1.1 The Problem of Evil

The philosophical problem of evil falls into two subproblems that employ different strategies: the logical problem and the evidential problem (Reference Peterson, Hasker, Reichenbach and BasingerPeterson et al. 2009: 145–154). A philosophical “problem” is an argument where the starting premises have credibility and the conclusion derived from those premises challenges the belief claims of their philosophical opponents.

The logical problem of evil argues the very strong claim that it is logically impossible for God and evil to coexist. The evidential problem of evil argues the weaker claim that evidence of evil in the world makes it unlikely God exists. The evils referred to in these problems fall into two broad categories: moral evil and natural evil. Moral evil is associated with wrongful or hurtful actions of either free human beings or other moral agents and can include acts such as murder, betrayal, theft, and attributes like dishonesty, cruelty, and greed. Natural evil encompasses physical suffering resulting from impersonal nonmoral agents or processes in nature and can include pain and death caused by flood, fire, famine, disease, and disability.

1.2 The Evidential Problem of Natural Evil

In his Reference Rowe1979 essay, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” William Rowe argued against the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God as follows (336):

1. (1) There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.

2. (2) An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.

3. (3) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.

Rowe’s famous evidential problem of evil has been persuasive and widely cited throughout the philosophical literature. Critical engagement with Rowe’s argument involves assessing and addressing its two premises. Premise (1) functions as an evidential premise, a statement of perceived facts, and premise (2) serves as a theological premise, describing God’s purposes and values. Stating Rowe’s claims more explicitly:

• There is widespread suffering in nature.

• There is unnecessary suffering in nature.

• God is purportedly an omniscient, omnipotent being.

• A wholly good omniscient, omnipotent being (God) would prevent widespread and unnecessary suffering.

• God has not prevented widespread, unnecessary suffering.

• Therefore, an omnipotent, omniscient wholly good God does not exist.

Rowe adds two potential defeaters to his argument that would undermine its strength against the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient wholly good God:

• If the prevention of suffering permitted an evil equally bad or worse.

• If the prevention of suffering permitted the loss of a greater good.

For the purposes of this inquiry, the adjective “intense” will be set aside since all suffering is subjective and unquantifiable. Consequently, Rowe’s argument will be evaluated by simply considering whether there is unnecessary suffering in nature.

In evidential premise (1) of Rowe’s argument, suffering is cited as evidence that makes the nonexistence of God a reasonable conclusion that is “more probable than not.” Rowe’s essay cites natural evil as having particularly negative evidential bearing against theistic belief. As support for premise (1), Rowe describes a fawn trapped in a forest fire dying a protracted, agonizing death (Reference Rowe1979: 337). The case of “Bambi,” as it is often called, purportedly typifies the many evils occurring daily in the natural world. Rowe’s essential thrust is not the logical impossibility of theism being compatible with evil, but theism is improbable given evidence of evil. The important evidential premise (1) in the Rowe-type argument is supported by a variety of presumably factual claims about nonhuman suffering caused by natural processes like forest fires, predation, parasitism, disease, famine, or instances of what appear to be acts of animal cruelty against other animals. Such claims suggest the amount of suffering in the world has not been minimized and is instead alarmingly high. Nevertheless, while there is agreement that natural processes can cause injury to creatures’ tissues, a central associated quandary lies in whether creatures with injured tissues perceive pain identically across species. For this reason, the science behind pain perception should be a major consideration when evaluating the problem of creaturely suffering.

In theological premise (2) of Rowe’s argument, God’s priorities are implicitly assumed to include the prevention of pain and discomfort throughout creation, a position that may be called hedonistic utilitarianism for our purposes.

1.3 Indifferent Universe or Loving Judeo-Christian God?

Joining Rowe in thinking unnecessary suffering in nature is excessive, Paul Draper cites biological failure as additional support for the evidential premise regarding natural evil and makes the theological claim “a morally perfect God would strongly prefer that every sentient being flourish for a significant portion of their lives” (Reference Draper2007). He also takes a hedonistic utilitarian approach to argue a wholly good God’s goal would be to minimize suffering and maximize the biological success and pleasure of creatures (Reference Draper1989: 334–337). However, do Rowe’s and Draper’s theological claims adequately reflect either a fair biblical interpretation or theological understanding of the Judeo-Christian worldview? Early on, their theological starting assumptions appear to be based upon the materialistic and hedonistic utilitarian value systems of many nontheistic philosophers, not the love-oriented ethic associated with the Judeo-Christian God (Deut 6:5; Lev 19:18b; Matt 22:36–40; John 14:23–24; 15:12–13; Rom 12:9–17; 1 John 4:7–12; 1 Cor 13:1–7).

Adopting a similar depiction of God as Rowe, Draper claims a morally perfect, omnipotent, omniscient God (1989: 336–337):

• Could create goal-oriented creatures (including humans) without biologically necessary pain systems.

• Would maximize pleasure and minimize pain except when morally necessary.

Draper further argues the hypothesis of indifference (the atheistic worldview of an indifferent universe unconcerned with creaturely pleasure and pain) is more probable than the hypothesis of theism (the conceptual core of the Judeo-Christian worldview that revolves around God’s love for creatures). Draper’s hypothesis of indifference states “neither the nature nor the condition of sentient beings on earth is the result of benevolent or malevolent actions performed by non-human persons” (Reference Draper1989: 332). Other philosophers concur: “The hypothesis of indifference predicts the data of an apparently indifferent universe” (Reference TooleyTooley 2019: 48).

This argument strategy is known as abductive reasoning, also called inference to the best explanation. Inference to the best explanation is an evaluative procedure that weighs competing hypotheses against each other and is a familiar pattern of scientific reasoning. In such evaluations, the “best explanation” is usually determined by the hypothesis – or philosophical perspective in this case – that successfully encompasses the widest range of empirical evidence, has the greatest explanatory and predictive power, and thereby has the ability to correctly anticipate outcomes. Consequently, when considering the evidential problem of natural evil, inference to the best explanation can compare the relative explanatory power of the Judeo-Christian and atheistic worldviews.

Rowe suggests theists must be scientifically uninformed in order to believe in God, calling this point of view “friendly atheism” and asserting theists would not be rationally justified in holding to theism if they were better acquainted with the findings of science (Reference Rowe1979: 340). While it is true a better assessment of the problem of pain will be obtained if the findings of science are incorporated into the reasoning process, it is still an open question whether atheism has more explanatory power than the Judeo-Christian worldview. It is possible Rowe and Draper’s statements regarding evidence of pain in the world may, upon interaction with the scientific literature, be impressionistic at best.

2.1 Cartesian/Neo-Cartesian Defenses

Cartesian/Neo-Cartesian defenses argue animal suffering is either theologically insignificant to God or there is no credible evidence of animal pain. These approaches aim to weaken claims that animal suffering diminishes the probable existence of a wholly good omnipotent God.

The notion that animal suffering is theologically unimportant to God goes back to St. Augustine of Hippo (ca. 400 CE), who employed Stoic philosophical assumptions, not Scripture, to dismiss the suffering of animals (Reference MoritzMoritz 2014: 351). According to Augustine, animal suffering is real but theologically insignificant because animals do not have souls; souls make suffering meaningful, thus God only cares about the suffering of ensouled humans.

René Descartes developed the more modern Cartesian view of animal suffering which claims animals do not have self-conscious awareness and therefore cannot experience morally significant pain (Reference MurrayMurray 2011: 41–72; Reference DoughertyDougherty 2014: 56–95). Descartes believed animals were insentient machine-like organisms lacking the cognitive capacity to perceive pain, so their distressed responses were morally insignificant.

In contrast to the Cartesian view, neo-Cartesian approaches acknowledge animals are sentient, yet claim animals lack some other aspect of human character that enables creatures’ experiences to be considered meaningful suffering (Reference HarrisonHarrison 1989: 83–84; Reference AdamsAdams 1999: 28; Reference LewisLewis 2001: 135–136; Reference HickHick 2010: 309–314). However, while scholars could once claim “no strict argument can be mounted for or against the existence of animal pain” (Reference HarrisonHarrison 1989: 81), Trent Dougherty correctly observes such claims are no longer tenable in light of publications like the 2009 U.S. National Academy of Sciences’ Recognition and Alleviation of Pain in Laboratory Animals (Reference DoughertyDougherty 2014: 61–64).

The Cartesian/neo-Cartesian line of reasoning, which claims no nonhuman animals can perceive pain in a theologically meaningful way, has several serious weaknesses. First, claims nonhuman animals are incapable of feeling pain have been speculative rather than empirically based and are now easily defeated by scientific research. Second, statements suggesting animals are theologically unimportant to God undermine Scriptures that depict God’s concern for all creatures, providing them food when they are hungry and watching over them even as they give birth (Gen 1:20–25, 30–31; Job 38:39–39:4; Ps 136:25; 145:15–16).

In short, Cartesian/neo-Cartesian defenses have the following strengths as they:

• Affirm the omnipotence and omniscience of God.

