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When the information of many individuals is pooled, the resulting aggregate often is a good predictor of unknown quantities or facts. This aggregate predictor frequently outperforms the forecasts of experts or even the best individual forecast included in the aggregation process (“wisdom of crowds”). However, an appropriate aggregation mechanism is considered crucial to reaping the benefits of a “wise crowd”. Of the many possible ways to aggregate individual forecasts, we compare (uncensored and censored) arithmetic and geometric mean and median, continuous double auction market prices and sealed bid-offer call market prices in a controlled experiment. We use an asymmetric information structure, where participants know different sub-sets of the total information needed to exactly calculate the asset value to be estimated. We find that prices from continuous double auction markets clearly outperform all alternative approaches for aggregating dispersed information and that information lets only the best-informed participants generate excess returns.
In a Diamond–Dybvig type model of financial intermediation, we allow depositors to announce at a positive cost to subsequent depositors that they keep their funds deposited in the bank. Theoretically, the mere availability of public announcements (and not its use) ensures that no bank run is the unique equilibrium outcome. Multiple equilibria—including bank run—exist without such public announcements. We test the theoretical results in the lab and find a widespread use of announcements, which we interpret as an attempt to coordinate on the no bank run outcome. Withdrawal rates in general are lower in information sets that contain announcements.
Asymmetric distribution of information, while omnipresent in real markets, is rarely considered in experimental financial markets. We present results from experiments where subjects endogenously choose between five information levels (four of them costly). We find that (i) uninformed traders earn the highest net returns, while average informed traders always perform worst even when information costs are not considered; (ii) over time traders learn to pick the most advantageous information levels (full information or no information); and (iii) market efficiency decreases with higher information costs. These results are mostly in line with the theoretical predictions of Grossman and Stiglitz (Am. Econ. Rev. 70:393-408, 1980) and provide additional insights that studies with only two information levels cannot deliver.
To investigate whether attention responds rationally to strategic incentives, we experimentally implement a buyer-seller game in which a fully informed seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to a buyer who faces cognitive costs to process information about the offer's value. We isolate the impact of seller strategies on buyer attention by exogenously varying the seller's outside option, which leads sellers to price high more often. We find that buyers respond by making fewer mistakes conditional on value, which suggests that buyers exert higher attentional effort in response to the increased strategic incentives for paying attention. We show that a standard model of rational inattention based on Shannon mutual information cannot fully explain this change in buyer behavior. However, we identify another class of rational inattention models consistent with this behavioral pattern.
We conduct a lab experiment to investigate an important corporate prediction market setting: A manager needs information about the state of a project, which workers have, in order to make a state-dependent decision. Workers can potentially reveal this information by trading in a corporate prediction market. We test two different market designs to determine which provides more information to the manager and leads to better decisions. We also investigate the effect of top-down advice from the market designer to participants on how the prediction market is intended to function. Our results show that the theoretically superior market design performs worse in the lab—in terms of manager decisions—without top-down advice. With advice, manager decisions improve and both market designs perform similarly well, although the theoretically superior market design features less mis-pricing. We provide a behavioral explanation for the failure of the theoretical predictions and discuss implications for corporate prediction markets in the field.
We provide experimental evidence on the ability to detect deceit in a buyer–seller game with asymmetric information. Sellers have private information about the value of a good and sometimes have incentives to mislead buyers. We examine if buyers can spot deception in face-to-face encounters. We vary whether buyers can interrogate the seller and the contextual richness. The buyers’ prediction accuracy is above chance, and is substantial for confident buyers. There is no evidence that the option to interrogate is important and only weak support that contextual richness matters. These results show that the information asymmetry is partly eliminated by people’s ability to spot deception.
A dataset does not speak for itself, and model assumptions can drive results just as much as the data. Limited transparency about model assumptions creates a problem of asymmetric information between analyst and reader. This chapter shows how we need better methods for robust results.
Multiverse analysis is not simply a computational method but also a philosophy of science. In this chapter we explore its core tenets and historical foundations. We discuss the foundational principle of transparency in the history of science and argue that multiverse analysis brings social science back into alignment with this core founding ideal. We make connections between this framework and multiverse concepts developed in cosmology and quantum physics.
