Investment Agreements (IIA) have gone against the grain and expressly incorporated principles of international environmental and human rights law. This chapter draws upon a clause in the Nigeria-Morocco Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) of 2016 which mandates that both the investor and the host state shall apply the precautionary principle to their investments. It will enquire whether the precautionary principle has achieved that normative status of customary international law which allows it to be binding on host states by virtue of inclusion in a BIT. Second, it will enquire whether the precautionary principle can be binding on foreign investors as non-state actors.
This paper focuses on the legal adoption and possible implications of the proposed per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) restriction. In the case of PFAS, this restriction puts value on the regulatory efforts to implement far-reaching and ambitious targets amid a high level of scientific uncertainty. The purpose of this paper is to present a report rather than conducting an in-depth analysis of the mentioned field. Overall, the paper argues that such a daring decision might be justified by the precautionary principle. However, the implementation might raise opposition from the stakeholders’ side and might take longer than initially anticipated, most likely with additional derogations concerning essential goods that do not currently have safe alternatives.
Civilisational collapse could occur. The cascading risks attached to climate change could happen within decades or half a century, so it is no longer the next generation that will carry the burdens of the climate emergency. Before the dominoes collapse, we must take climate risks seriously and act accordingly. If we act now, climate risks can be minimised, if not avoided.
Sea-based measures represent a new way of dealing with eutrophication in the Baltic Sea. They refer to different technological innovations that may be implemented at sea to target pollution that has already been released, in contrast to reducing discharges from the original source on land. These measures are not subject to any specific regulation. The Chapter explores how marine environmental law operates in the absence of specific rules and how environmental law principles manage to fill legal gaps. Moreover, sea-based measures raise interesting issues linked to the balancing of interests, as the arguments both against and in favour of the measures are based on environmental protection, and as the environmental impact of the measures is uncertain. A framework for applying the precautionary approach while expanding knowledge on the impact attached to different measures, as developed within the dumping regime, is also explored.
This Chapter studies the management of living resources under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea considering the so-called precautionary principle/approach. It strives to give insights on the question whether the UN Convention demands application of the precautionary principle/approach with respect to the management of living resources vel non. The notions of the precautionary principle/approach, management and lastly that of living resources are discussed to evaluate the demand on common grounds. Taking the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases as a departure point, the analysis focuses on Part XII of the UN Convention. Finally, it gives an outlook on potential consequences of the required application to the ’package deal’.
The protection of marine environment assumes a special place under UNCLOS. Part XII provides for general obligations to protect and preserve the environment as well as more specific provisions concerning the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution, including those relating to different sources of pollution. At the same time, Part XII is intended to provide a general framework for the protection of the marine environment. This framework nature is demonstrated not only by the existence of many generally-worded provisions and open-ended obligations which need to be further elaborated but also in the existence of numerous reference to external rules and standards, international organisations and regional arrangements. This chapter examines the contribution of UNCLOS tribunals to clarifying the scope and content of the general obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment before moving to discussing the extent to which UNCLOS tribunals have shed light on the normative content of three key environmental obligations and principles in the context of the marine environment.
Law can influence conservation translocations in two basic ways: it can play a supportive and/or a restrictive role. Regarding the first role, legislation can provide support, a mandate, and/or an obligation to consider or perform a translocation. This may involve both general obligations to conserve or restore certain species or ecosystems, as well as specific obligations concerning species reintroductions or other types of translocation. Regarding the second role, legislation can impose limitations on translocation possibilities and/or make translocations conditional on meeting certain requirements. Such limitations and conditions may follow from legislation on native species protection, area protection, invasive non-native species, disease, trade, animal welfare, and several other areas of law. Requirements of both types may flow from international and national law. The legal requirements that will apply to any projected conservation translocation will depend on the countries, areas, and species involved, and there may be significant differences between one project and the next. The applicable requirements may be easy to meet for some projects, and be prohibitive for others. It is crucial that a careful analysis of applicable domestic legislation is carried out in the early stages of any contemplated conservation translocation. Practitioners should also make themselves aware of the relevant international legislation to provide them with the wider legal context of their work, and to help them influence the development of future legislation.
Both the waste regulation and chemicals regulation of the European Union are based on the precautionary principle. The main objective of the chemicals regulation is to protect human health and the environment from the risk caused by hazardous chemicals. The modern waste regulation aims, among other things, at fostering the recovery of waste. These material circulation aims have been recently emphasised by introducing the ambitious circular economy objectives. Many of the waste streams contain hazardous substances that may pose risks to human health and the environment. This article examines the role of the precautionary principle in the circular economy. We argue that sustainable material circulation can only be achieved through a case-by-case application of the precautionary principle, but this also requires participatory discourse in which competing arguments, beliefs and values are openly discussed.
Climate change is the existential crisis of our lifetime, requiring immediate action to limit global warming to 1.5˚C. Countries have committed, through the Paris Agreement, to take measures to curb greenhouse gas emissions. Yet, fossil fuel suppliers around the world continue to bet against the Paris Agreement by further expanding fossil fuels exploration, extraction, and production, which exacerbates the climate crisis and impedes meaningful action to safeguard human rights. As fossil fuel suppliers continue to profit from the climate crisis, they have consistently evaded accountability for climate change by leaning on domestic climate mitigation policies void of supply-side measures and hiding behind a wall of impunity. This chapter examines how climate litigation is closing this supply-side accountability gap through the judiciary, using the Norwegian climate case People v. Arctic Oil as an example. Although a loss for the co-plaintiffs, the Norwegian decision is, in some respects, a step in the right direction and a warning to the fossil fuel industry. This is because, for the first time, the Supreme Court held that greenhouse gas emissions from Norwegian fossil fuel products that are combusted abroad (“exported emissions”) must be considered when analyzing the climate impacts of fossil fuel extraction and production.