• Protect God from the claim God allows animals to suffer.

However, Cartesian/neo-Cartesian defenses also have the following weaknesses as they:

• Take an anthropocentric worldview that diminishes the theological significance of other living creatures in creation.

• Take a theologically speculative position that is not well supported by Scripture.

• Take a scientifically indefensible position that there are no animals that can perceive pain despite contemporary scientific research strongly supporting pain perception in more highly evolved animals.

2.2 Natural Order Defenses

Natural order defenses argue pain is a necessary and inevitable aspect of the well-ordered universe God created. Proponents of this approach have tended to be scientist-theologians and include John Polkinghorne, Holmes Rolston III, and Arthur Peacocke.

Polkinghorne depicted the universe as bearing the divine gift of self-making fruitfulness where creation participates in its own creating, yet occasionally results in blind alleys and death (Reference Polkinghorne, Peterson, Hasker, Reichenbach and Basinger2010: 556). Rolston understood the dynamic nature of healthy ecosystems where advanced sentient life only emerges in species higher on the food chain and death is a necessary part of the cycle of life where nothing goes to waste (Reference Rolston1987: 136). Peacocke noted pain and suffering are the complementary opposites of pleasure and well-being that come with a creature’s emergent consciousness and are necessary for responsiveness to the surrounding environment and continued survival (1993: 68).

Natural order defenses provide a big picture view of how order and regularity in nature benefit a biologically diverse and dynamic creation. Yet, they also paint a portrait of individual creatures who each suffer alone for the greater good of evolutionary processes that they cannot comprehend. This approach can convey a God who is indifferent to the suffering of creatures caught in these processes, as though good ends for the greater creation are sufficient to justify the difficult means endured by the individual creature: a very utilitarian view of God’s value system.

Natural order defenses weaken Rowe’s evidential premise (1) by arguing pain is a necessary component for survival and the absence of pain and death would permit the equally bad or worse evil of nonexistence. The strengths of natural order defenses are they:

• Appeal to natural laws widely accepted in science.

• Emphasize empirically observable benefits of order and regularity in the cosmos.

• Note the advantages of dynamic over static ecosystems.

• Lessen notions of wastefulness in nature.

• Point to empirically observable life/death/life cycles found in nature.

• Recognize the death of one creature creates opportunity for life of another.

• Recognize the same neurocognitive ability to perceive pain enables a creature to perceive pleasure.

• Observe pain is necessary for creatures’ survival.

Natural order defenses also have weaknesses as they:

• Lack a compassionate approach to the suffering of the individual creature.

• Do not incorporate pain mitigation strategies found in nature.

2.3 Process Theism and Kenosis Approaches

To defend God’s goodness in a creation where natural processes cause pain and death, some theologians have removed God’s responsibility for suffering by undermining God’s omniscience and omnipotence either directly or indirectly. Process theologians taking this nonstandard approach argue God does not have the power to prevent suffering (Reference Griffin and DavisGriffin 1981: 105; Reference HartshorneHartshorne 1984; Reference BuckareffBuckareff 2000; Reference PinnockPinnock 2001; Reference VineyViney 2018). God’s power over nature is purportedly limited to the power of love to persuade, not power that controls (Reference BarbourBarbour 1997: 326–327; Reference McDaniel, Linzey and YamamotoMcDaniel 1998: 167). They further claim God has no foreknowledge of events, thus God cannot know what will happen until it happens (Reference McDaniel, Linzey and YamamotoMcDaniel 1998: 164). Under these assumptions, process theists affirm God is wholly good as they claim suffering exists because God is incapable of preventing it.

While successfully affirming God’s goodness, this approach has several weaknesses. Besides abandoning classical Christian doctrines on God’s omniscience and omnipotence (Reference OdenOden 1992: 48–53), it lacks scriptural support for its position while ignoring these divine attributes in the biblical text. God’s omniscience is supported by Hebrews 4:13: “Nothing in all creation is hidden from God’s sight.” God’s vast foreknowledge is proclaimed in passages like Isaiah 46:10: “I make known the end from the beginning, from ancient times, what is still to come.” The biblical text not only supports God’s active power over nature (Psalm 147:8–9, 15–18), but also includes more unusual interventions such as when God parted the Red Sea (Exodus 14) and Jesus calmed the storm (Mark 4:35–41). Consequently, process theism’s claims tend to be theologically speculative without support from either traditional Christian reasoning or Scripture. Moreover, this depiction presents a God who is powerless to prevent suffering and leaves “a greater problem of evil and suffering, not a lesser one, since there is no clear end to evil” (Reference SollerederSollereder 2019: 66).

Besides lacking power to prevent harm, if God lacks foreknowledge, it suggests either: (1) God had no idea the creation set in place would eventually produce disease, pain, and death, or (2) it was a risk God was willing to take. Ultimately, process theism offers a weak defense, depicting a world of suffering created by a kind but powerless God who should not be blamed for what he could not foresee.

In contrast, kenosis approaches are more robust than process theism because they deny neither God’s omniscience, omnipotence, nor God’s ability to act in the world (Reference PolkinghornePolkinghorne 2001). Kenosis makes the weaker, more defensible claim that God chooses to lay down power in many circumstances rather than the stronger process theism claim that God’s power is limited. In doing so, kenosis approaches are compatible with both scriptural depictions and classical Christian doctrines of God’s foreknowledge and power as well as God’s eventual triumph of good over evil.

Yet, kenosis does not explain why God allows animal suffering. While it can be argued God sets aside power so moral agents like humans might gain moral or spiritual insight from suffering, this is harder to justify in the case of nonhumans. Furthermore, “while kenosis may explain the origin of suffering, it does not – by itself – offer hope to individuals who suffer” (Reference SollerederSollereder 2019: 72). Although proponents of kenosis claim God shares each creature’s suffering, Ruth Page objects: “God has merely changed from a powerful onlooker to a suffering onlooker, and creation remains on its own” (Reference RolstonRolston 1987: 144–146; Reference PagePage 1996: 53; Reference McDaniel, Linzey and YamamotoMcDaniel 1998: 165–166; Reference 73Peacocke and PolkinghornePeacocke 2001: 37–39).

In summary, the strengths of process theism approaches are they:

• Acknowledge the existence of animal pain is credible and animals are theologically significant to God.

• Affirm the loving-kindness of a wholly good God.

The weaknesses of process theism approaches are they:

• Reject God’s omnipotence, omniscience, and responsibility for suffering in the created order.

• Depict a God who is powerless to stop evil and offers little support to creatures that suffer.

• Lack scriptural support for their claims while ignoring biblical texts that depict God’s omnipotence, omniscience, and power to defeat evil.

The strengths of kenosis approaches are they:

• Acknowledge the existence of animal pain is credible and animals are theologically significant to God.

• Affirm the loving-kindness of a wholly good God.

• Acknowledge God’s omnipotence, omniscience, and responsibility for suffering in the created order.

• Affirm God’s power to overcome and defeat evil.

• Depict a God who suffers alongside creatures.

The weaknesses of kenosis approaches are they:

• Depict a God who has inexplicably chosen to lay aside the power to intervene and alleviate suffering in nature.

• Offer no succor to creatures that suffer.

2.4 Suffering as Punishment: The Theodicy of Adam’s Fall

A more traditional explanation for suffering has been to claim it is justified punishment for Adam and Eve’s sin. In Western thought, theologians followed Augustine, assuming Genesis 1–3 intended to describe the origins of the material universe, pain, and biological death. In order to exonerate God for the existence of the latter two maladies, many Western theologians regarded suffering as punishment for sin imposed upon humans and animals alike after the Fall. According to Reference TaylorAugustine (1982: 2:164–165), “Death occurred on the day when our first parents did what God had forbidden. … When Adam and Eve, therefore, lost their privileged state, their bodies became subject to disease and death, like the bodies of animals.”

John Calvin expanded on Augustine’s thought, blaming the punishment of Adam and Eve for the suffering of all creatures (Reference Calvin and Owen1849: Romans 8:20–22):

This belief became pervasive in the Western church and successfully absolved God from responsibility for creaturely suffering, laying that burden on human beings instead.

2.5 Other Corruption of Creation Theodicies

Scientific evidence showing death and pain preceded the existence of Adam and Eve has been a powerful defeater for the argument that God’s perfect creation was corrupted by fallen humans. In response, some scholars have turned to other corruption of creation approaches that suggest suffering is the work of shadowy dark, chaotic, or demonic-like forces.

