We explore gender attitudes towards competition in the United Arab Emirates—a traditionally patriarchal society which in recent times has adopted numerous policies to empower women and promote their role in the labor force. The experimental treatments vary whether individuals compete in single-sex or mixed-sex groups. In contrast to previous studies, women in our sample are not less willing to compete than men. In fact, once we control for individual performance, Emirati women are more likely to select into competition. Our analysis shows that neither women nor men shy away from competition, and both compete more than what would be optimal in monetary terms as the fraction of men in their group increases. We offer a detailed survey of the literature and discuss possible reasons for the lack of gender differences in our experiment.

We study the relative effectiveness of contracts that are framed either in terms of bonuses or penalties. In one set of treatments, subjects know at the time of effort provision whether they have achieved the bonus/avoided the penalty. In another set of treatments, subjects only learn the success of their performance at the end of the task. We fail to observe a contract framing effect in either condition: effort provision is statistically indistinguishable under bonus and penalty contracts.

This article replicates an experiment by Coffman et al. (Manag Sci 67(6):3551–3569, 2021) who separated taste-based and statistical discrimination by comparing employer choices in one of two hiring environments (treatments). Both treatments were characterized by the same ability distributions of workers in tasks on which men are found to outperform women on average, but only one allowed for gender-specific considerations. We found statistical discrimination against women when they are presented to employers not as women, but as people belonging to a low-performance group, but discrimination in their favor when their gender is revealed to potential employers. This discrimination in favor of women was observed in both male and female employers. It was greater when employers were women and disappeared when monetary incentives to employ more productive workers were higher for employers.

I show how using response times as a proxy for effort can address a long-standing issue of how to separate the effect of cognitive ability on performance from the effect of motivation. My method is based on a dynamic stochastic model of optimal effort choice in which ability and motivation are the structural parameters. I show how to estimate these parameters from the data on outcomes and response times in a cognitive task. In a laboratory experiment, I find that performance on a digit-symbol test is a noisy and biased measure of cognitive ability. Ranking subjects by their performance leads to an incorrect ranking by their ability in a substantial number of cases. These results suggest that interpreting performance on a cognitive task as ability may be misleading.

We examine the effects of mining booms in Indonesia on labor market outcomes using exogenous price changes and 452 mines. We do this using labor force surveys between the years 1998 and 2011, and four waves of individual panel data between 1997 and 2014. Surprisingly, female incomes grow during mining booms, not because women work more, but because their work moves from the agricultural to the service sector where paid work is more common. Men experience mixed labor market changes. High average mining incomes attract male labor to mining districts, allowing for some adjustment of labor supply to demand. Suggestive evidence also shows that informal work increases marginally for men, potentially in auxiliary mining jobs. A male dominated industry that supports economic opportunities for women can unexpectedly benefit women as well.

This paper explores the (de-)routinisation of employment structure in developing countries, through the case of Morocco. We investigate employment (de-)routinisation from an often-overlooked perspective, aiming to elucidate the interplay between the dynamics of occupational employment composition by the level of routine tasks intensity and two structural aspects: premature deindustrialisation and the prevalence of informal labour.

Our findings, based on tertile analysis and regressions, do not fully support the hypothesis of employment structure de-routinisation. At the same time, we could not identify a clear process of routinisation similar to that observed in developing countries undergoing the first stage of the traditional structural transformation process. Rather, we identified an inverted U-shaped pattern in the dynamics of occupational employment, indicative of a rise in intermediate routine-intensive occupations.

We emphasise two key factors, with opposite effects that have contributed to this atypical pattern: The first aspect is premature deindustrialisation, which according to our shift-share decomposition, has adversely affected highly routine-intensive jobs, contrasting with the routinisation trend observed in countries that have experienced a more traditional process of structural transformation. The influence of premature deindustrialisation in terms of de-routinisation is somewhat mitigated by the increasing prevalence of occupations demanding intermediate routine tasks, particularly within the services and construction sector. Regarding the second structural aspect – the prevalence of informal labour – our three-way interaction model indicates a lower susceptibility of informal jobs to de-routinisation compared to their formal counterparts within the same industry. Consequently, the prevalence of informal employment has slowed down the process of de-routinisation of employment structure.

Teenage childbearing is a common incident in developed countries. However, teenage births are much more likely in the USA than in any other industrialized country. Most of these births are delivered by female teenagers from low-income families. The hypothesis put forward here is that the welfare state (a set of redistributive institutions) has a significant influence on teenage childbearing behavior. We develop an economic theory of parental investments and the risky sexual behavior of teenagers. The model is estimated to fit stylized facts about income inequality, intergenerational mobility, and the sexual behavior of teenagers in the USA. The welfare state institutions are introduced via tax and public education expenditure functions derived from US data. In a quantitative experiment, we impose Norwegian taxes and education spending in the economic environment. The Norwegian welfare state institutions go a long way in explaining the differences in teenage birth rates between the USA and Norway.