In chapter 7, Releasing the BIS credit (May 29 - June 5), the BIS credit of 150 million schilling is released to the ANB as a moratorium is averted and a guarantee. Meantime, the issue of an Austrian government loan, re-emerges and it becomes clear that the French may not be able to or wanting to take the lead in organizing the loan. In Basel, the BIS is getting ready for the upcoming board and governors’ meeting, where the decision about another credit to the ANB will have to be discussed. Rodd prepares several notes and a plan for the meeting.
We study a signaling game between an employer and a potential employee, where the employee has private information regarding their production capacity. At the initial stage, the employee communicates a salary claim, after which the true production capacity is gradually revealed to the employer as the unknown drift of a Brownian motion representing the revenues generated by the employee. Subsequently, the employer has the possibility to choose a time to fire the employee in case the estimated production capacity falls short of the salary. In this setup, we use filtering and optimal stopping theory to derive an equilibrium in which the employee provides a randomized salary claim and the employer uses a threshold strategy in terms of the conditional probability for the high production capacity. The analysis is robust in the sense that various extensions of the basic model can be solved using the same methodology, including cases with positive firing costs, incomplete information about an individual’s own type, as well as an additional interview phase.
Chapter 8 delves into the complexities introduced by asymmetric information, where some contestants possess more information than others, or neither of the contestants has complete information about the characteristics of the others. The chapter examines contests in which the true common value of the prize may be unknown to certain contestants, such as an incumbent having a better understanding of the value of office than a challenger, or a current resource owner having more information about its true value than potential entrants. It also examines situations where no contestant has complete information about the value assigned for each contestant to the prize, such as companies competing to develop a new product or technology. Each company knows its own valuation of the potential market but does not know the competitor’s valuation. The chapter also analyzes the existence and properties of equilibrium and other related questions, such as the following: How do outcomes in complete and incomplete information scenarios compare? Should a well-informed planner disclose information to maximize total effort in a contest involving both informed and uninformed contestants?
Contest theory is an important part of game theory used to analyse different types of contests and conflicts. Traditional microeconomic models focus on situations where property rights are well defined, and agents voluntarily trade rights over goods or produce rights for new goods. However, much less focus has been given to other situations where agents do not trade property rights, but rather fight over them. Contests: Theory and Applications presents a state-of-the art discussion of the economics of contests from the perspective of both core theory and applications. It provides a new approach to standard topics in labour, education, welfare and development and introduces areas like voting, industrial organisation, mechanism design, sport, and military conflict. Using elementary mathematics, this book provides a versatile framework for navigating this growing area of study and serves as an essential resource for its wide variety of applications in economics and political science.
Human minds are particularly biased when processing information in digital environments. Behavioral economics has highlighted many cognitive biases that afflict our economic decision making. We may choose people like ourselves for important jobs or we may focus on irrelevant characteristics. We may also focus on recent, available information because our brains interpret that as more relevant for the current situation, whereas, optimally, we might benefit from a deeper dive into collecting more representative or comprehensive data and analyzing it appropriately. Even the way information is presented influences whether we believe it. Designers of digital content and experiences need to be aware of and account for such biases when engaging users.
Online marketplaces have permeated many aspects of our lives, as we use them to procure goods and services of all sorts, and many have relied on them during the COVID-19 lockdowns. Both sides of the market must feel comfortable trusting each other for online marketplaces to thrive, and for that, they need to have safeguards that alleviate the problems caused by asymmetric information. In this chapter I explain how feedback and reputation systems work in practice, and how they support ecommerce in online marketplaces. It starts by covering the theory behind reputation mechanisms and how they support more efficient trade, followed by descriptions of the actual working of typical online feedback and reputation systems. A survey of empirical findings from a host of papers is presented that explore how reputation works in actual online marketplaces, and how these relate to the theory. I then highlight some of the shortcomings of feedback systems and offer some suggestions and considerations for the future design of feedback and reputation systems that can augment their effectiveness.