2.6 Animal Afterlife and Saint-Making Theodicies

A growing number of theologians acknowledge that the existence of animal pain is credible, animals are theologically significant to God, and corruption of creation arguments are unable to explain why animal suffering exists. Therefore, to reduce the strength of Rowe’s theological premise (2), some theologians begin with a natural order–like defense then suggest God allows animals to suffer in this life because they will be healed and blessed in the afterlife. These approaches acknowledge God’s omnipotence and omniscience and accept God’s responsibility for creaturely suffering and death but argue the eternal bliss creatures experience after death will compensate any negative experiences in life (Reference McDanielMcDaniel 1989: 44–47; Reference SouthgateSouthgate 2008: 78–91; Reference MurrayMurray 2011: 41–72; Reference DoughertyDougherty 2014: 134–178; Reference SollerederSollereder 2019: 156–182; Reference SchneiderSchneider 2020: 219–269).

Influential leaders and scholars in the church have long advocated for the theological dignity of animals. Theologians like St. Basil the Great of the Eastern Orthodox Church, St. Francis of Assisi of the Roman Catholic Church, and more modern thinkers like John Polkinghorne of the Anglican Church contend all creatures matter to God (Ugolino 1998: Chapter 16; Reference PolkinghornePolkinghorne 2004: 147; Reference DoughertyDougherty 2014: 158–159). The Armenian liturgy proclaims all creatures “will be renewed at the resurrection, that day which is the last day of earthly existence and the beginning of our heavenly life” (Reference DoughertyDougherty 2014: 159). John Wesley, founder of the Methodist movement, also preached God’s complete restoration of animals in the new creation (Reference Wesley1872).

Christopher Southgate agrees animal afterlife can compensate creatures whose lives were either too short or disadvantageous for them to achieve their full potential and distinguishes various levels of creaturely flourishing (Reference Southgate2008: 64, 84–85):

• Fulfilled: a state in which the creature is utterly being itself, in an environment in which it flourishes (including an appropriate network of relationships with other organisms), with access to the appropriate energy sources and reproductive opportunities.

• Growing toward fulfillment: not yet mature, but still with the possibility of attaining the “fulfilled” state.

• Frustrated: held back in some way from fulfillment, whether by adverse mutation or environmental change, or through old age, or being predated upon or parasitized, or being unable to find a mate through competition or species scarcity.

While Southgate’s categories help explain why animal suffering must be overcome in the afterlife (78–91), there is a danger of viewing creaturely success and failure purely along biological metrics. Like Draper, some scholars tend to assume human and nonhuman creatures cannot flourish or experience completeness without perfect health, long life, and reproductive fruitfulness. Such perspectives overlook how social acceptance and affectionate relationships can enhance and transform creaturely experience, enabling a sense of flourishing even in the midst of tribulations. Flourishing can be observed in human lives despite the presence of deafness, blindness, injury, childlessness, or poverty, so why might not the same be true for animals? Therefore, theologians should hesitate to assume creaturely fulfillment can be solely based upon categories of biological “success.” Nevertheless, animal afterlife theodicies provide robust compensation for creaturely suffering, find some degree of support in Scripture (Isa 11:6–9; Rom 8:19–22), and can be theologically plausible by postulating everything God declared “good” in the old creation (Genesis 1) would be present in the new creation (Revelation 21–22), including nonhuman animals.

While agreeing afterlife compensates animals for their suffering, Dougherty suggests the reason why God allows animals to suffer is to enable them to become saints (Reference Dougherty2014: 134–153). He contends animals bear the image of God and God will gift animals posthumously with the cognitive ability to be deified, make meaning of their suffering, and experience joy by accepting their pain and martyrdom as part of God’s plan (143–148). However, each creature’s peace in heaven is conditional upon reconciling with God and being virtuous, echoing a perspective that claims animals and nature are either fallen or sinful and must exhibit appropriate mentalities and/or behaviors for redemption and afterlife in heaven (153; Reference Deane-DrummondDeane-Drummond 2008: 20–24; Reference MoritzMoritz 2014: 362–374). John Schneider agrees animals can become saints, experiencing martyrdom on earth through suffering. Moreover, since cats and dogs love praise, Schneider suggests animals will receive praise, admiration, and gratitude from God and the angelic host for their painful sacrifices (Reference Schneider2020: 261–269).

These saint-making theodicies of Dougherty and Schneider make admirable attempts to offer additional afterlife compensation but appear to be ad hoc explanations for animal suffering. First, they anthropomorphize animals too much, as though animals were inadequately created in Genesis 1 and can only be compensated by becoming cognitively and morally more humanlike in the new creation. Second, the notion suffering animals must earn their place in heaven through self-reflection or virtuous behavior seems to add insult to injury by suggesting animals must work to earn God’s favor and consolation. Theologians who claim creatures are sinful or lack heaven-worthy virtues implicitly assume animals have a deficient relationship with God, making them unfit for heaven. Yet, animals do not break relationship with their Creator by mistaking themselves for God as humans do and Scripture suggests animals are always embraced by the love and providential care of God (Job 38–39; Matt 10:29; Reference BirnbaumBirnbaum 1975: 172–173).

Third, proponents of animal saint-making theodicies offer no scriptural support for either the sinfulness, deification, moral agency, sainthood, or martyrdom of animals. Moreover, Dougherty and Schneider stretch concepts of martyrdom and sainthood beyond recognition. “Martyr” comes from the Greek martus meaning “witness” and was used to describe Apostles and Christians who suffered or died to bear witness to the life and resurrection of Jesus Christ (Reference OdenOden 1992: 582). So how can animals who died from predation or disease be plausibly associated with people who died to pass on the Christian faith? Moreover, the word “saint” comes from sanctus (Latin) meaning “holy or consecrated” (Reference OdenOden 1992: 660). The Greek (hagios) and Hebrew (qadosh) words for sacred/holy are only connected in Scripture to God, the things of God, angels, and human beings … never animals. Therefore, no matter how well intended, applying “sainthood” to animal suffering bears little resemblance to the traditional usage of the term in the Christian faith.

In summary, animal afterlife and saint-making theodicies have the following strengths:

• They acknowledge the existence of animal pain is credible and animals are theologically significant to God.

• They acknowledge God’s omnipotence, omniscience, and responsibility for suffering in the created order.

• They offer restoration and compensation in the blissful afterlife for suffering experienced by nonhumans in the created order.

• Animal afterlife theodicies have some level of church tradition and scriptural support for animal resurrection and immortality in the new creation.

The weaknesses of these theodicies are:

• Theologians can often emphasize either biological or anthropocentric priorities over theocentric values that are directed toward God’s love-oriented care for individual creatures.

• Animal saint-making theodicies claim without scriptural support that animals who have suffered must work to earn God’s favor and consolation.

• Animal saint-making theodicies claim without scriptural support that animals can be moral agents, saints, and martyrs and try to justify animal suffering by using the terms “saint” and “martyr” in ways that bear little resemblance to their traditional usage in the Christian faith.

• Animal saint-making theodicies offer a theologically speculative addendum to more scripturally plausible animal afterlife theodicies.

2.7 Seeking a New Theodicy for Suffering

The preceding analysis describes strengths and weaknesses of approaches offered to address the evidential problem of natural evil. The strongest approaches appear to be natural order defenses, kenosis approaches, and animal afterlife theodicies. If combined, these begin to offer a robust explanation for creaturely suffering that:

• Acknowledges the existence of animal pain is credible and animals are theologically significant to God.

• Acknowledges God’s omnipotence, omniscience, and responsibility for suffering in the created order.

• Appeals to natural laws widely accepted in science.

• Emphasizes the empirically observable benefits of order and regularity in the cosmos.

• Notes the advantages of dynamic over static ecosystems.

• Lessens notions of wastefulness in nature.

• Points to empirically observable life/death/life cycles found in nature.

• Recognizes death of one creature creates opportunity for life of another.

• Recognizes the same neurocognitive ability to perceive pain enables a creature to perceive pleasure.

• Depicts a God who cares for and is near to all creatures that suffer.

• Offers a scripturally sound narrative of restoration and compensation in the afterlife for the suffering experienced by humans and nonhumans.

Nevertheless, a combined natural order, kenosis, animal afterlife theodicy would still lack:

• A depiction of God mitigating creaturely suffering in this life.

However, since this can be addressed by understanding suffering more deeply, this work will (1) engage the scientific literature to analyze neurocognitive aspects of pain perception along the evolutionary spectrum, (2) consider necessary features of ecological balance in healthy ecosystems, and (3) ascertain whether naturally occurring pain mitigation processes exist in nature. This approach will test claims regarding natural evil and offer a theodicy of God’s providential care that:

• Affirms the existence of animal pain.

• Affirms God’s concern for animals.

• Affirms God’s omnipotence and omniscience.

• Affirms God’s responsibility for the existence of pain.

• Affirms God’s loving care of creatures.

• Affirms God’s existence.

Theists need to appreciate the concerns of those who think theistic Judeo-Christian belief is compellingly undermined by scientific evidence. Therefore, in order to test the strength of atheists’ arguments on their own terms, the scientific method will be considered the “gold-standard” for investigating the natural order and neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory will be assumed, employing both Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection and Gregor Mendel’s theory of genetics.

