Index

George Tsebelis

doi:10.1017/9781009597234.016

Index

Achen, Christopher, 54, 86, 88

Ackerman, Bruce, 11–13

acquis communautaire, 83

Albert, Richard, xv, 1, 7, 11, 14, 16, 55, 78–81, 151

amendment culture, 2, 78, 82, 85, 89, 130

amendment difficulty, 2, 78–79, 82

amendment provisions, xiii, 19–20, 25, 69, 80, 115, 123, 126–127, 147, 150, 186, 221–222

amendment rate, 2, 82–83, 90, 126, 147–148, 152–153, 155, 157–158, 160–161, 169–170, 176

Anckar, Dag, 1, 126, 151–154

Argentina, 98, 219

Armstrong II, David, 91–92, 94–97, 167, 169

Arrow, Kenneth, 148

Atilano-Robles, Edwin, 127

Australia, 36, 98, 154, 219

Austria, 64, 71, 73, 205, 219

Belgium, 29, 205, 219

Benin, 27, 205, 219

bicameral core, 61, 100, 103, 144

bicameral legislature, 60–61, 64, 71–72, 153–154, 224

Blake, William, 91–96, 97, 167, 169

Botswana, 36

Brown, Adam, 9, 172, 183, 185–186, 218

Burgess, John, 1, 58, 147–148, 150, 160

Carrubba, Clifford, 192, 207, 212

centralization of power, 142

Chile, xiv, 6–9, 21, 65, 70, 98–99, 102–103, 108–110, 113–117, 123–124, 219

citizen initiatives, 35

civic activism, 93–94, 96–97, 169

civil society participation, 96

Colombia, 14, 33, 38, 98, 205, 219

CompLaw Database, 201, 212, 214

concertacesiones, 133, 135

Congleton, Roger, 1, 152–154, 176

constituent assembly, 109–110, 115, 124, 268

constituent power, 13, 47

constitutional amendment, 2, 7, 11–14, 19–20, 23–28, 31, 33–36, 40, 46–48, 50, 52, 54, 65–66, 69–70, 73, 76, 78–79, 82, 90–93, 95, 97, 102, 108, 112, 114–115, 124, 127, 129, 131, 136, 142, 147–148, 150, 152–154, 161, 187, 191, 203, 224

constitutional change, 7, 14, 18, 36, 40, 46, 52, 54, 57, 68, 83, 85, 114, 188

constitutional convention, 9, 18, 49–50, 273

constitutional core, 54, 56–58, 60, 63–65, 100, 103, 106–107, 111, 127–128, 203, 211

constitutional court, 46, 92, 125, 204–205, 207, 211, 213–215, 223

constitutional entrenchment, 2, 83, 130, 170

constitutional equilibrium, 6–9, 12, 14, 16, 19, 54, 93, 141, 175

constitutional flexibility, 2, 28, 83, 150, 170

constitutional interpretation, 8–10, 12, 19, 47–48, 202–203, 221

constitutional length, 171, 176, 180–183, 185

constitutional moments, 11, 13, 222

constitutional reform, 25, 102, 107, 109–110, 113–114, 118, 129, 142

constitutional replacement, 54, 65, 85, 116, 173, 221

constitutional revision, xiv, 27, 30, 32, 50, 59, 64, 70, 72, 79, 100, 102–103, 107, 111, 114, 141, 150, 170, 172, 174, 203, 210–211

constitutional rigidity, xiii–xiv, 1–3, 5, 17, 19–22, 24, 55, 65–66, 69–70, 72–73, 80, 82–83, 85–86, 91, 93, 96, 129, 132, 147–148, 150–155, 157–161, 167, 169–172, 175–176, 184, 191–193, 200, 207, 211, 213–215, 217–218, 222, 224

Cooter, Robert, 190, 201

core, xv, 20, 40, 45, 54–55, 57–66, 68–69, 74, 97, 99–101, 103, 106–107, 116, 123, 127–128, 142, 144–146, 149, 156, 202–203, 211

corruption, 34, 41, 45, 171, 173, 179, 181, 183, 185

Costa Rica, 18, 33, 210

Cozza, Joseph, 91–92, 94–97, 167, 169

cultural theories, 21

Czech Republic, 25, 73, 98, 205

de facto judicial independence, 196, 200

de jure judicial independence, 196

decision-making rules, 52

democracy, 2, 8, 12, 14–15, 17, 42, 45, 77, 85, 97, 155, 159–160, 170, 212, 222

democratic consolidation, 190

Denmark, 36, 154, 170

Dixon, Rosalind, 1, 11–12, 14–15, 35, 77, 115, 153, 171, 188, 210

economic development, 88, 134, 152, 212

Elkins, 130, 152, 173

entrenchment, 24, 171–172

eternal provisions, 32

eternity clauses, 14

federalism, 31, 180

Feld, Lars, 190–191, 193, 195–199

Ferejohn, John, 67, 153, 195

Finke, Daniel, 205–206

Fix-Fierro, Héctor, 131, 141–142

France, 7, 16, 34, 65, 98, 120–122, 154, 192, 205, 207, 212, 219

Friedman, Barry, 192, 204, 207

Friesen, Amanda, 91–92, 94–97, 167, 169

Fuentes, Claudio, xv, 113–114

game theory, 55

Germany, 14, 32, 72–73, 98, 205–206, 219

Ginsburg, Tom, xv, 2, 15, 73, 76, 82–85, 87, 89–90, 126, 129–130, 147, 149, 152–154, 157, 161, 173, 187, 190–191, 194–195, 197–201

