Chapter 12 shows that the Covid-19 emergency and the ensuing suspension of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and its sanctioning mechanisms in 2020 led to crucial changes in the EU’s new economic governance (NEG) regime. For example, the transnational distribution of EU funds, institutionalised by the EU’s Recovery and Resilience Fund (RRF) Regulation in 2021, meant that the post-Covid NEG regime no longer mimicked the divisive beggar-thy-neighbour tools that transnational corporations use to steer their subsidiaries and workforce. Even so, EU executives continue to direct the post-Covid NEG regime without much participation by national parliaments and the European parliament or unions and social movements. Instead of using the financial sanctions of the suspended SGP, EU executives use the policy conditionalities attached to RRF funding to reach their objectives, which are in keeping with the overarching commodification script.

Chapter 7 shows that EU leaders had already started in the 1980s to steer the trajectory of national public services in a commodifying direction. The commodifying pressures from direct EU interventions reached a peak in 2004 with the Commission’s draft Services Directive, which failed to become law because of unprecedented transnational protest movements. After the financial crisis however, the EU’s shift to its new economic governance (NEG) regime empowered EU executives to pursue public service commodification by new means. Our analysis reveals that the NEG prescriptions on public services for Germany, Italy, Ireland, and Romania consistently pointed in a commodifying direction, by demanding both a curtailment of public resources for public services and the marketisation of public services. Although our analysis uncovers some decommodifying prescriptions, namely, quantitative ones calling for more investment at the end of the 2010s, they were usually justified with policy rationales subordinated to NEG’s commodification script.

In Chapter 4, we identified commodification as the policy orientation most relevant to our analysis of the nexus between EU economic governance and labour politics and developed a corresponding novel analytical framework to assess new economic governance (NEG) prescriptions in the areas of employment relations and public services. Before engaging in this assessment however, we need to understand the prescriptions’ meaning, for which we must make an additional analytical move. The meaning of NEG policy prescriptions depends not only on their wording but also on their location in larger policy scripts and their uneven coercive power across countries, time, and policy areas. Hence, NEG prescriptions are embedded in larger semantic fields and taxonomies, in power struggles over the definition of appropriate solutions to social problems, and in the EU’s integrated but also uneven political economy. Chapter 5 thus first explains the semantic, communicative, and policy contexts in which we situate NEG prescriptions and then outlines the implications of this analytical move for our research design, including case selection, data collection, and comparative approach.

Chapter 8 traces the EU governance of transport services from the Treaty of Rome to the new economic governance (NEG) regime adopted by the EU after the 2008 financial crisis. Initially, European public sector advocates were able to shield transport from commodification, but, over time, the Commission gradually advanced a commodification agenda one transport modality after another. Sometimes, however, the Commission’s draft liberalisation laws encountered enduring resistance and recurrent transnational protests by transport workers, leading the European Parliament and Council to curb the commodification bent of the Commission’s draft directives. After 2008 however, NEG provided EU executives with new means to circumvent resistance. Despite their country-specific methodology, all qualitative NEG prescriptions on transport services issued to Germany, Italy, Ireland, and Romania pointed towards commodification. But the more the Commission succeeded in commodifying transport services, the more the nature of counter-mobilisations changed. Accordingly, the European Transport Workers’ Federation’s Fair Transport European Citizens’ Initiative no longer targeted vertical EU interventions, but rather the social dumping pressures created by the horizontal free movement of services and fellow transport workers. This target made joint transnational collective action more difficult.

Chapter 6 shows that workers’ wages and employment relations were, until the 2008 crisis, shaped by horizontal market pressures rather than direct political vertical EU interventions in the labour policy area. That changed radically after the EU’s shift to its new economic governance (NEG) regime. We found that the EU’s NEG prescriptions on wage levels, collective bargaining, and hiring and firing mechanisms followed a consistent trajectory that furthered the commodification of labour in Italy, Ireland, and Romania, but less so in Germany. Instead, Germany received decommodifying NEG prescriptions on wage policy that were linked to a rebalance-the-EU-economy policy rationale. Although this policy rationale was still compatible with NEG’s overarching commodifying script, the diverging policy orientation of prescriptions in this area across countries made it hard for unions to challenge NEG transnationally.