Usually, philosophers and theologians focus solely on Darwinian natural selection since it is most closely associated with the death of creatures or the inability of an organism to successfully pass on heritable traits. However, it hinders the analysis of suffering to ignore beneficial versus detrimental genetic factors when determining whether a stronger or weaker evolutionary impetus exists for the selection of pain in a creature. This becomes relevant when comparing evolutionary pressures for and against pain perception in invertebrates and vertebrates (Section 3.4).

Nevertheless, the theological perspective of this work is grounded in theistic evolution – the position that belief in an all-powerful, all-good God is compatible with the theory of evolution. This position takes the view that as God spoke creation into existence, God brought the natural laws that order the cosmos into being, where the laws of physics empower the laws of chemistry, which subsequently define the laws of biology. Through these structures of cosmic order, God created a universe in which living organisms could arise and natural ecosystems could unfold. Therefore, while neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory is currently the best explanation for the mechanisms that brought living biodiversity into existence, theistic evolution acknowledges God as the originator of those mechanisms.

3.1 Empirical Claims Regarding God’s Cruelty in Nature

The following claims can be derived either explicitly or implicitly from Dawkins’ and Kitcher’s preceding statements:

1. 1. Starvation and misery represent the normal state of creatures in nature.

2. 2. Sufferings can be treated as objective quantifiable units that are cumulative.

3. 3. It is doubtful a benevolent, loving, omnipotent God would need to create pain.

4. 4. Most creatures are capable of suffering, from caterpillars to human beings.

5. 5. The majority of animal lives are dominated by pain.

6. 6. Animals endure unnecessary suffering from parasites, disease, and predators.

In light of these claims, it is appropriate to ask the following questions:

1. 1. Is it accurate to depict starvation and misery as the “norms” in the natural world?

2. 2. Is it appropriate to treat suffering as an objective quantitative entity?

3. 3. Is pain biologically necessary and what happens to creatures when they cannot feel it?

4. 4. Is it true most living creatures produced by evolutionary processes are capable of suffering?

5. 5. Is it correct to claim most animals live in a perpetual state of pain most of their lives?

6. 6. Does the evidence support the claim creatures endure unnecessary suffering from parasites, disease, and predator attack?

In addition to these claims, other examples have been cited contending the natural world is filled with unnecessary suffering and cruelty. A famous example is William Rowe’s burned fawn suffering needlessly after being trapped during a forest fire (Reference Rowe1979: 337). Other examples include Holmes Rolston’s insurance chick that is killed through avian siblicide as well as killer whales who purportedly play with their prey before they eat them (Reference Rolston1987: 137–140; Reference Rolston and Drees2003: 67). These are the pieces of evidence presented to claim the world was not created by the loving, benevolent, omniscient, omnipotent God of the Judeo-Christian faith, so it will be these claims that will be examined.

3.2 Mistaken Reasoning and Understandings of Pain

Well-meaning scientists and philosophers may accurately describe empirical observations of animal behavior in their arguments, but it may be asked whether they are sufficiently apprised of the scientific literature to understand the broader scope of what occurs in nature, especially regarding the problem of pain. This has caused misunderstandings regarding animal suffering, such as to what degree the neurocognitive capacity to perceive pain exists along the evolutionary spectrum (Section 3.3), and misconceptions related to natural processes and animal behavior (Section 4).

However, in other cases, proponents of atheistic metaphysical naturalism appear to make category errors or present distorted accounts of nature to further their arguments. Some examples will be addressed here.

3.3 Nociception and Pain Along the Evolutionary Spectrum

When discussing animal pain, the philosophical community has tended to split between two extremes: the Cartesian/neo-Cartesian approach, which denies animals feel pain, and the anthropocentric approach, which contends most animals feel pain as humans do (Reference Kuhse and SingerKuhse and Singer 1999: 640; Reference GriffinGriffin 2004: 190–192). Yet, research from evolutionary biology and neuroscience shows these approaches fail to incorporate insights from evolutionary theory and animal neurophysiology; just as there is a diverse spectrum of evolutionary development across species, there is also wide variability among creatures to perceive pain. However, since the neo-Cartesian and anthropocentric understandings of animal pain both revolve around the human experience of pain, that is where this analysis will begin.

3.4 Claims Regarding Universal Creaturely Suffering

It is ironic atheists like Dawkins and Kitcher appeal to science to make their arguments, yet omit insights from pain-related science and neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory in their analysis of creaturely pain. They seem unaware that, according to the US National Academy of Sciences, empirical evidence only supports pain perception in the more highly evolved brains of mammals and birds. Moreover, Darwinian evolutionary theory would seem to make it rather obvious that less evolved organisms would lack the neurocognitive abilities of more evolved organisms. Consequently, while mammals have the capacity to experience the distressing and sensory aspects of pain to the degree their frontal and parietal lobes have evolved respectively, it would seem to be anthropocentric speculation to assume evolutionarily lower organisms perceive pain like mammals. In fact, many scientific studies confirm this is not the case.

The Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences rejects claims that insects have subjective experience required for pain perception (Reference Brian, Arlinghaus and BrowmanKey, Arlinghaus, and Browman 2016). Moreover, entomologists observe that insects seem entirely oblivious to their injuries (Reference Eisemann, Wayne and JorgensenEisemann et al. 1984: 166):

So, the scientific literature has noted the lack of pain response in insects for decades, yet proponents of metaphysical naturalism like Dawkins and Kitcher still try to bolster their arguments against the Judeo-Christian faith by citing the supposed pain of caterpillars caused by the ichneumonidae wasp whose larvae consume the caterpillar from within. But if insects do not have nervous systems with the equivalent of a frontal lobe to perceive pain, how can their existence be said to include the experience of suffering?

This counterintuitive concept of bodily destruction without pain might initially be difficult to accept, but during the last twenty-four hours the average adult human being endured the death of billions of their cells due to the process of apoptosis (programmed cellular death). Were all these people writhing in pain as their cells died? Obviously not, and the reason is because human bodies are not wired with a nervous system to detect this kind of death or destruction within the body. It would serve no purpose, so the human body did not evolve to experience pain due to apoptotic cellular death. In the same way, insects like the caterpillar did not evolve with the nervous system necessary to feel pain even when they are dying from within.

Neither caterpillars nor any other insect can feel pain. Yet Richard Dawkins declares, “If Nature were kind, she would at least make the minor concession of anesthetizing caterpillars before they are eaten alive from within” (Reference Dawkins2008: 131). Apparently, Nature has done just that since caterpillars cannot feel pain at all. So, perhaps it is time to realize Nature is far kinder than she is given credit for?

This inability to perceive the distress associated with “pain” is not unique to insects. It also appears to be lacking in the entire category of animals classified as invertebrates. According to the International Association for the Study of Pain, it is the subjective, emotional component that causes pain in a creature, not the activation of nociceptive receptors in the body (2011). So, while invertebrates have the capacity to experience a nociceptive response to noxious stimuli, they do not have the neurocognitive psychological capacity to suffer (Canada Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs [CSSCLCA] 2003a). This conclusion is based upon (1) the evolutionary function of pain, (2) the neural capacity of invertebrates, and (3) the observed behavior of invertebrates (CSSCLCA 2003b).

First, in the case of vertebrates, the perception of emotionally distressful pain is an evolutionary advantage as an educational tool to avoid harms that could affect the longevity of the animal (Reference Melzack, Dennis and SternbachMelzack and Dennis 1978: 1–26). Because vertebrates are generally longer-lived than invertebrates, they have more time to learn from experiences of both pain and pleasure that in turn will improve their chances for survival. In contrast, invertebrate lifespans tend to be shorter and their behavior is largely thought to be genetically determined. Consequently, there is weaker evolutionary impetus for the selection of pain in invertebrates (Reference Eisemann, Wayne and JorgensenEisemann et al. 1984).

Second, the neural capacity of invertebrates, with the exception of cephalopods (e.g., octopus, squid), has been found to be quite limited compared to vertebrates (Reference Matheson and FullerloveMatheson 2002). Invertebrate nervous systems are composed of many small brains (ganglia) with relatively few neurons distributed throughout their nervous systems. As such, they are thought to have limited cognitive capacity since they have evolved without the complex nervous system required for the development of a psychological response like suffering. Cephalopods have been considered a possible exception to this because of their larger centralized nervous systems, which share similarities to those of fish (Reference SmithSmith 1991). However, a recent review of the literature on pain perception in fish (evaluating more than 200 peer-reviewed scientific papers) has concluded that while fish demonstrate nociceptive responses to negative stimuli, they do not have the neurophysiological capacity to perceive pain or suffer in a conscious fashion as humans do (Reference Rose, Arlinghaus and CookeRose et al. 2014). The neurobiologists, behavioral ecologists, and fishery scientists who examined the literature concluded most studies investigating fish ability to perceive pain were flawed. For example, researchers did not adequately consider the significant anatomical and neurophysiological differences between humans and fish that would suggest very different perception capabilities between the species (111–114). Also, methodologies failed to distinguish between unconscious nociceptive perception and conscious perception of emotional suffering, making it impossible to deduce emotional states from fish behavior (104–109). Consequently, human interpretations of fish responses too often simply assumed the presence of emotional pain. Furthermore, pain killers like morphine had no effect on fish, suggesting fish are either completely oblivious to pain in human terms or they respond to pain in a way unrecognizable to human observers. In fact, dosages given to fish at “10 times the lethal dose for any bird or mammal that has ever been studied” were insufficient to “alter the swimming behavior of the trout” (107). The reviewers concluded “fish responses to nociceptive stimuli are limited and fishes are unlikely to experience pain” (97). It is therefore logical to conclude that if vertebrates like fish lack the psychological ability to suffer, it is even less likely invertebrate cephalopods would have such capacity.

