Appendix 6.A.1
Here, I will present the results of the different models in more detail.
Table 6.A.1.1 presents the results of the heteroskedastic regression for fundamental amendments. Table 6.A.1.2 gives the results of the combination of fundamental and major amendments. Table 6.A.1.3 presents the results of all amendments.
Table 6.A.1.1 Results of the heteroskedastic regression for fundamental amendments (POLITY2 ≥ 5)
| Null model | Mean-only model | Het. regression | |
|---|---|---|---|
| n | 103 | 103 | 103 |
| Dependent variable: the fundamental amendment rate | |||
| (Intercept) | 0.043 *** | 0.117 ** | 0.089 *** |
| (0.011) | (0.037) | (0.026) | |
| Veto players constitutional rigidity | –0.082 * | –0.057 * | |
| (0.039) | (0.024) | ||
| Dependent variable: the log-squared residuals of the OLS regression of the fundamental amendment rate on veto players constitutional rigidity | |||
| (Intercept) | –4.408 *** | –0.189 | |
| (0.139) | (0.468) | ||
| Veto players constitutional rigidity | –5.616 *** | ||
| (0.502) | |||
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.
Table 6.A.1.2 Results of the heteroskedastic regression for the combination of fundamental and major amendments (POLITY2 ≥ 5)
| Null model | Mean-only model | Het. regression | |
|---|---|---|---|
| n | 103 | 103 | 103 |
| Dependent variable: the major and fundamental amendment rate | |||
| (Intercept) | 0.117 *** | 0.249 *** | 0.254 *** |
| (0.015) | (0.051) | (0.050) | |
| Veto players constitutional rigidity | –0.148 ** | –0.152 ** | |
| (0.055) | (0.046) | ||
| Dependent variable: the log-squared residuals of the OLS regression of the major and fundamental amendment rate on veto players constitutional rigidity | |||
| (Intercept) | –3.720 *** | –2.110 *** | |
| (0.139) | (0.515) | ||
| Veto players constitutional rigidity | –2.016 *** | ||
| (0.556) | |||
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.
Table 6.A.1.3 Results of the heteroskedastic regression on all amendments (POLITY2 ≥ 5)
| Null model | Mean-only model | Het. regression | |
|---|---|---|---|
| n | 103 | 103 | 103 |
| Dependent variable: the all amendment rate | |||
| (Intercept) | 0.253 *** | 0.506 *** | 0.519 *** |
| (0.025) | (0.084) | (0.084) | |
| Veto players constitutional rigidity | –0.284 ** | –0.298 *** | |
| (0.090) | (0.084) | ||
| Dependent variable: the log-squared residuals of the OLS regression of all amendment rate on veto players constitutional rigidity | |||
| (Intercept) | –2.714 *** | –2.022 *** | |
| (0.139) | (0.515) | ||
| Veto players constitutional rigidity | –0.910 | ||
| (0.557) | |||
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.
Figure 6.A.1.1 gives the graphic representation of fundamental amendments. Figure 6.A.1.2 presents the fundamental and major amendments. (The graphic representation of all amendments is presented in the main text as Figure 6.2).
Figure 6.A.1.1 The effect of constitutional rigidity on the rate of fundamental amendments (amendments of constitutions in effect in 2013 in all democratic countries)
Figure 6.A.1.2 The effect of constitutional rigidity on the rate of significant and fundamental amendments (amendments of constitutions in effect in 2013 in all democratic countries)
Open access