Chapter 11 compares the policy orientation of the EU’s new economic governance (NEG) prescriptions in two policy areas (employment relations, public services), three sectors (transport, water, healthcare), four countries (Germany, Italy, Ireland, Romania) from 2009 to 2019. It reveals that almost all qualitative prescriptions pointed in a commodifying direction. Most quantitative prescriptions tasked governments to curtail wages and public expenditures too, but, over time, they not only became less coercive but also increasingly pointed in a decommodifying direction, tasking governments to invest more. It would, however, still be wrong to speak of a socialisation of NEG, not just given the decommodifying prescriptions’ weak coercive power but also because of their links to policy rationales that are compatible with NEG’s overarching commodification script. Moreover, Chapter 11 shows that NEG prescriptions tasked governments to channel more public resources into the allegedly more productive sectors (transport and water services) rather than into essential social services like healthcare. Given NEG’s country-specific methodology, it is not surprising that there have been only few instances of transnational action on specific NEG prescriptions. By contrast, the share of transnational labour protests targeting EU interventions broadly defined increased after 2008. This suggests that NEG has been altering protest landscapes.

Chapter 4 first reviews earlier studies of the EU’s new economic governance (NEG) regime and discusses the methodological challenges that they pose for the assessment of NEG documents. Earlier studies of NEG policy prescriptions flattened the semantic relationships between the different terms used in them and the power relations between the actors involved in their production. We therefore outline a novel research design that accounts for the links between the policy orientation of NEG prescriptions and the material interests of concrete social groups as well as the hierarchical ordering of NEG prescriptions in larger policy scripts unevenly deployed across countries, time, and policy areas. We address the first point in Chapter 4 and the second in Chapter 5. In 4.2, we identify commodification as the most relevant dimension for analysing the nexus between EU economic governance and labour politics. In 4.3, we operationalise the concepts of commodification and decommodification in employment relations and public services and outline the analytical framework against which we assess the policy orientation of the EU’s NEG prescriptions in the policy areas of employment relations and public services.

Chapter 9 analyses the EU governance of water and the countervailing mobilisations against its commodification. Initially, European law decommodified water services through the harmonisation of quality standards that took them out of regulatory competition between member states. However, from the 1990s onwards, the Commission repeatedly attempted to commodify water through liberalising EU laws. When these attempts failed, EU executives tried to advance commodification by new means, namely, through the EU’s new economic governance (NEG) prescriptions. Our analysis revealed that all qualitative prescriptions on water services issued from 2009 to 2019 to Germany, Ireland, Italy, and Romania called for their marketisation, despite recent calls to increase public investment. Like preceding attempts by draft EU directives, the NEG’s consistent commodification script triggered transnational protests by unions and social movements that defended water as a human right and as a public service, namely, under the banner of the successful Right2Water European Citizens’ Initiative.

Chapter 10 traces the EU governance of health services and its discontents. The first European interventions in the health sector facilitated mobile workers’ access to health services in their host countries, thereby decommodifying cross-border care, albeit by recourse to solidaristic mechanisms situated at national rather than EU level. Since the 1990s however, European horizontal market pressures and EU public deficit criteria have led governments to curtail healthcare spending and to introduce marketising reforms. Thereafter, healthcare became a target of EU competition and free movement of services law. In 2006, transnational collective action of trade unions and social movements moved EU legislators to drop healthcare from the scope of the draft EU Services Directive. After the financial crisis of 2008 however, EU executives pursued commodification of healthcare through new means, as shown by our analysis of their new economic governance (NEG) prescriptions for Germany, Italy, Ireland, and Romania. Even when commodifying prescriptions were on occasion accompanied by decommodifying ones, the latter remained subordinated to the former. Although NEG’s country-specific methodology hampered transnational protests, the overarching commodification script of NEG prescriptions led not only to transnational protests by the European Federation of Public Service Unions, but also to the formation of the European Network against the Privatisation and Commercialisation of Health and Social Protection, which unites unionists and social-movement activists.

Chapter 2 gives scholars and students across disciplines, but also policymakers, trade unionists, and social movement activists, a clear account of the arcane new economic governance (NEG) regime that European Union leaders adopted after 2008. The chapter avoids jargonistic academic language as well as the Euro-speak of the EU’s economic governance documents when describing the setup and operation of the NEG regime. This is important if one wants to understand its internal contradictions and change the operation and policy direction of the EU’s NEG regime.