We investigate the effect of water quality on the educational outcomes of children aged 8–11 in 39 districts in five states in the Ganges Basin of India. Using data from the Centre for Pollution Control Board of India and the Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS) 2011–12, we study the effect of water quality in the Ganges Basin on the performance in three test scores. Our evidence suggests that faecal coliform levels in water sources above safety thresholds negatively affect reading and writing test scores. The effects of Nitrate-N and Nitrite-N in the water appear to be weaker compared to those of faecal coliform. The results establish that water pollution caused by excessive presence of faecal coliform is an important environmental factor in determining educational outcomes of children. High levels of faecal coliform in the water could be lowering cognitive abilities of the pollution-affected children through the channel of waterborne diseases.

Several decades ago, Sig Prais concluded that the root cause of the UK’s poor industrial performance was the poor quality of education and training. In this lecture, I will make a related argument, focussing on the lack of opportunity in the United Kingdom for workers who have not succeeded in the formal education system and the long-lasting impacts this has on their economic, health and social wellbeing. I will highlight the importance of providing opportunities for continued training over a worker’s lifetime for appropriate skills that are valued in the workplace in order to achieve inclusive growth.

Existing empirical literature provides converging evidence that selective emigration enhances human capital accumulation in the world's poorest countries. However, the within-country distribution of such brain gain effects has received limited attention. Focusing on Senegal, we provide evidence that the brain gain mechanism primarily benefits the wealthiest regions that are internationally connected and have better access to education. Conversely, human capital responses are negligible in regions lacking international connectivity, and even negative in better connected regions with inadequate educational opportunities. These results extend to internal migration, implying that highly vulnerable populations are trapped in the least developed areas.

This study investigates the relationship between occupational skills and wages in Thailand using the Labour Force Survey from 1985 to 2020. We quantify the contribution of changes in the skill requirement and highlight the increase in the return on the ‘brain’ and the decrease in the penalty on ‘brawn’, which helps explain the wage distribution changes across periods. We further explore the polarisation in the labour market and analyse the changes in the wage distribution by applying the decomposition method proposed by Firpo et al (2009). Our results suggest that wage dispersion increases in the top end over the first two time periods but decreases in the third time period, while it continues to decrease in the lower end of the distribution.

This paper develops a general equilibrium life-cycle model with endogenous retirement that focuses on the interplay between old-age pensions (OAP) and disability pensions (DP) in Germany. Germany has introduced a phased-in increase of the normal retirement age from age 65 to 67 (Reform 2007) and closed off other routes to early OAP retirement. This reform was followed by a phased-in expansion of future DP benefits (Reform 2018). Our simulation results indicate that the first reform will induce a shift toward DP retirement, while the Reform 2018 will even neutralize the financial and economic gains of the Reform 2007 if current DP eligibility and benefit rules remain unchanged. We therefore highlight the increased relevance of DP when reforming the retirement system and retirement incentives in an aging society. Securing the financial stability of public pensions requires activation and rehabilitation of sick elderly in the workforce and tight access to disability benefits.

The rapid development of the digital economy has highlighted the crucial role of data in economic growth. This study investigates the impact of two types of innovation on long-term growth by incorporating data into a model of creative destruction and knowledge accumulation. Unlike traditional factors, data exhibit nonrivalry between the two research and development (R&D) sectors, thereby influencing the growth rate of economic outputs simultaneously without interference. Our findings reveal the existence of a balanced growth path (BGP) in both the decentralized economy and the social planner’s economy. In horizontal innovation, data can be transformed into digital knowledge to promote the economic growth [Cong et al. (2021)]. In addition to horizontal innovation, the utilization of data in vertical innovation also enhances the success rate of innovation, with a gradual decrease in per capita data usage on the BGP. Moreover, as agents accumulate human capital, the economy achieves higher output levels, effectively addressing consumer privacy concerns. However, along the transitional path, insufficient data provision by both R&D sectors leads to lower economic growth rates or more intense economic fluctuations, necessitating policy interventions.

This paper documents trends over the last two decades in retirement behavior and retirement income choices of participants in TIAA, a large and mature defined contribution plan. From 2000 and 2018, the average age at which TIAA participants stopped contributing to their accounts, which is a lower bound on their retirement age, rose by 1.2 years for female and 2.0 years for male participants. There is considerable variation in the elapsed time between the time of the last contribution to and the first income draw from plan accounts. Only 40% of participants take an initial income payment within 48 months of their last contribution. Later retirement and lags between retirement and the first retirement income payout led to a growing fraction of participants reaching the required minimum distribution (RMD) age before starting income draws. Between 2000 and 2018, the fraction of first-time income recipients who took no income until their RMD rose from 10% to 52%, while the fraction of these recipients who selected a life-contingent annuitized payout stream declined from 61% to 18%. Among those who began receiving income before age 70, annuitization rates were significantly higher than among those who did so at older ages. Aggregating across all income-receiving beneficiaries at TIAA, not just new income recipients, the proportion with a life annuity as part of their payout strategy fell from 52% in 2008 to 31% in 2018. By comparison, the proportion of all income recipients taking an RMD payment rose from 16% to 29%. About one-fifth of retirees received more than one type of income; the most common pairing was an RMD and a life annuity. In the later years of our sample, the RMD was becoming the de facto default distribution option for newly retired TIAA participants.