Third, there is little indication of emotion in invertebrates. Most invertebrates lack social behaviors, with many cannibalistically eating their own young. Social behavior is absent in cephalopods as well, who do not provide parental care for their young, suggesting their ability to hunt, hide from predators, and communicate must be genetically determined rather than learned behaviors (Reference Hanlon and MessengerHanlon and Messenger 1996). Furthermore, many invertebrates, like the insects cited earlier, continue to behave normally even after severe injury. Consequently, based upon the three criteria mentioned above, it is reasonable to conclude invertebrates have not evolved the neurocognitive ability to perceive emotional suffering.

This is significant because it provides empirically derived, scientifically based reasoning to exclude the vast majority of species on earth from the category of those that suffer. According to Oxford zoologist Robert May, approximately 2,507,500 animal species are invertebrates and the other 41,300 are vertebrates (1988: 1446). This means 98.4 percent of animal species on earth have evolved to live and die, but will never experience the emotional distress associated with suffering. The remaining 1.6 percent of earth’s animal species that are vertebrates may or may not be able to experience suffering, but like fish, many of these species appear to lack the psychological capacity to perceive pain.

For example, researchers note the challenges of studying pain in reptiles. They observe captive reptiles frequently suffer thermal burns because they perch themselves too close to heat sources and do not move even when their tissue is being damaged (Reference MosleyMosley 2011: 49). Consequently, if some reptiles are so insensitive to harmful stimuli they do not move to protect themselves, it seems even less likely reptiles experience traumatic psychological anguish. Furthermore, reptilian anatomy lacks the neurophysiological structures needed to experience the distressing aspect of pain since “the ACC is one of the neural adaptations that distinguishes mammals from our reptilian ancestors” (Reference MacLeanMacLean 1985: 405; Reference LiebermanLieberman 2013: 51).

It is also doubtful amphibians have the neurocognitive psychological capacity to perceive emotional suffering since they are even less evolved than reptiles, leaving birds (Aves) and mammals (Mammalia) as those most likely to experience emotional distress among species. With approximately 9,000 species of birds and 4,500 species of mammals, this means only about 13,500 species, or 0.5 percent of all species on earth, have the capacity to experience suffering (Reference MayMay 1998). So, when metaphysical atheists categorically lump all creatures together in one great heaping mass of misery, the science suggests they are making a claim that cannot be substantiated by the empirical evidence.

4.1 Forest Fires

In 1979, William Rowe created the infamous image of a burned fawn suffering a prolonged agonizing death to argue God allows unnecessary suffering (337):

In reality, it may be more accurate to say Rowe’s imagined scenario is pointless, or at least highly improbable. In contrast to the dire invention of philosopher Rowe, US Fish and Wildlife fire ecologist Bill Leenhouts reveals a completely different reality: “Don’t worry about the animals. Most animals actually escape the fires” (Reference JamesJames 2000). In fact, closer scrutiny of Rowe’s caricature shows it has little in common with real-world animal behavior. As University of Idaho forestry specialist Yvonne Barkley clarifies (2019):

These observations are among several reasons the suffering fawn scenario is so unlikely. Because most animals’ sense of smell is excellent, wildlife is likely to smell smoke on the wind, providing ample time to move a safe distance from fire (Reference KomarekKomarek 1969: 170). Furthermore, since wind driving the blaze sends smoke downwind into the direction the fire is traveling, it would seem a surprisingly accurate way of forewarning animals in its path. So rather than becoming trapped, the fawn would have sufficient time to move away from approaching fire to protected areas with other large wildlife.

This is not to say large animal mortality never occurs from wildfires, but when it does death is usually caused by smoke inhalation from large, fast-moving fires (Reference BarkleyBarkley 2019). In such cases, the animal is deprived of oxygen to the brain, quickly resulting in unconsciousness, then death. Consequently, these animals will not suffer if the flames reach their bodies. Unfortunately, it is often livestock restrained by fences that become “trapped” casualties of wildfires (Reference BrownBrown 2012). Yet if cattle are unable to escape wildfires due to fences built by human hands, is their suffering effectively caused by God or human beings?

Those who suggest destructive processes in nature are evidence of God’s cruelty or indifference often neglect fire’s role as a natural and necessary part of healthy ecosystems, with plants and animals alike adapting to fire in the environment (Reference VoglVogl 1973; Reference ChangChang 1996). Highly mobile animals easily avoid heat and noxious gases by flying or moving away at the first scent of smoke. Low mobility animals like snails and other invertebrates have also adapted to fire-prone environments. Snails shelter their eggs and themselves in areas protected from fire. Even when larger numbers of snails and insects died after an intense fire (painlessly, since they are invertebrates), their populations returned to normal within a year (Reference KomarekKomarek 1985: 5). Animals like the reed frog and red bat use chemo-reception of smoke, visual detection of flames/smoke, and sounds of fire to evade danger (Reference EngstromEngstrom 2010: 116). Wrens and sparrows fly short distances away to shrub thickets near wet soil for protection. Lizards either burrow or climb trees to escape flames. Meadow voles flee to undisturbed areas or shelter underground. Multiple species of rattlesnakes were monitored sheltering safely in underground burrows during low intensity ground fires. Burrows generally provide safe shelters for younger, smaller, or less mobile animals where measured temperatures and CO₂ levels rise minimally in times of fire (Reference EngstromEngstrom 2010: 117).

While primary fire effects cause little animal death, the more serious problem is destruction of habitat. Yet many plants and trees have not only adapted to fire, but require periodic fire for seed germination, the removal of dead vegetation, and the return of nutrients to the soil (Reference Bonnet, Anna and WayneBonnet et al. 2005). Ponderosa pines in the Western United States survive fires because they have developed thick fire-resistant trunks and branches high out of reach from fires typically found in ecologically balanced forests (U.S. National Park Service 2017). Even though food and shelter are lacking immediately after fire, University of Idaho fire ecologist Leon Neuenschwander explains fires are actually necessary and advantageous for all wildlife: “In the long term, these wildfires will benefit all animals. In the short term, some animals will be displaced” (Reference JamesJames 2000). The severity of this problem will be proportional to the size of the fire (Reference ChangChang 1996: 1075). Smaller fires leave surviving habitats for forest animals to move into and meet their needs. While some creatures may move on, others move into the newly scorched area for the unusually nutrient-rich new plant growth that emerges from the ash debris. Burned areas of woodland return as meadowlands, providing an inviting environment for plants and animals that prefer open fields, organically rich soils, and additional sunlight. Such areas become lush with wildflowers, bees, and other pollenating insects along with the birds that feed on them. New meadows also attract deer, elk and mice as well as their predators: coyotes, bobcats, mountain lions, bears, and wolves (Reference JamesJames 2000). It is the start of a refreshed cycle of the natural ecosystem that will become forest again with the passage of time.

Unfortunately, human interference has upset the natural ecology of forests in several ways, unnecessarily worsening the effects of fire for both plants and animals. First, human encroachment on forest lands reduces the overall acreage available to wildlife. This means less territory animals can migrate into when their habitat has been damaged by fire. Second, human fire suppression has unintentionally increased the severity and destructive power of wildfires when they do occur. Because fire suppression was the standard protocol for the past 100 years, the accumulation of dead wood and undergrowth has resulted in far more fuel for fires than would occur naturally, causing fires to burn hotter, higher, and longer than they would otherwise (U.S. National Park Service 2017). Fires of this magnitude can overwhelm species that would otherwise be suitably adapted to fire, like ponderosa pine (Reference Lentile, Smith and ShepperdLentile, Smith, and Shepperd 2005). While these overgrown fires may result in the unnecessary death of plants and animals, the responsibility would seem to lay at the feet of human beings, not the natural world.