This chapter considers Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Nineteen States currently have the euro as their currency. EMU is built around three pillars. There is, first, an independent European Central Bank with the exclusive right to authorise the issue of the euro. It has also developed extensive powers to purchase large amounts of securities to stimulate weak economic performance in part of the euro area, and of prudential supervision over credit institutions within the euro area. States not participating in the euro are not bound by its decisions. Secondly, States commit not to incur excessive deficits, to run balanced budgets over the medium term and to correct macroeconomic imbalances. Euro area States can be subject to heavy sanctions for not meeting their obligations. Thirdly, there is coordination of domestic economic policy. The central arena for oversight of much of this is the European Semester for Economic Policy Coordination. There, the EU Institutions assess domestic economic and fiscal performance as well as performance in the fields of social policy and climate change, with recommendations to be implemented by States in their budgets in the subsequent year.

The euro crisis has brought about remarkable changes in the economic governance of the European Union (EU) and consequently in the ways the executives can be held to account. By focusing on the interactions between national parliament and government in Poland, the fifth-largest EU member state by population, this chapter discusses debates concerning the EU annual cycle of fiscal and economic surveillance - the European Semester, related in particular to its most important element – the Country Specific Recommendations (CSRs). The goal of this paper is to assess how parliamentary scrutiny affects the level of implementation of CSRs. The positions of Members of Parliament (MPs) towards CSRs and connected arguments expressed in parliamentary discussions are explained by applying an analytical framework of justification and contestation as two basic forms of accountability. On accountability dimension, most questions, which were asked by both majority and opposition MPs, fall within the justification category in which the demands for explanation or information from the representatives from two ministries responsible for finance and development were made. On the efficiency dimension, one can hardly see any link at all as the scrutiny of the CSRs has a limited impact on their implementation.

This chapter provides the volumes general conceptual framework. It begins by addressing why new approaches to accountability are needed, arguing that accountability literature has reached a stalemate as a result of an impasse between deductive and inductive approaches to accountability in the EU. It then argues that overcoming the stalemate requires developing a generalised framework of what accountability is for, deriving four accountability goods to be used in subsequent chapters. The chapter argues that each of the goods can be delivered in procedural or substantive ways, focusing either on the process by which decisions are made or the substantive worth of decisions themselves. The chapter concludes by discussing the strengths and weaknesses of both varieties of accountability before mapping out how the concepts will be applied across policy fields and institutions in subsequent chapters.

As the most powerful executive actor in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the Eurogroup has faced continuous demands to improve its accountability record since the euro crisis. One reform introduced to meet these demands were the Economic Dialogue – a regular exchange of views between the European Parliament and the President of the Eurogroup designed to ‘ensure greater transparency and accountability’ in the EMU. This chapter investigates the practical functioning of the Economic Dialogues with the Eurogroup between 2013 and the 2019 European Parliament elections. Applying the theoretical framework of the introduction, the purpose is to examine the extent to which the Parliament focuses on procedural or substantive accountability when questioning the Eurogroup President. Moreover, the chapter investigates the reasoning of parliamentary questions in line with the four accountability goods identified at the outset (openness, non-arbitrariness, effectiveness, and publicness). The findings show that Members of the European Parliament are eager to question the extent to which Eurogroup decisions are substantively open and effective, and to a lesser extent whether they are arbitrary or protect EU interests more generally. The analysis is based on fourteen transcripts of Economic Dialogues with the Eurogroup President, which took place between 2013 and 2019.

Chapter 7 examines whether the fiscal governance architecture enacted since the crisis is reconcilable with the constitutional boundaries of member state fiscal sovereignty underlying the EU legal order as a whole. It conducts a piece-by-piece deconstruction of the European governance framework to identify instruments which trespass on ultra vires and constitutional identity rulings of national constitutional courts. It finds that the new architecture is dependent, for its stable functioning, on instruments which are beyond the boundaries of the EU legal order and profess to bind national legislators in economic/fiscal policy, contrary to member state constitutional identity jurisprudence. By restricting fiscal autonomy and providing bailouts, the EU has sunk the foundation stones of a unitary model that is manifestly incompatible with the constitutional jurisprudence of its twenty-eight member states catalogued in this book. This is not only legally unsound, but economically ineffective and injurious to good principles of fiscal federalism.