While technological progress played a central role in the British Industrial Revolution, statistical evidence on how inventors and entrepreneurs engaged in the process of technological innovation has typically received minor attention. In this paper I use quantitative methods to show that counties with a relatively high number of informal networks −in the form of Freemasonry, friendly societies, libraries, and booksellers− experienced more innovation as measured by new patents and exhibits at the 1851 Crystal Palace World’s Fair. Qualitative evidence and propensity score matching suggest that the mechanisms highlighted here were an important part of British technological leadership. Economic factors cannot account for these patterns.

Higher education enrolment and graduation rates have increased rapidly inter-generationally across much of the world, offering employers the promise of more knowledgeable recruits and promising individuals new means of social advancement. In the case of Bolivia, the labour force is becoming more heterogeneous over time, which could imply positive effects induced by a closer match between labour supply and recruiters’ needs. However, we show that this is not the case. We revisit the transition mechanisms from college to the workplace, positing recruiters’ interpretations of educational credentials as a crucial determining factor for employability in the formal sector. In a two-branch correspondence study, 2848 fictitious CVs were sent to 1424 formal firms in the three main urban Bolivian areas. We find a large university reputation premium. Applicants from well-valued universities are around 40% more likely to receive a positive response – a 2.25 percentage point advantage from a 7.87% baseline likelihood. Thus, the increasingly heterogeneous labour force is generating additional informational frictions in the labour market, rather than promoting a more efficient matching process.

The aim of this study is to examine whether the prevalent and fairly long unemployment spell of young Macedonians, Serbians and Montenegrins early in their career has negative effects on their subsequent labour-market performance: the so-called employment scarring. We first model unemployment spell as a function of individual and household characteristics and work attitudes and preferences using a discrete-time duration method. Then, we estimate the survival probabilities to examine the potential existence of employment scarring. The results provide some evidence for the potential presence of employment scarring in the three countries. The scars are largest in Serbia for all durations of the unemployment spell followed by Macedonia; they are weakest in Montenegro.

Increasing awareness of the productive potential of soft skills has sparked a discussion of their systematic and purposeful development. However, education systems pay only limited attention to this topic in most countries and remain focused on the development of hard skills. Is this approach rational or inadequate? This article provides new evidence on different aspects of the wage returns to soft skills (as an approximation of their productivity), and thereby contributes significantly to the discussion of the role of educational institutions in their development. It provides evidence that soft skills are as productive as hard skills. Moreover, it suggests that the productivity of hard skills stems from their combination with soft skills. These conclusions do not correspond to the fact that the value of education is intermediated mainly by hard skills, resulting in unequal development of soft and hard skills in schools. While concluding that education systems should pay more attention to soft skills development, the analysis recognises that this attention should be differentiated according to employers’ needs, owing to substantial differences in the value of soft skills across economic sectors. It is also noteworthy that while significant gender differences in returns to hard skills were identified, wage returns to soft skills appear gender neutral.

In the COVID-19 pandemic, people’s dwellings suddenly became a predominant site of economic activity. We argue that, predictably, policy-makers and employers took the home for granted as a background support of economic life. Acting as if home is a cost-less resource that is free for appropriation in an emergency, ignoring how home functions as a site of gendered relations of care and labour, and assuming home is a largely harmonious site, all shaped the invisibility of the imposition. Taking employee flexibility for granted and presenting work-from-home as a privilege offered by generous employers assumed rapid adaptation. As Australia emerges from lockdown, ‘building back better’ to meet future shocks entails better supporting adaptive capabilities of workers in the care economy, and of homes that have likewise played an unacknowledged role as buffer and shelter for the economy. Investing in infrastructure capable of providing a more equitable basis for future resilience is urgent to reap the benefits that work-from-home offers. This article points to the need for rethinking public investment and infrastructure priorities for economic recovery and reconstruction in the light of a gender perspective on COVID-19 ‘lockdown’ experience.

This article presents an historical and comparative analysis of the bargaining power and agency conferred upon migrant workers in Australia under distinct policy regimes. Through an assessment of four criteria – residency status, mobility, skill thresholds and institutional protections – we find that migrant workers arriving in Australia in the period from 1973 to 1996 had high levels of bargaining power and agency. Since 1996, migrant workers’ power and agency has been incrementally curtailed, to the extent that Australia’s labour immigration policy resembles a guest-worker regime where migrants’ rights are restricted, their capacity to bargain for decent working conditions with their employers is truncated and their agency to pursue opportunities available to citizens and permanent residents is diminished. In contrast to recent assessments that Australia’s temporary visa system is working effectively, our analysis indicates that it is failing to protect temporary migrants at work.