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From the Covenant of the League of Nations (1919) to the Kellogg–Briand Pact (1928), the interwar years were punctuated by efforts to codify the right of states to resort to armed force. It is often said that the Covenant and the pact prohibited war while leaving recourse to measures short of war unregulated. This account eludes the heated debates that animated interwar scholarship regarding the scope of the prohibition of the use of force contained in these two instruments. Doctrine was, in fact, split: a (smaller) part claimed that armed reprisals were not forbidden, while another (larger) faction asserted that they were. Likewise, states had different understandings of their obligations not to ‘resort to war’ under the Covenant and the pact. This chapter uses these debates as a thread to give an overview of interwar jus ad bellum.