Fires are a healthy part of forest ecosystems, being a necessary and beneficial balance of growth and destruction, life and death (Reference KomarekKomarek 1969). As discussed previously, only mammals and birds are capable of experiencing the agony associated with pain. This means the creatures most vulnerable to fire are the ones least likely to feel pain, namely invertebrates and other non-mammalian, non-avian vertebrate species. In contrast, mammals and birds capable of feeling pain escape injury by fleeing or sheltering during fire. Creatures who die of asphyxiation lose consciousness and die very quickly due to lack of oxygen to their brains, consequently having little chance to perceive pain before their death. Accordingly, there is very little evidence to suggest animals suffer due to forest fires. Rather, animal behavior in nature minimizes pain resulting from such destructive events. It is therefore a distortion for scholars like Rowe to misrepresent complex, well-balanced natural systems as scenarios of natural evil and then accuse God of causing unnecessary suffering. On the contrary, the natural life and death processes of forest fires in healthy biomes have evolved in such a way as to minimize animal suffering while providing benefits for all the creatures therein. As such, these processes are consistent with a benevolent God who seeks to minimize suffering and creates new life even in the midst of death.

4.2 Pain, Predation, and Ecological Balance

In most philosophical discussions, predation is synonymous with natural evil and considered a primary source of suffering in nature. However, this assumption should be reconsidered in light of additional information on pain and animal behavior. To begin, it is important to distinguish the different types of pain available in more highly evolved creatures: acute, persistent, and chronic pain (USNAS 2009: 16).

Acute pain refers to momentary pain that quickly passes, like a pinch or needle prick, and warns the creature of immediate harm to tissues and causes rapid withdrawal from the danger. Persistent pain, like that of a sprained ankle, refers to pain that lasts for days or weeks as a creature heals and needs unpleasant sensory feedback to avoid further injury. Chronic pain is pain that continues past the time expected for healing and is typically associated with poorly healed injuries, age-related issues like arthritis and tissue degeneration, or destructive diseases like cancer. Unlike acute and persistent pain, chronic pain does not appear to produce survival benefits for the creature and seems to be an unhelpful side effect of the body’s pain system, causing prolonged suffering. This is where the role of predators come in.

Predators detect prey animals that are injured, sick, or weak; in other words, they notice the animals most likely to be in pain or distress. Researchers observed black sea bass preferentially preyed upon injured squid over uninjured squid (Reference Price and DussorPrice and Dussor 2014: R384). The preference for distressed prey is probably an evolutionary development that minimizes the energy expenditure of the predator while maximizing their caloric intake (Reference Butler and FinnButler and Finn 2009: 185). Moreover, predation minimizes the pain duration of weak or sickly animals that might otherwise suffer. This has been shown in scientific studies on predation.

For example, researchers wanted to determine whether predator birds killed randomly or by noticing specific features of individual prey. To test this, yellow-legged gulls were culled using two methods: predation by raptors, and shooting birds randomly. After veterinary analysis of the bird carcasses, researchers concluded predators did not kill at random, but preferentially selected their prey based upon age, muscle condition, and sickness. Birds with parasites, infections, diseased organs, injuries, or other weaknesses were statistically more likely to be killed by raptors than by random shooting, suggesting predators are better adapted to recognize distressed prey than human eyes (Reference Genovart, Negre and TavecchiaGenovart et al. 2010). Similar observations were made with mountain lions, which were four times more likely to kill deer sick with chronic wasting prion infections than their healthy counterparts, even when field observers had not detected noticeable illness before their deaths (Reference Miller, Swanson and WolfeMiller et al. 2008).

Predators detect the earliest changes in prey at the onset of debilitating conditions, suggesting prey are typically killed before they have to endure long-term pain. This conclusion, that predators are more likely to kill animals suffering from conditions that will result in chronic pain than their healthier counterparts, is also supported by related neurobiological evidence.

Stress-induced analgesia (SIA) is a natural part of the fight-or-flight response that suppresses pain while an animal is endangered by predators or other life-threatening situations (Reference Basbaum and FieldsBasbaum and Fields 1984; Reference Butler and FinnButler and Finn 2009). Analgesia (suppression of pain) is facilitated by the release of endogenous opioids and increases the animal’s chances of survival by allowing it to focus on evading threats rather than tending to an otherwise painful injury (Reference Reeder and KramerReeder and Kramer 2005). Nevertheless, once danger has passed, nociception and pain perception become elevated, increasing pain sensitivity in tissues surrounding the injury to discourage normal behaviors that could inflict further damage (Reference Basbaum, Bautista, Scherrer and JuliusBasbaum et al. 2009; Reference Price and DussorPrice and Dussor 2014). SIA also helps mammals survive by minimizing signs of injury that attract predators.

However, SIA is reduced in animals with chronic pain where stressful events can actually trigger hypersensitivity to pain (Reference Rivat, Laboureyras and LaulinRivat et al. 2007; Reference Butler and FinnButler and Finn 2009: 186). Reductions in SIA were also observed in animals subjected to other long-term stresses, like chronic malnourishment or REM sleep deprivation (Reference Butler and FinnButler and Finn 2009: 188). These results suggest mammals weakened by naturally occurring long-term stresses, like famine or drought, may have diminished SIA, making it harder to hide painful body language from predators and resulting in the swift ending of the creature’s suffering.

This may help explain predation behaviors known as “surplus killing,” where predators kill more than they can immediately eat during times of extreme distress in a prey population. Besides killing suffering animals, predators help bring populations back into equilibrium with the environment’s available resources and alleviate scarcity and suffering among remaining animals. Such behavior has been witnessed in crocodiles at watering holes in times of drought and wolves during extremely hard winters. So, if predatory behavior is driven not only by hunger but also by an instinctual motivation to kill suffering animals, it may explain why surplus killing occurs in times of distress. This predator–prey behavior was observed in Yellowstone National Park during the winter of 1996–1997 when inclement weather cut off grazing animals’ food supply (Reference Smith and FergusonSmith and Ferguson 2005: 129–130):

First, this account supports the growing body of evidence that predators preferentially select suffering and distressed animals for their prey, limiting the pain these creatures would otherwise experience. Second, it suggests surplus killing only occurs when ecological factors stress an entire population of prey, as in times of famine or drought. Third, even though predators may kill more prey than they can immediately eat, other carnivores, scavengers, and decomposers will consume the carcass eventually. There is no waste in nature. Fourth, when predators are absent, prey animals must die slower, more protracted and painful deaths, either by starvation, parasitism, or disease. Fifth, not every predator attack will result in a kill as wildlife observation shows wolf predation is successful only 20 percent of the time.

Predator success rates are typically around 30 percent (Reference EysenckEysenck 2000: 173). Spotted hyenas inhabiting Kenya’s Masai Mara National Reserve capture prey in approximately 33 percent of hunting attempts (Reference Holekamp, Smale, Berg and CooperHolekamp et al. 1997). Great white sharks, an apex predator, had a kill rate of about 48 percent during surface attacks on Cape fur seals near Seal Island (University of Miami 2018). While it might seem these sharks are better hunters, their higher kill rate is likely due to hunting solitary juveniles that are easy, inexperienced prey (Reference Baird and DillBaird and Dill 1995: 1306, 1309). This is significant since philosophical contemplation of predation often assumes predators are guaranteed winners and treats them as unwelcome interlopers in an otherwise unspoiled natural system, yet this depiction of reality is inaccurate. In fact, mammalian predators that do not eat will suffer as much as their distressed prey. Furthermore, the entire ecosystem is weakened when predators are removed from the environment (Reference Estes, Terborgh and BrasharesEstes et al. 2011; Reference Winnie and CreelWinnie and Creel 2017). The unintended consequences of predator absence can be seen most clearly in the case of Yellowstone National Park.

Without wolves in Yellowstone, elk lingered unhindered among young vegetation, grazing upon willow and cottonwood shoots growing along the park’s waterways (Reference Smith and FergusonSmith and Ferguson 2005: 15). This caused degradation of waterside environments, the loss of beaver populations, and an elk population that grew so large it had to be culled by human hunters lest the elk die of starvation. The reintroduction of wolves not only brought the elk population back into equilibrium but also initiated an unexpected trophic cascade that reached further into Yellowstone’s ecosystem than researchers anticipated. Once the wolves’ presence became reestablished, elk grazing behavior changed, causing them to avoid feeding along streams and rivers with low visibility. As a result, willows, cottonwoods, and other beleaguered vegetation reappeared and with their return came beavers. Renewed construction of beaver dams created additional ponds and waterways in the park that became home to populations of yellow and Wilson’s warblers, muskrat, fish, waterfowl, and amphibians. Wolves also created safer habitats for prey animals like pronghorn deer, particularly pronghorn fawns experiencing predatory pressure from unchecked coyote populations (125).

Not only did the presence of these predators create and improve habitats for a greater diversity of species, but it also indirectly increased the food supply for many species. “In all the planning, all the studies,” says biologist John Varley, “the one thing we totally underestimated was how many other mouths the wolves would feed” (Reference Smith and FergusonSmith and Ferguson 2005: 121–122). Whenever wolves kill, there are scraps for scavengers. Biologists observed at least twelve different species of scavengers feeding off carcasses left by wolves, including ravens, magpies, and coyotes, as well as golden and bald eagles. The wolves also indirectly feed songbirds, like the mountain bluebird, which eat beetles and flies whose growth and development occur on carcass remains. Additionally, by decreasing the coyote population, wolves helped increase populations of other animals, like red foxes and rodents (Reference Smith and FergusonSmith and Ferguson 2005: 125). Increased rodents meant an increase in food supply for owls and hawks, supporting their populations as well.