Greece, 8, 27, 35, 70, 73, 98

Guatemala, 7, 73, 98, 205, 219

Guyana, 33–34

Hayo, Bernd, 83, 191, 194–199

Helmke, Gretchen, 194–195, 211–212

heteroskedasticity, 150, 158, 160

Howard, Robert, 191, 193, 195, 197, 199

human rights, 15, 41, 49, 71, 150–151, 190, 193, 199, 209, 218, 225

Hungary, 42–43, 98, 170, 205, 219

India, 14, 38, 47, 98, 130, 175, 187, 203, 214, 219

institutional approach, 3, 21, 94, 171, 176

institutional constraints, 83, 127

Ireland, 38, 43, 47–48, 65, 121, 154, 219

Israel, 24, 40, 42, 47, 70, 96, 175, 214, 219, 221

Italy, xiv, 6, 21, 35, 65, 70, 77, 98–99, 101, 103, 111–112, 115–117, 123–125, 154, 205, 214, 219

judicial discretion, 190, 192–193, 200, 202, 207, 212, 217

judicial independence, 3, 83, 132, 190–193, 195–197, 199–201, 207, 211, 213, 215, 217–218, 223

judicial review, 39–40, 43–44, 82, 87, 151, 194, 205, 212

Karvonen, Lauri, 1, 126, 151–154

Keith, Linda, 190, 193, 195, 198–199

Knight, Jack, xv, 204

König, Thomas, 54, 121

Kydland, Finn, 174

La Porta, Rafael, 152, 154, 190, 193, 195–196, 198–199

Lakatos, Imre, 84, 91, 221, 223

Landau, David, 7, 11, 14–15, 77, 115, 210

legal origins, 180

Lijphart, Arend, 1, 71, 111, 126, 151–154, 176

Linzer, Drew, 191, 195–196, 199

Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio, 151, 191, 193, 195–196, 198–199

Lorenz, Astrid, 1, 126, 151, 153–154

Lutz, Donald, 1, 126, 132, 151–154, 176

Luxembourg, 31, 73, 205, 219

Marshfield, Jonathan, 2, 83, 170, 176

Martin, Andrew, 192, 207, 212

Melton, James, 2, 73, 76, 82–85, 88–90, 126, 129, 147, 149, 152–154, 157, 161, 173, 187, 191, 194–195, 197–200

Mexico, xiv, 6, 9, 21, 55, 60, 62, 74, 98, 126–130, 133–139, 141–146, 175, 187

Michigan, xv, 49–51, 148

Moldova, 36, 98, 205

necessary conditions, 22, 97, 214, 223

Negretto, xv, 71, 74, 126

Nevada, 37–38

Nigeria, 33

North Dakota, 51

Ohio, 50–51

PAN, 134–142

Poe, Steven, 193, 195, 198–199

Poland, 26, 98, 205, 220

policy space, 56, 66

political culture, 77, 94, 146

political parties, 42, 55, 94, 97, 109, 113, 118, 122, 130, 133–134, 137–138, 140

Polity, 19, 70, 73, 148–149, 160, 192, 199, 213–214

Pop-Eleches, Cristian, 151, 190, 193, 195–196, 198–199

popular initiatives, 68

PRD, 134, 136–139, 143

Prescott, Edward, 174

PRI, 55, 127, 133–142, 146, 211

Prokch, Sven-Oliver, 121

Putnam, Robert, 76–77, 92

qualified majorities, 10, 20, 23, 69, 73, 127, 151, 153, 222

quorum requirements, 20, 118

Rasch, Bjørn, xv, 1, 83, 116, 152–154, 176

referendums, 20, 23, 28, 36–38, 48–49, 52, 65, 70, 99, 116, 118, 120–121, 124–125, 151, 222

rigidity index, 21, 73–74, 154, 160, 192–193, 201

Ríos-Figueroa, Julio, xv, 191, 194–195, 197–199, 211

Rosenbluth, Frances, 194–195, 211

Roznai, Yaniv, 11, 43–44, 210

separation of powers, 44, 69

Shleifer, Andrei, 151, 190, 193, 195–196, 198–199

single-subject rule, 52

Slovakia, 44, 46, 205

social capital, 91–94, 97, 169

South Korea, 26, 98

Spain, 7, 35, 98, 170, 205, 220

Stanton, Kimberly, 108–110

Staton, Jeffrey, 190–191, 194–197, 199, 212

statutory interpretation, 8, 10, 141, 201–202

sufficient conditions, 64, 149

supreme courts, xiv, 205

Switzerland, 35, 73, 98

Tarabar, Danko, 89, 91

term limits, 7, 15, 34, 38, 51, 210

time inconsistency, 2, 19, 21, 171, 174–176, 178, 186–189, 223

Tsebelis, George, 28, 67, 72, 74, 98, 108, 114, 121, 132–133, 152–153, 156, 159, 172, 177, 181, 184, 200–201, 209

Ukraine, 46, 98, 205

unconstitutional constitutional amendments, 14, 222

United States, 25, 98, 122, 129, 137, 172, 204, 207, 212, 220

Uribe, Alvaro, 14, 34, 36

Vanberg, Georg, 192, 205–207

Velasco-Rivera, Mariana, 126–127, 140

Versteeg, Mila, 2, 83, 130, 161, 170–171, 174, 176, 187, 192

veto players, xiii, 54, 69, 71–73, 148, 152–153, 157, 160, 170, 201, 224

Voigt, Stefan, 83, 179, 186, 190–191, 193–199

Weingast, Barry, 54, 190, 193

win-set, 20, 60, 64, 66, 69, 74, 111, 116, 208–209

World Values Survey, 95, 97

Zackin, Emily, 2, 83, 130, 161, 170–171, 174, 176, 187

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