Chapter 3 lays out the book’s central theory as well as the theory’s observable implications. It argues that powerful producers seek to use their privileged knowledge of the risks and benefits of their products (and regulators’ dependence on that knowledge) to systematically push their own out-of-patent products and those of generic sellers off the market via regulation, in favor of more expensive, patented alternatives. Producers accomplish this first by strategically revealing negative information about out-of-patent products as a means of convincing regulators that these products require stricter regulations. Second, producers support regulatory institutions that require existing products to be reevaluated under a precautionary standard, meaning that failure to prove an existing product is safe leads to the assumption it is dangerous. These precautionary institutions help innovative producers eliminate out-of-patent products more systematically, allowing them to acquire stricter standards not via the provision of damaging information, which carries some reputational risks, but through the withholding of favorable information. This chapter also lays out expectations for where we might expect these precautionary institutions to be adopted, given the distribution of preferences across countries, and it shows why such precautionary institutions should tend to be supported by developed countries and opposed by developing ones. Finally, the chapter argues that because international standard-setters ought to be susceptible to the same sorts of information problems as domestic regulators, and given the distribution of national power within these organizations, we can expect international standard-setters to replicate the precautionary institutional preferences of their wealthier members. We can additionally expect this to create the same tendency on the part of international standard-setters to arbitrarily impose stricter standards on more affordable products, despite the fact that this creates trade barriers that disadvantage poorer members and that directly conflict with these standard-setters’ stated mission.
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the book. Motivating the book with examples of various regulatory barriers to agricultural trade that have proven particularly contentious, this chapter asks what might explain these barriers and whether we should expect current international solutions to resolve them. The chapter provides a brief overview of the book’s argument regarding how producers leverage private information to acquire the sorts of regulatory barriers that the opening examples describe. In addition, it previews the book’s main contribution and gives a brief chapter outline.
This chapter sets the stage for the remainder of the book by providing a broad overview of the sorts of information asymmetries that exist between producers of potentially dangerous products and those who are tasked with regulating them. Leveraging insights from a diverse set of industries -- aerospace, direct-to-consumer products, pharmaceuticals, and industrial chemicals -- and spanning a wide range of countries, this chapter establishes the surprising degree to which regulators not only are at a disadvantage relative to firms when it comes to acquiring information about product risk but also, as a result, depend on firms to be the primary source of information required to regulate. The chapter then investigates the conditions under which this might allow producers to influence the timing and direction of regulatory change. After establishing the pervasiveness of information asymmetries and dependencies at the domestic level, as well as the resulting opportunities for regulatory bias, the chapter demonstrates why we should expect the very same information asymmetries and biases to be replicated and even exacerbated at the international level.
When governments impose stringent regulations that impede domestic competition and international trade, should we conclude that this is a deliberate attempt to protect industry or an honest effort to protect the population? Regulating Risk offers a third possibility: that these regulations reflect producers' ability to exploit private information. Combining extensive data and qualitative evidence from the pesticide, pharmaceutical, and chemical sectors, the book demonstrates how companies have exploited product safety information to win stricter standards on less profitable products for which they offer a more profitable alternative. Companies have additionally supported regulatory institutions that, while intended to protect the public, also help companies use information to eliminate less profitable products more systematically, creating barriers to commerce that disproportionally disadvantage developing countries. These dynamics play out not only domestically but also internationally, under organizations charged with providing objective regulatory recommendations. The result has been the global legitimization of biased regulatory rules.
After establishing why people migrate, in this chapter we turn to an investigation of how migrants economically re-engage with their homeland. Specifically, we explore how migrants facilitate flows of international financial capital. We argue that migrants, because they possess critical knowledge about investment opportunities in their homelands, help international investors overcome information asymmetries which drives both portfolio and foreign direct investment into their homelands. Our empirical analyses leverage a wide range of data on migrant stocks and portfolio and foreign direct investment to test our argument. We find that migrants are key to explaining international capital flows, especially in environments where formal political institutions that protect property rights are absent or weak.
In markets with asymmetric information, only sellers have knowledge about the quality of goods. Sellers may of course make a declaration of the quality, but unless there are sanctions imposed on false declarations or reputations are at stake, such declarations are tantamount to cheap talk. Nonetheless, in an experimental study we find that most people make honest declarations, which is in line with recent findings that lies damaging another party are costly in terms of the liar's utility. Moreover, we find in this experimental market that deceptive sellers offer lower prices than honest sellers, which could possibly be explained by the same wish to limit the damage to the other party. However, when the recipient of the offer is a social tie we find no evidence for lower prices of deceptive offers, which seems to indicate that the rationale for the lower price in deceptive offers to strangers is in fact profit-seeking (by making the deal more attractive) rather than moral.