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China's Diplomacy and International Law. By Huikang Huang. Singapore: Springer, 2024. Pp. xvii, 384.

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China's Diplomacy and International Law. By Huikang Huang. Singapore: Springer, 2024. Pp. xvii, 384.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 April 2025

Julian Ku*
Affiliation:
Deane School of Law at Hofstra University

Abstract

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Type
Book Reviews
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of American Society of International Law

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References

1 U.S. Dept. of State Press Release, Anthony J. Blinken, Sec'y of State, The Administration's Approach to the People's Republic of China (May 26, 2022), at https://2021-2025.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china.

2 See also Opening Remarks by Secretary of State-Designate Marco Rubio Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Jan. 21, 2025), at https://china.usembassy-china.org.cn/opening-remarks-by-secretary-of-state-designate-marco-rubio-before-the-senate-foreign-relations-committee (“We welcomed the Chinese Communist Party into the global order, and they took advantage of all of its benefits and they ignored all of its obligations and responsibilities.”).

3 Blinken Press Release, supra note 1.

4 The most comprehensive academic discussion in English on this topic is: Congyan Cai, The Rise of China and International Law: Taking Chinese Exceptionalism Seriously (2019); Jiangyu Wang & Huaer Cheng, China's Approach to International Law: From Traditional Westphalianism to Aggressive Instrumentalism in the Xi Jinping Era (2022).

5 See 黄惠康, 中国特色大国外交与国际法 (2019).

6 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China Press Release, Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on December 1, 2014.

7 This term is also translated as, “a community with a shared future for mankind” (“人类命运共同体”).

8 Julian Ku, China Has Ditched Its Own Principles to Back Russia, For. Pol'y (Apr. 7, 2022) (reviewing China's practice of condemning U.S. use of force and comparing it to its silence on Russia).

9 See Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States Press Release, Wang Yi Meets with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (Oct. 16, 2023), at http://us.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng./zgyw/202310/t20231017_11162141.htm (stating with respect to Israel-Palestine conflict that “China condemns all acts that harm civilians and opposes any violation of international law”).

10 Huang alleges, without citation, that Yanai improperly dismissed an arbitrator on the panel due to trumped-up conflict of interest claims. He fails to note that Yanai (who he dismisses as a “rightist hawk”) was only empowered to appoint all of the arbitrators because China refused to participate in the proceeding and exercise its right to appoint two of the five arbitrators. For a fuller discussion, see Julian Ku, China's Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Casually Slanders the South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal, Opinio Juris (July 26, 2016), at http://opiniojuris.org/2016/07/26/chinas-vice-minister-for-foreign-affairs-casually-slanders-the-south-china-sea-arbitral-tribunal.

11 China Begins Patrolling Boundary of Its “Nine-Dash Line"” Claim, Maritime Executive (Jan. 12, 2025), at https :// maritime-executive.com/article/china-begins-patrolling-boundary-of-its-nine-dash-line-claim.

12 Julian Ku, China's Legal Scholars Are Less Credible After South China Sea Ruling, For. Pol'y (July 14, 2016) (noting that China's leading association of international law scholars voted unanimously to reject the South China Sea award).