We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected]
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
This paper investigates whether and to what extent group identity plays a role in peer effects on risk behaviour. We run a laboratory experiment in which different levels of group identity are induced through different matching protocols (random or based on individual painting preferences) and the possibility to interact with group members via an online chat in a group task. Risk behaviour is measured by using the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task and peer influence is introduced by giving subjects feedback regarding group members’ previous decisions. We find that subjects are affected by their peers when taking decisions and that group identity influences the magnitude of peer effects: painting preferences matching significantly reduces the heterogeneity in risk behaviour compared with random matching. On the other hand, introducing a group task has no significant effect on behaviour, possibly because interaction does not always contribute to enhancing group identity. Finally, relative riskiness within the group matters and individuals whose peers are riskier than they are take on average riskier decisions, even when controlling for regression to the mean.
This paper examines the relationship between norm enforcement and in-group favouritism behaviour. Using a new two-stage allocation experiment with punishments, we investigate whether in-group favouritism is considered as a social norm in itself or as a violation of a different norm, such as egalitarian norm. We find that which norm of behaviour is enforced depends on who the punisher is. If the punishers belong to the in-group, in-group favouritism is considered a norm and it does not get punished. If the punishers belong to the out-group, in-group favouritism is frequently punished. If the punishers belong to no group and merely observe in-group favouritism (the third-party), they do not seem to care sufficiently to be willing to punish this behaviour. Our results shed a new light on the effectiveness of altruistic norm enforcement when group identities are taken into account and help to explain why in-group favouritism is widespread across societies.
Are people willing to sacrifice resources to save one’s and others’ face? In a laboratory experiment, we study whether individuals forego resources to avoid the public exposure of the least performer in their group. We show that a majority of individuals are willing to pay to preserve not only their self- but also other group members’ image, even when group identity is minimal. When group identity is made more salient, individuals help regardless of whether the least performer is an in-group or an out-group. In contrast, people are less likely to sacrifice for individual strangers, showing a major role for group identity and reputation concerns within groups relative to an interpretation in terms of moral norms.
Recently, social science research replicability has received close examination, with discussions revolving around the degree of success in replicating experimental results. We lend insight to the replication discussion by examining the quality of replication studies. We examine how even a seemingly minor protocol deviation in the experimental process (Camerer et al. in Science 351(6280):143–1436, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaf0918), the removal of common information, can lead to a finding of “non-replication” of the results from the original study (Chen and Chen in Am Econ Rev 101(6):2562–2589, 2011). Our analysis of the data from the original study, its replication, and a series of new experiments shows that, with common information, we obtain the original result in Chen and Chen (2011), whereas without common information, we obtain the null result in Camerer et al. (2016). Together, we use our findings to propose a set of procedure recommendations to increase the quality of replications of laboratory experiments in the social sciences.
We experimentally study intention-based social influence in standard and modified Ultimatum and Impunity games. Standard games with bi-dimensional strategy vectors let individuals decide independently in the role of proposer and responder and allow fairness intentions to be role dependent. Uni-dimensional strategy vectors in modified games constrain individuals to consistent offers and acceptance thresholds. To induce social influence, we randomly match participants in groups of four, which are minimally identified by colors. Social influence is assessed by how one reacts to information about median group intention(s). The factorial experimental design varies the order of the two game types and the strategy vector dimensionality. Social influence, depending on the game type and strategy dimensionality, significantly impacts participants’ behavior compared to their own intention. At the aggregate level, however, these differences cancel each other out. As there are more constraints on the action space, uni-dimensionality increases strategic concerns.
Our research addresses the effect of shared vs. mixed group identities in an information cascade game. We vary whether subjects always choose after a decision maker who shares the same identity or after a decision maker with a different identity. We find that subjects’ inclination to follow their predecessor is stronger in groups uniquely consisting of ingroup members compared to mixed groups. We relate this result to recent social cognition research.
This chapter explores the relationship between natives and migrants in the territory transferred from Germany to Poland in 1945 using contemporaries’ memoirs. It shows that migration status and region of origin served as salient identity markers, structuring interpersonal relations and shaping collective action in the newly formed communities. Statistical analysis is used to demonstrate that indigenous villages and villages populated by a more homogeneous migrant population were more successful in organizing volunteer fire brigades than villages populated by migrants from different regions.
This chapter examines the conceptualization and measurement of contact phenomena in the context of bilingualism across various languages. The goal of the chapter is to account for various phonetic contact phenomena in sociolinguistic analysis, as well as providing context for elaborating on quantitative methodologies in sociophonetic contact linguistics. More specifically, the chapter provides a detailed account of global phenomena in modern natural speech contexts, as well as an up-to-date examination of quantitative methods in the field of sociolinguistics. The first section provides a background of theoretical concepts important to the understanding of sociophonetic contact in the formation of sound systems. The following sections focus on several key social factors that play a major part in the sociolinguistic approach to bilingual phonetics and phonology, including language dominance and age of acquisition at the segmental and the suprasegmental levels, as well as topics of language attitudes and perception, and typical quantitative methods used in sociolinguistics.