Studies show predators are not only necessary but also beneficial to other species, including prey animals. Without predators, animals suffer needlessly in times of starvation or when they become sick and weak. Predators have an instinct to kill animals showing signs of injury or distress. It must be emphasized that predation is a part of nature that, in fact, minimizes the suffering of creatures; it in itself is not the source of pain in nature. Medical ethicists argue quick deaths that shorten the experience of pain are often preferable to lingering deaths that prolong unnecessary suffering (Reference KuřeKuře 2011). As the American Veterinary Medical Association Guidelines for the Euthanasia of Animals states: “When animals are plagued by disease that produces insurmountable suffering, it can be argued that continuing to live is worse for the animal than death” (2020: 6). Human beings euthanize animals when they have painful conditions that are resistant to treatment: to allow protracted suffering rather than ending it is considered cruel (Reference RollinRollin 2009). In the same way, animals with ailments that would eventually cause long-term pain and suffering are euthanized in nature by predators who seek out creatures that are sickly, weak, or in distress.

4.3 Perceptions of Predator-Targeted Animals

At this point, it is fair to pose the following query: “It may be true predators minimize pain and suffering in nature by euthanizing weak and sickly animals. It may also be true predators are a necessary part of balanced and healthy ecosystems. However, surely the pain an animal feels when it is being killed by predators is unnecessary and cruel?” Dawkins’ commentary alleging Nature’s indifference to suffering suggested Nature would be kinder if there was “a gene that, say, tranquilizes gazelles when they are about to suffer a killing bite” as we “guess that gazelles suffer horrible pain and fear when they are pursued to the death” (Reference Dawkins2008: 131). There are two requests here. First, a wish that animals would not experience pain and fear when pursued by predators, and second, a “tranquilizing effect” of some sort to calm prey before receiving the kill bite. It is therefore ironic Dawkins insists these accommodations would be evidence in favor of Nature’s kindness (and indirectly theism) because that is unwittingly close to what Nature has provided.

Dawkins “guesses” gazelles suffer horrible pain and fear when they are pursued by predators, but the physiological evidence does not support this supposition. As mentioned previously, it is precisely the onset of stress or fear that induces SIA in mammals (Reference Basbaum and FieldsBasbaum and Fields 1984; Reference Butler and FinnButler and Finn 2009). Although fear may be an unwelcome emotion, that appears to be part of the point: it removes all other distractions from the creature’s attention (Reference Reeder and KramerReeder and Kramer 2005: 226). Moreover, a major part of what makes feelings of fear so unpleasant is the corresponding cascade of stress hormones that prepare the creature’s body for survival (Reference Reeder and KramerReeder and Kramer 2005: 225–228; Reference Koenig and PostKoenig 2007: 423–424). Cortisol inhibits insulin production and prepares the body to fight or flee by flooding it with glucose as an immediate energy source for muscles (Reference Febbraio, Lambert, Starkie, Proietto and HargreavesFebbraio et al. 1998: 466–467; Reference AronsonAronson 2009: 38; University of Utah 2010). As cortisol constricts arteries, epinephrine increases the heart rate and together these cause the blood to pump harder and faster. In addition, epinephrine improves cognitive brain function, increasing awareness and alertness (Reference Reece, Taylor, Simon and DickeyReece et al. 2011: 528). Endogenous opioids suppress pain perception in the animal, allowing the creature to focus on escaping from danger (Reference Rivat, Laboureyras and LaulinRivat et al. 2007). Other physiological changes like inhibition of digestion (associated with a queasy stomach) and shaking are partially due to the diversion of blood flow to large skeletal muscles needed for fighting and escape (Reference Gleitman, Gross and ReisbergGleitman et al. 2010: 473–477). Another unpleasant but necessary side effect of the adrenal response is increased muscle tension throughout the body, providing the animal with additional strength and speed. But no matter how odious, none of these physiological changes or their corresponding emotional responses associated with fear are gratuitous or “painful.” Rather, all are necessary to help the creature stay alive.

For most of us, it is hard to understand what it feels like to be prey in the presence of a predator. Most of our knowledge about predator attacks comes from watching nature documentaries, like Blue Planet or National Geographic, where the prey response can only be witnessed from a third-person point of view. As such, it is easy to impose our own notions of fear and pain upon the creatures viewed on television. However, unlike the animals being filmed, human beings sitting safely in a room would not only feel pain like a pinch or a cut to its full extent, but their ability to feel empathy also causes them to feel sympathetic pain in their own bodies as they watch animals being attacked (Reference LiebermanLieberman 2013: 155). Therefore, observers must recognize their own bodies are in a completely different physiological state than the animals being observed. The animals under attack are flooded with stress hormones that minimize their pain perception and make them stronger and more effective at eluding predators. Even though animals cannot tell us these things for themselves, we can identify these effects in accounts from human beings who have experienced predator attack.

Achmat Hassiem’s shark attack illustrates many aspects of the fight-or-flight response (Reference HassiemHassiem 2010). In 2006, Achmat was swimming off Sunrise Beach with his brother, Taariq. They were treading water during a life-saving exercise while two fellow lifeguards stayed in a boat nearer shore:

Thankfully, Achmat survived to compete with South Africa’s national swimming team at the 2008 Beijing Paralympics. Yet, his experience provides an excellent perspective of prey when attacked by a predator.

Achmat’s sighting of the shark fin initiates the fear event that begins the corresponding adrenal response and his SIA. Also notice Achmat’s splashing successfully distracted the shark from his brother because predators preferentially target prey in distress, which Achmat was simulating. Achmat is more fearful once he is alone in the water, which keeps his stress hormones elevated. Consequently, moments later when the shark attacks, he will not feel pain from the event. Like most prey, Achmat first tries to flee. He tries to push away and get on top of the shark, but is surprised he can’t. He doesn’t know why his right leg won’t move and must look down to visually ascertain his leg is clenched in the shark’s teeth. Notice Achmat’s somatosensory cortex is working, telling him his right leg is immobile, but his ACC is suppressed by endogenous opioids, so he is unable to feel any pain associated with the injury. When Achmat is dragged underwater, we observe the adrenal fight instinct of the cornered animal. He feels anger, uses clear-headed strategies like grabbing the eye and punching the nose, and continues to experience SIA as he punches the shark until the skin on his knuckles is gone. In fact, the analgesia is so strong Achmat breaks his own leg to free himself. Even when safely in the boat, his natural pain suppression is so great he doesn’t realize his lower leg is gone.

Achmat is insensitive to his injuries because endogenous opioids from his pain suppression systems continue to operate throughout his ordeal and afterward like the long-term analgesic responses studied in rats. Researchers discovered the central nervous system has numerous pathways for pain suppression (Reference Basbaum and FieldsBasbaum and Fields 1984). These involve opioid and non-opioid mechanisms which are anatomically and neurochemically distinct from each other (Reference Watkins and MayerWatkins and Mayer 1982). When subjected to inescapable electric shock, rats demonstrated a short-term nonopioid analgesic response for approximately thirty minutes along with a longer-lasting opioid analgesic response lasting up to twenty-four hours after shocks ended (Reference Maier, Davies and GrauMaier et al. 1980; Reference Grau, Hyson, Maier, Madden and BarchasGrau et al. 1981; Reference MaierMaier 1989). However, rats allowed to escape shocks experienced no analgesia whatsoever (Reference Grau, Hyson, Maier, Madden and BarchasGrau et al. 1981: 1409). This suggests opioid-induced analgesia only occurs when subjects cannot evade or avoid the trauma. Achmat, who also found himself in an inescapable traumatic situation, appears to have experienced opioid-induced analgesia similar to rats that endured inescapable shock. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude other mammals experience opioid-induced analgesia when they undergo inescapable predator attack, eliciting the strong endogenous pain suppression mechanisms that block pain perception for hours.

These examples of SIA demonstrate that human beings in otherwise safe environments experience pain differently than humans and mammals under duress (Reference FeinFein 2014: 136). This may explain the observations of Harvard anesthesiologist Dr. Henry K. Beecher. Treating 215 casualties at Anzio beachhead in World War II, Beecher observed, “only one in four soldiers [25%] with serious injuries (fractures, amputations, penetrated chests or cerebrums) asked for morphine, though it was freely available. They simply did not need help with the pain, and indeed many of them denied feeling pain at all” (Reference Brand and YanceyBrand and Yancey 1997: 203–204). Beecher compared soldiers’ responses to injury to his patients in private practice, where 80 percent of patients healing from surgical wounds plead for morphine or other painkillers. These observations may be explained by the studies on rats exposed to inescapable shock. Like the opioid response of these rats, soldiers who faced the inescapable trauma of a battlefield environment would be far more likely to experience ongoing opioid-induced analgesia than patients undergoing (escapable) surgery in a hospital setting. Scholars therefore not only need to avoid anthropocentric assumptions about animal suffering in nature but must also be more self-aware that their protected comfortable environments and relative unfamiliarity with life-threatening fear makes them far less capable of correctly interpreting animal pain than they may realize.

