The rapid development in neurotechnology raises significant human rights concerns. A normative analysis of this emerging technology’s ability to interfere with individual’s mental processes, highlights the lack of a clear human rights framework protecting the human mind. In this chapter, we will outline the interplay between neurotechnology and the right to freedom of thought, as well as the plea for new neurorights. First, we will examine how neurotechnology interferes with people’s mental sphere, and how this may put human rights – and the right to freedom of thought in particular – at risk. Second, we analyse how the international community addresses the disruptive impact of neurotechnology and which role the freedom of thought is attributed in these efforts. Third, we explore the impact on this freedom, its capacity to address the challenges emanating from neurotechnology, and how it may be reconceptualised to serve as an effective safeguard. Finally, we offer general remarks on the necessity of new neurorights and explore the current positions of various international and supranational institutions on this issue.

This chapter analyses the right to freedom of thought in the Chilean legal order, considering its various juristic dimensions. Though historically rooted in the nation’s foundational charters, it remains ambiguously defined within its legal system, primarily interpreted through the lenses of freedom of conscience and expression. This chapter argues that whilst the right to freedom of thought has not yet been explicitly enshrined in the Chilean Constitution, it has been implicitly incorporated through international human rights treaties; however, due to recent technological advances, a pressing re-evaluation has arisen. The 2021 Constitutional Reform Act innovatively protected brain activities by resorting to the right to mental integrity, introducing a paradigm shift in juridical safeguarding of cognitive freedoms. This development, however, presents new conceptual and systematic challenges. The chapter focuses on the historical evolution of the right to freedom of thought, judicial interpretations, and scholarly perspectives, mainly concentrating on the emerging category of ‘neurorights’. It examines the implications of the 2021 constitutional amendment and argues for a more precise recognition and theoretical development of the right in response to neurotechnological progress. The analysis underscores the necessity of unambiguously defining cognitive freedoms and freedom of thought to provide adequate legal protections in an era of rapid technological change.

In this chapter, Philipp Kellmeyer discusses how to protect mental privacy and mental integrity in the interaction of AI-based neurotechnology from the perspective of philosophy, ethics, neuroscience, and psychology. The author argues that mental privacy and integrity are important anthropological goods that need to be protected from unjustified interferences. He then outlines the current scholarly discussion and policy initiatives about neurorights and takes the position that while existing human rights provide sufficient legal instruments, an approach is required that makes these rights actionable and justiciable to protect mental privacy and mental integrity, for example, by connecting fundamental rights to specific applied laws.

Emerging neurotechnology offers increasingly individualised brain information, enabling researchers to identify mental states and content. When accurate and valid, these brain-reading technologies also provide data that could be useful in criminal legal procedures, such as memory detection with EEG and the prediction of recidivism with fMRI. Yet, unlike in medicine, individuals involved in criminal cases will often be reluctant to undergo brain-reading procedures. This raises the question of whether coercive brain-reading could be permissible in criminal law. Coercive Brain-Reading in Criminal Justice examines this question in view of European human rights: the prohibition of ill treatment, the right to privacy, freedom of thought, freedom of expression, and the privilege against self-incrimination. The book argues that, at present, the established framework of human rights does not exclude coercive brain-reading. It does, however, delimit the permissible use of forensic brain-reading without valid consent. This cautionary, cutting-edge book lays a crucial foundation for understanding the future of criminal legal proceedings in a world of ever-advancing neurotechnology.

Emerging neurotechnology offers increasingly individualised brain information, enabling researchers to identify mental states and content. When accurate and valid, these brain-reading technologies also provide data that could be useful in criminal legal procedures, such as memory detection with EEG and the prediction of recidivism with fMRI. Yet, unlike in medicine, individuals involved in criminal cases will often be reluctant to undergo brain-reading procedures. This raises the question of whether coercive brain-reading could be permissible in criminal law. Coercive Brain-Reading in Criminal Justice examines this question in view of European human rights: the prohibition of ill treatment, the right to privacy, freedom of thought, freedom of expression, and the privilege against self-incrimination. The book argues that, at present, the established framework of human rights does not exclude coercive brain-reading. It does, however, delimit the permissible use of forensic brain-reading without valid consent. This cautionary, cutting-edge book lays a crucial foundation for understanding the future of criminal legal proceedings in a world of ever-advancing neurotechnology.

Neurorights are novel human rights that specify areas of protection from potential abuses of neurotechnologies. They protect mental privacy, mental freedom and fair access to neuroenhancement. We discuss neurorights research and advocacy, including the Chilean constitutional amendment and neuroprotection bill of law, which explicitly protect neurorights and adopt a medical model for the regulation of all neurotechnologies, defining them as medical devices. These Chilean bills could serve as a model for legislation elsewhere.