Developing an online media presence is of particular importance during a military conflict. Two motivations inform the need for doing so: legitimising the grievances underlying one’s participation in the conflict and delegitimising the opponent by demoralising it or by demonising it in the eyes of third-party observers. Between 2014 and 2018, around forty news sites were set up by the authorities of the Donetsk and Luhansk ‘People’s Republics’. This chapter examines the content produced by four of these news sites. Three main narratives are identified: ‘business as usual’, ‘the cost of the war’, and ‘shaming the enemy’. News sites weaponised emotional discourse, with a focus on evoking fear and anger among their readers. A great deal of attention was paid to portraying Ukraine as a failed state, guilty of war crimes, which has no business continuing the war and which deliberately stymies all attempts at resolving the conflict peacefully. Conversely, ingroup identity was implicitly assumed rather than explored in detail; articles that evoked patriotism or addressed cultural events or local politics rarely explored why readers should identify with the Donbas ‘Republics’.
This chapter examines newspaper discourse in the Donetsk and Luhansk ‘People’s Republics’, analysing the content of twenty-six local newspapers between the start of the Euromaidan demonstrations in late 2013 and the end of 2017. The goal of this chapter is to uncover the themes and narratives in DNR and LNR print media, and examine how these narratives relate back to ideology and identity building. Three main narratives are identified: ‘business as usual’, ‘war and memory’, and ‘loss and guilt’. Newspapers in the Donbas ‘Republics’ continued to perform ‘typical’ activities as a source of information for local communities. However, a significant part of their content did address the development of collective identity, for example, through references to newly instated public holidays and a kinship with Russia and the Russian language. However, this ‘ingroup’ identity remained impoverished, projecting an identity discourse without a sui generis, unifying coherence. Instead, negative descriptions of the ‘outgroup’ (i.e., Ukraine/the ‘Kyiv regime’) received much more attention, with a view to demonising Ukraine and Ukrainians in the eyes of the local population.
Games of pure mutual interest require players to coordinate their choices withoutbeing able to communicate. One way to achieve this is through team-reasoning,asking ‘what should we choose’, rather than just assessingone’s own options from an individual perspective. It has been suggestedthat team-reasoning is more likely when individuals are encouraged to think ofthose they are attempting to coordinate with as members of an in-group. In twostudies, we examined the effects of group identity, measured by the‘Inclusion of Other in Self’ (IOS) scale, on performance innondescript coordination games, where there are several equilibria but nodescriptions that a player can use to distinguish any one strategy from theothers apart from the payoff from coordinating on it. In an online experiment,our manipulation of group identity did not have the expected effect, but wefound a correlation of .18 between IOS and team-reasoning-consistent choosing.Similarly, in self-reported strategies, those who reported trying to pick anoption that stood out (making it easier to coordinate on) also reported higherIOS scores than did those who said they tended to choose the option with thelargest potential payoff. In a follow-up study in the lab, participants playedeither with friends or with strangers. Experiment 2 replicated the relationshipbetween IOS and team-reasoning in strangers but not in friends. Instead,friends’ behavior was related to their expectations of what theirpartners would do. A hierarchical cluster analysis showed that 46.4% ofstrangers played a team reasoning strategy, compared to 20.6% of friends. Wesuggest that the strangers who group identify may have been team reasoning butfriends may have tried to use their superior knowledge of their partners to tryto predict their strategy.
Chapter 4, “Ritual Assemblies and the Geopolitics of Zhou Expansion” acknowledges that the early Zhou kings conducted several major, state-level events that combined individual ritual techniques into narrative sequences depicting various potential ways of relating to their political project. This chapter examines how the royal house deployed such events as part of an integrative strategy of ritual suited to the geopolitical environment of the early Western Zhou period.
Chapter 2, “The Ritual Figuration of the Zhou Kings” examines the surviving records of a few rare but important ritual techniques that posed symbolic arguments about the relationship of the Zhou king to the social order and the natural world. The details of their implementation, as the chapter shows, reveal an effort to refigure the Zhou kings as qualitatively different from their contemporaries, with a special relationship to the natural world and its products.
In this concluding chapter, I first bring the story up to date by briefly considering influential developments since the 1990s, especially theories of governance and theories of group identity, which variously reiterate the problem of social order. I then argue that instead of positing, again and again, social order as a presupposition for political inquiry, social order should be turned into an object of political inquiry. To that end, I conclude, we may well need other conceptual and theoretical resources than those provided by the tradition of social science that is the subject of this book. Accepting the social ontology of complexity and diversity on which this tradition has been predicated does not compel us to keep relying on concepts and theories marked by the problem of social order.