The evidence suggests prey do not suffer from pain while they are fleeing and fighting to survive, but what about those moments near death? Surely, the kill bite must be painful? Again, as observers a safe distance from danger, we often assume this must be the case. Yet, empirical evidence does not appear to support this conclusion either. As observed for Achmat and the Anzio soldiers, the endogenous opioid system operates throughout the threatening episode and beyond. If exhaustion or asphyxiation leads to unconsciousness, as it nearly did for Achmat, it would leave the prey unaware of any additional attacks or injuries from predators. Also, many injuries in nature, whether caused by predation, sickness, or injury, can quickly initiate a life-threatening but opioid-releasing condition known as shock.

Shock can be caused by heavy bleeding (hemorrhagic/hypovolemic shock), damage to the spine (neurogenic shock), or infection entering the blood stream (septic shock) (State Government of Victoria, Australia 2014). Shock causes blood pressure to decrease, reducing the flow of oxygen and nutrients to the brain, heart, lungs, and other organs and, if not reversed, quickly leads to unconsciousness and death. Traumatic injury, hemorrhaging, and sepsis also activate the neuroendocrine and endogenous opiate systems, producing analgesia for critically wounded creatures (Reference MolinaMolina 2003; Reference Molina2006). Therefore, empirical evidence suggests creatures like the gazelle, who will die from tissue trauma and bleeding, experience analgesia both before and after the “kill bite.”

Still, the speed of death is often dependent upon the age of the animal. Young animals can be killed so quickly by predators there is little chance for them to feel pain at all, especially if fear has already produced SIA. In contrast, more mature animals have greater skill and strength for eluding predators but may have to endure longer periods of fighting or fleeing as well, as in the case of a seal lion eluding killer whales or a zebra pursued by hyenas.

During such an encounter, as the animal depletes its glucose it begins showing symptoms of both neurogenic and neuroglycopenic hypoglycemia (Reference EysenckEysenck 2000: 172; Reference CryerCryer 2007: 868–869). Neurogenic hypoglycemia occurs when glucose levels get dangerously low and activate the autonomic nervous system – symptoms include trembling, heart palpitations, nervousness, sweating, hunger, and tingling in the peripheral nerves. Neuroglycopenic hypoglycemia results from glucose blood concentrations dropping too low to fuel normal brain function – symptoms include confusion, a feeling of warmth, weakness/fatigue, drowsiness, severe cognitive failure, seizure, or coma (Reference Towler, Havlin, Craft and CryerTowler et al. 1993; Reference CryerCryer 1999).

So, when prey endure prolonged pursuit by predators who seek to exhaust them, their glucose levels decrease dramatically and can eventually result in measurable cognitive dysfunction and neuronal death (Reference Blomqvist, Gjedde and GutniakBlomqvist et al. 1991; Reference Clarke, Sokoloff, Siegel, Agranoff, Albers and MolinoffClarke and Sokoloff 1994; Reference Aubert, Costalat, Magistretti and PellerinAubert et al. 2005; Reference Lubow, Piñón and AvogaroLubow et al. 2006; Reference SchurrSchurr 2006; Reference CryerCryer 2007: 868). It is therefore likely prey animals experiencing fatigue also begin to experience neuroglycopenic symptoms of disorientation, confusion, drowsiness, and cognitive failure associated with glucose depletion. Consequently, exhausted prey would simultaneously feel opioid-induced analgesia with loss of cognitive awareness and fear before being killed by their predators.

This combination effectively mimics Dawkins’ “tranquilizing effect” that occurs when an animal has depleted its stores of glucose and no longer has the strength to fight or flee. In light of these findings, it may be time to reexamine metaphysical assertions of Nature’s cruelty and indifference, and instead conclude that Nature may be much more concerned for the suffering of her creatures than it may appear on the surface.

4.4 Accounts of Cruel Animals

Philosophical claims of natural evil are frequently based upon incomplete representations of animal behavior. The predatory behaviors of orcas and accounts of avian siblicide have been prime examples of such misunderstandings. In these cases, poorly understood observations of animal behavior are used to suggest evolution has produced creatures that are cruel to the weak and inflict needless suffering upon other animals. Fortunately, scientific advances in environmental ecology and animal behavior can correct such misconceptions and offer insight into God’s providential care in nature.

5.1 Revisiting Rowe’s Evidential Problem of Natural Evil

It is therefore fair for the theist to conclude claims of cruelty in nature have been considerably weakened. First, empirical evidence suggests suffering is not widespread across the evolutionary spectrum and is curtailed far more than previously assumed. Second, without pain perception more highly evolved long-lived species with greater intelligence would be unlikely to exist, their nonexistence being an evil equally bad or worse than existence with pain perception. Together, these two conclusions greatly diminish Rowe’s evidential premise (1) – an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented unnecessary suffering without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.

In premise (2) Rowe claimed an omniscient, wholly good being would prevent unnecessary suffering in nature. This is another widely shared assumption among nontheists regarding the purposes of God, but it too is vulnerable to serious critique. First, scientific evidence suggests unnecessary suffering in nature has been prevented. Second, Rowe and Draper incorrectly imagine an omniscient, wholly good being would adopt their value system of hedonistic utilitarianism, which assumes pleasure and biological success are the greatest goods while pain and biological failure are the greatest harms. Instead, the value system of the biblical Judeo-Christian God is one of love and evidenced in nature by the mitigation of pain through empathetic social interactions and the release of endogenous opioids during traumatic and/or life-threatening situations. In other words, the omniscient, omnipotent, wholly good and loving God of the theist has created a world filled with God’s providential care, which minimizes the suffering of creatures even in the midst of injury and death. Consequently, Rowe’s premise (2) that asserts an omniscient, wholly good being would not allow suffering is inaccurate.

Therefore, since premises (1) and (2) are faulty, Rowe’s conclusion (3) “there does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being” is also unsound.

5.2 Seeking the Best Explanation

In this section, the comparative approach inference to the best explanation will evaluate Draper’s hypothesis of indifference against the Judeo-Christian hypothesis of theism to determine which is more probable. The question is, “Does the Judeo-Christian hypothesis of theism have more or less explanatory and predictive power than the hypothesis of indifference?” For this comparison, the two philosophical hypotheses will be evaluated like scientific hypotheses are where the superior hypothesis is the one that deals with the most evidence, has the greater explanatory power, and correctly anticipates outcomes.

The Judeo-Christian hypothesis of theism:

• Anticipates a finely tuned and ordered cosmos defined by natural laws and described with mathematical precision. The concept of an ordered universe is conveyed in ANE understandings of Genesis 1 as well as the rhetoric found in texts like Psalm 104, Proverbs 8:12–31, and Job 38:4–18.

• Anticipates a telos in the universe that would enable life to evolve from nonlife so creatures could have fellowship with God. This worldview also explains why Earth’s most highly evolved creatures, humans made in the image of God (Gen 1:26–27), would have the capacity to comprehend the order of the cosmos.

• Anticipates and explains why human beings would have an innate sense of morality.

• Anticipates and explains why human beings would have desire for relationship with the divine through religion and/or other spiritual practices.

• Anticipates a loving God would minimize unnecessary suffering among creatures in nature.

• Anticipates and explains why empathetic love would reduce suffering among creatures that feel pain.

In contrast, the hypothesis of indifference states “neither the nature nor the condition of sentient beings on earth is the result of benevolent or malevolent actions performed by non-human persons” (Reference DraperDraper 1989: 332). What does this hypothesis anticipate? Nothing. What does it explain? Nothing. This “hypothesis” is the statement of a negative that cannot be tested. Even if one is supposed to assume by “indifference” that 50/50 random chance is meant, such a hypothesis would predict an ordered universe was as likely as a disordered universe. Evolutionary existence would be as probable as nonexistence. The hypothesis of an indifferent universe would anticipate sentience with equal probability as nonsentience. In fact, the hypothesis of indifference can predict and explain … nothing at all.

Atheism’s greatest strength has been that Western theism, based upon Greco-Roman interpretations of Genesis 1–3, was incompatible with neo-Darwinian evolution and Earth’s geological history (Reference PlantingaPlantinga 2011: 3–63). However, since alternative interpretations are available that incorporate ANE insights and remove purported conflicts between science and the Genesis text (Section 2.4), Judeo-Christian theism is wholly compatible with evolution even as atheism fails to provide the explanatory power it claims. In short, the Judeo-Christian worldview can offer a scientifically tenable explanation of suffering in a neo-Darwinian world that makes the hypothesis of theism more probable than the hypothesis of indifference.