By the 1960s, quite different societies were developing in the two halves of Berlin, one under capitalist auspices and the other under communism. With West German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik in the early 1970s, a series of treaties resulted in recognition of the GDR and easing of travel restrictions from west to east. Under GDR leader Erich Honecker, the modernity of ‘actually existing socialism’ was expressed in an energetic housing development programme, significant public buildings, and some leeway for cultural experimentation; yet the secret police or Stasi continued to expand, and the physical apparatus of the Wall was further refined. Divergent identities between East and West were evident not only in differing political ideologies, social profiles, and degrees of freedom, consumerism, and material well-being, but also in patterns of historical memorialisation. In the 1980s the economic and environmental decline of the GDR became ever more visible. Growing unrest culminated in challenges to communist rule and the opening of the Wall on 9 November 1989, and led to German reunification in October 1990.

In the late 1960s, Brezhnev aimed to downplay the East–West ideological divide, prioritizing practical relationships over ideology. Worsening relations with China, demonstrated by the 1969 border clashes, heightened Moscow's fears of China. The prospect of an economic bonanza tempted the Soviets to reach out to France and West Germany in search of trade deals and access to markets. However, as this chapter shows, it was Nixon's visit to Beijing in February 1972 that awakened Brezhnev to the imperative of engaging with the United States. Despite America's ongoing war in Vietnam, he went out on a limb to host Nixon in Moscow. Brezhnev subsequently discovered that he and Nixon had much in common. He then strove to end the Cold War on terms that would approximate a Soviet–American condominium. This chapter argues, however, that the contradictions between the Soviet desire for American recognition and the Soviet quest for revolutionary legitimacy weakened the prospects for genuine superpower detente.

The rivalry between the two states of divided Germany played out on a global scale across the Third World. The chain of upheavals in East Africa in 1964-65 led to Dar es Salaam becoming the first African capital south of the Sahara in which the German Democratic Republic maintained a diplomatic mission. This turned the city into a propaganda battlefield. East Berlin strove for full recognition from Tanzania, while Bonn tried to prevent such a development from coming to pass. In the face of this rivalry, Julius Nyerere’s government sought to pursue a non-aligned foreign policy and broker aid agreements to further its socialist project. Adopting a triangular approach, this chapter demonstrates how Tanzania’s relationship with the two German states turned on developments in Central Europe, especially West Germany’s Ostpolitik. It reveals the challenges of upholding non-alignment in a Cold War world which did not revolve around simple binaries and was complicated by politics ‘on the ground’ in Dar es Salaam.

Chapter 11 examines the steps needed to rescue Brandt’s Ostpolitik from its near-demise at the hands of a polarized Bundestag. Following a rash of back-channel diplomacy with Egon Bahr at the center, France, Britain, the United States, and the USSR finally reached a Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin; it guaranteed access to the city but failed to clarify West Berlin’s relationship to the Federal Republic, leaving room for future disputes. Brandt’s surprise visit to Brezhnev in Crimea deepened the relationship between these two leaders, but created suspicion in the Western camp that did not ease even with Brandt’s award of the Nobel Peace Prize. Rainer Barzel, leader of the CDU/CSU, insisted that the Warsaw and Moscow treaties must be renegotiated; he maneuvered in the Bundestag to overthrow the Brandt government. Outside observers feared that the entire course of détente was in jeopardy. Barzel’s bid for power failed, but he continued to seek concessions from the Soviets; the GDR did briefly take a softer line. The treaties passed without CDU/CSU support, and Brandt went on to win a decisive victory in the 1972 elections, affirming public backing for Ostpolitik.

In Chapter 8, focus turns to the handiwork of Brandt’s Ostpolitik – the negotiation of the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties in 1970. Egon Bahr’s bargaining strategy in Moscow was hasty and dilettantish; he did not worry overly about the contents of the treaty with the USSR, since he saw the agreement as only one component of an interlocking series of treaties. When the substance of the “Bahr Paper” was leaked, his secretive approach and his failure to address the Berlin problem further polarized German politics. The CDU/CSU vehemently rejected Brandt’s policies and members of the coalition parties began to defect. The external resonance of German Ostpolitik was nonetheless enormous. Brandt’s meeting with Brezhnev in Moscow alerted the world to the ebbing of Soviet hostility, resulting in greater maneuvering room for Bonn. When the chancellor kneeled in Warsaw, it appeared to signal German acceptance of the moral weight of Nazi crimes. A closer view shows, however, that the Federal Republic was extremely hard-nosed toward Poland; it demanded emigration rights for ethnic Germans while refusing to offer restitution payments. Brandt’s Germany looked forward, not backward.

Chapter 7 depicts a severe cleft in German politics as the Grand Coalition headed toward Bundestag elections in September 1969. Chancellor Kiesinger tried to coax the USSR into softening its enmity toward West Germany, but his hard-line stances on Berlin and the NPT stalled progress. Egon Bahr, Willy Brandt’s controversial aide, urged the SPD to cast aside old ballast: Bonn should sign the NPT, stop isolating the GDR, and renounce territorial claims in Poland. Economy minister Karl Schiller, the SPD’s central figure in the 1969 campaign, insisted that the German mark should be revalued. Kiesinger’s CDU/CSU rejected all of these proposals, and the coalition cabinet proved incapable of decisive action for most of the year – causing economic havoc across Western Europe. The SPD–FDP coalition won the election only narrowly, but as Chancellor Willy Brandt acted decisively to revalue the mark and pledge German support for “deepening” and “widening” Europe at an EC summit in The Hague. On Ostpolitik, Brandt signed the NPT and authorized soundings with the USSR and Poland; but Bahr grew impatient and angled to open a back channel to the Kremlin.

The rivalry between the two states of divided Germany played out on a global scale across the Third World. The chain of upheavals in East Africa in 1964-65 led to Dar es Salaam becoming the first African capital south of the Sahara in which the German Democratic Republic maintained a diplomatic mission. This turned the city into a propaganda battlefield. East Berlin strove for full recognition from Tanzania, while Bonn tried to prevent such a development from coming to pass. In the face of this rivalry, Julius Nyerere’s government sought to pursue a non-aligned foreign policy and broker aid agreements to further its socialist project. Adopting a triangular approach, this chapter demonstrates how Tanzania’s relationship with the two German states turned on developments in Central Europe, especially West Germany’s Ostpolitik. It reveals the challenges of upholding non-alignment in a Cold War world which did not revolve around simple binaries and was complicated by politics ‘on the ground’ in Dar es Salaam.

With the course of jazz profoundly influenced by the events of the previous decade,examines the 1970s, a time of new growth and innovation in jazz in the GDR. During these years East German cultural critics viewed American free jazz (as exemplified by Ornette Coleman) as an expression of social revolution in the United States, reading it as music protesting grievances and echoing class warfare. By contrast, however, jazz “made in the GDR” became emblematic of an art form in harmony with socialist society. Yet this harmonization was not perfect. This chapter explores how jazz retained its countercultural aspect, despite its incorporation into state culture and its subsequent flourishing, as well as how STASI surveillance of jazz increased given growing traffic between East and West. At various live jazz events in the 1970s, fans described an oppositional atmosphere, revealing a more ambiguous dynamic between individual and state than official proclamations might indicate. In the era of Ostpolitik, performers and audiences found subtle ways to critique the socialist state, even as East German diplomats recruited jazz to showcase socialist Germany on the global stage.