The roles language played in shaping and articulating one’s identity in Greco-Roman and Jewish antiquity constitute a backdrop against which the new developments attested in early Christianity can be measured. The ways in which foreign language speakers appeared in the Jewish Bible and Classical literature provided tropes, references, and allusions widely employed by early Christian authors. The chapter starts with an analysis of ancient Greek literary, historical, and philosophical compositions, from Homer to Aristotle, and investigates why the thought universe of the Classical Greek literati was virtually monolingual. It then proceeds to an overview of developments in the Hellenistic and early Roman eras and traces how the monolingual antiquity of Classical Greece gradually became the bilingual universe of the Roman empire, where Latin always shared its prestigious status as a vehicle of culture with Greek. The final section focuses on how early Jewish traditions depicted foreign languages and their speakers and how this culture adapted multilingual self-expression. In the conclusion, we discuss why language was rarely a decisive factor of group identity in these cultures and problematize the idea that the presence of linguistic differences by itself is a sufficient factor to trigger the processes of identity consolidation and objectification.
Theories of democracy all insist on some basic conditions in order for citizens to hold their elected officials accountable. One of the first ones to mention is an openness to new information about the world that might influence beliefs about a politician’s performance, character, intelligence and the like. In recent decades, BPS has discovered that this basic assumption is regularly violated. Citizens and elites often resist new and credible information in favor of their existing beliefs and viewpoints even when they would greatly benefit from updating those stands. In this chapter, we review a related set of theories captured under the umbrella of motivated reasoning that attempts to understand why, exploring the role of cognitive dissonance, self-esteem, and group identity in shaping individuals’ goals when processing information. While the field has no concrete answers yet, we at least have begun to estimate the often dire consequences of arguing from our existing attitudes to our perceptions of the world – top-down processing – instead of the other way around.
A Black middle class has emerged in many Latin American countries. Yet given the fluidity of Black identity, it is unclear if socioeconomic gains will result in the consolidation of a Black middle-class group identity with a sense of political responsibility or purpose. In this article, we use qualitative interviews with twenty-two Black professionals in Cali, Colombia, plus a small convenience survey, to explore the following research questions: Does the intersection of being Black and middle class cohere into a group identity? If so, does it translate into a Black political consciousness? And if not, what are the obstacles? We find that while respondents individually identify with a Black middle-class label, they do not experience it as a group that feels symbolic bonds of attachment or acts in a coordinated or mutually cognizant manner. It is a category without shape or coherence. It is amorphous. There are four primary explanations for Black middle class amorphism: the absence of shared or positive markers of collective Black identity; a lack of organizational infrastructure; taboos against organizing along racial lines in the workplace; and a strong individualist ethos towards protecting opportunities and enhancing personal status. We situate our findings within the field of Black politics to discuss what might be lost or gained by this amorphism.
Chapter Three, “Crowds and Transformation,” synthesizes concepts of self-recovery, play, and collective intellect to explore what transformative tools and practices crowds were developing (in modernist fictional worlds) in order to identify and represent themselves, or to have as tactical weapons during their conflicts with elite authority. Conventional identity is creatively reworked by disarticulated performances such as Clarissa’s or the unnamed Captain in The Secret Sharer. The chapter maps mechanisms that produce modernity’s porous and transmissible social mind, exemplified in readings of Jacob’s Room and “Ithaca,” for example. Historical examples of street demonstrations and popular movements in the first decades of the twentieth century in England and Ireland are compared with readings of the permeable and suggestible crowds of “Wandering Rocks” and Wyndham Lewis’ writings, to differentiate what the book identifies as rising crowds from Lewis’ crowds of “extinction.” Finally, the chapter transitions to the concept of crowdedness as an ethical experience.
Climate change poses a profound challenge to human well-being and the very foundation of social justice and human rights. This chapter applies a psychological lens to understand the impacts of and responses to climate change at individual and societal levels. We describe the dire mental health implications of climate change impacts, which cause trauma and uproot lives, destabilize socioeconomic and governance institutions, exacerbate inequality by disproportionately impacting vulnerable communities, and spur conflict through resource scarcity and uncertainty. We examine group identity and belonging dynamics driving societal conflict, including competition over resources; scapegoating, hate crimes, and exclusionary politics; ethnic and political strife surrounding immigration; and political polarization and the rise of far-right parties – and consider their human rights implications. We then explore the psychology of climate inaction. Our moral judgment system is unable to grapple with a psychologically distant threat whose cause is endemic to the foundation of society. Motivated reasoning processes, including identity-protective cognition and system justification, contribute to moral disengagement and resistance to direly needed systemic changes. We offer psychologically informed approaches for overcoming inaction through communication, solution design, and empowerment. Finally, we overview international climate efforts, with a focus on the UN 2030 Global Agenda for Sustainable Development.
A well-functioning democracy requires a degree of mutual respect and a willingness to talk across political divides. Yet numerous studies have shown that many electorates are polarized along partisan lines, with animosity towards the partisan out-group. This article further develops the idea of affective polarization, not by partisanship, but instead by identification with opinion-based groups. Examining social identities formed during Britain's 2016 referendum on European Union membership, the study uses surveys and experiments to measure the intensity of partisan and Brexit-related affective polarization. The results show that Brexit identities are prevalent, felt to be personally important and cut across traditional party lines. These identities generate affective polarization as intense as that of partisanship in terms of stereotyping, prejudice and various evaluative biases, convincingly demonstrating that affective polarization can emerge from identities beyond partisanship.