On the Singaporean resort island of Sentosa, two waxworks depict the British surrender to the Japanese in Singapore in 1942, and the Japanese surrender to the Allies in 1945. This essay focuses on the Japanese surrender waxworks, first displayed in 1974. Consideration of what the waxworks represent, how the display came about, and the experience the exhibit offers provides a perhaps unexpected opportunity to examine questions concerning the nature of diplomacy as refracted through post-war Japan-Singapore relations. In both representational and material terms, the waxworks mark a liminal condition. Representing a surrender grants them an ambivalent relation to post-war diplomacy, something crystallised by fraught public debate over their creation in the 1970s as independent Singapore struggled to reconcile its wartime past and commercial present. The chapter then goes on to consider the contemporary experience of the waxworks, which today represent historical curiosities in their own right and present the visitor with a strange and uncanny embodied experience of a moment frozen in time. In light of the events the waxworks depict, and the debates they triggered, the chapter seeks to answer the question of what embodied ‘work’ of history they continue to perform.

Chapter 12 investigates Yukikaze’s activities after the sinking of Yamato and during Japan’s surrender to the Allies. Yukikaze was transferred to the Republic of China in 1947, where she defended Taiwan during the crises in the Taiwan Strait. The chapter concludes with Yukikaze’s enduring legacy in Japanese culture.

This chapter examines the impact of the sudden end of the war, which caught the Chiang Kai-shek government off guard. The Allies had planned an amphibious landing on the coast of China, which would have given Chongqing time to regain control of the east coast and reduce inflation. After Japanese surrender, inflation briefly halted but then rather quickly resumed. Why was there no peace dividend?

Botched liberation: The retaking of occupied areas was done poorly, alienating many of the residents who had endured years under Japanese control. Topics covered include fleecing collaborators and undervaluing the currency of the Wang Jingwei government. There were problems maintaining the exchange rate of fabi with foreign currencies. Shipping and transportation problems were serious and inhibited economic recovery. UNRRA had problems getting aid to China.

How should the United States end the war with Japan? Secretary of War Stimson agonized over the use of the atomic bomb, knowing it would kill tens of thousands of innocent civilians. But he also recoiled at the thought of an invasion of Japan, which would likely cost many Allied soldiers’ lives. There had to be an alternative. He found a third option in conditional surrender: allowing the Japanese to retain their Emperor. If Japan’s leaders could be assured that the Emperor could remain on his throne safe from prosecution, then perhaps they might be induced to surrender. This chapter tracks the convoluted course by which high officials tried to maneuver President Truman toward conditional surrender and away from the other two costly options.