Hostname: page-component-669899f699-7tmb6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-04-26T14:51:34.218Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

The Department of Justice Issues Regulations to Prevent Access to Americans’ Bulk Sensitive Personal Data by Foreign Adversaries

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 April 2025

Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Type
International Economic Law
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of American Society of International Law

The U.S. Department of Justice has issued regulations to prevent access to Americans’ bulk sensitive personal data by foreign adversaries.Footnote 1 The rules prohibit for the first time U.S. persons from entering into certain transactions that could give countries, like China, access to such data. The rules also restrict other transactions absent the implementation of specified security requirements.Footnote 2 The rules do not cover U.S. government collection of commercially available information, nor is their purpose to protect privacy interests.Footnote 3 Concerns about foreign access to U.S. personal data, through illicit acts (like hacking) and lawful measures (such as collecting and purchasing publicly available information), have existed for years.Footnote 4 Yet, U.S. law and policy have generally opposed the imposition of limits on private sector cross-border data flows. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) review and rejection of transactions, like that for TikTok, due to data security concerns have been the exception and are of limited scope.Footnote 5 The new regulations, together with other recent rules and governmental actions, signal a change in approach.Footnote 6 The shift reflects a fear in U.S. law enforcement and national security agencies that existing rules are insufficient to counter the increasing risk of electronic espionage by China and other countries stemming from the proliferation of data, data collection, data sales, and the development of artificial intelligence technologies and other forms of data analysis.Footnote 7

Data flows are a staple of international commerce and communications; they can transmit ideas and norms; they can promote human rights and global health; and they can be misused by private and public actors to impose privacy harms and create national security risks. Despite the harms and risks, U.S. policy, across administrations, has championed the free cross-border flow of information and has sought to establish international norms and mechanisms that limit the regulation of transnational data transfers. The United States initiated and promoted the Declaration on the Future of the Internet, which committed signatories to “[p]romote [their] work to realize the benefits of data free flows.”Footnote 8 In the context of the G7, it has supported the Data Free Flow with Trust concept first proposed by Japan.Footnote 9 It has backed the Global Cross-Border Privacy Rules Forum, which included as one of its objectives support for the free flow of data.Footnote 10 In trade agreements and fora, the United States has proposed policies that safeguard cross-border data flows, prohibited data localization requirements, and restricted government access to software source code.Footnote 11

But U.S. support for unrestricted data flows abruptly shifted in late 2023. At a meeting of the World Trade Organization's Joint Statement Initiative on Electronic Commerce, the United States withdrew a proposal, first made in 2019 during the Trump administration,Footnote 12 that took a strong position in favor of free cross-border data flows and against data localization and software source code review.Footnote 13 Announcing the decision, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) stated that “[m]any countries, including the United States, are examining their approaches to data and source code, and the impact of trade rules in these areas. In order to provide enough policy space for those debates to unfold, the United States has removed its support for proposals that might prejudice or hinder those domestic policy consideration.”Footnote 14 Soon thereafter, USTR also paused Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity talks on digital trade.Footnote 15 USTR's decisions drew protests from the business community, which benefits from open data borders and international restrictions on the domestic regulation of data transfers, and a mixed reception in Congress, where some have argued for a trade policy that reserves leeway for greater domestic digital governance.Footnote 16

USTR did not provide a full explanation for the announced policy shift, but U.S Trade Representative Katherine Tai offered some insight into the decision in remarks she gave early in 2024.Footnote 17 Ambassador Tai noted the transformation in the role of data in international transactions over the past two decades from facilitating traditional transactions (in goods) to becoming the subject of the transaction itself. This change, she explained, “give[s] you a sense . . . that there are much, much bigger equities at stake than what we might be doing in our trade negotiations.”Footnote 18 Before making additional international commitments, she said, the United States needed to give further consideration to “how we regulate data, . . . how we regulate the companies that accumulate, harvest, and trade in this data,” and the relationship between “trade [in data] and national security.”Footnote 19

Ambassador Tai's comments on data and national security foreshadowed President Biden's issuance, just a couple of weeks later, of an executive order on “Preventing Access to Americans’ Bulk Sensitive Personal Data and United States Government-Related Data by Countries of Concern.”Footnote 20 The order directed the attorney general to issue regulations restricting the sale of personal information by data brokers to adversaries “when such access would pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States.”Footnote 21 Uncontrolled access to Americans’ personal data constituted, according to the order, an “unusual and extraordinary threat.”Footnote 22 Adversaries could “use access to bulk data sets to fuel the creation and refinement of AI and other advanced technologies, thereby improving their ability to exploit the underlying data.”Footnote 23 They could use “sensitive personal data linked to populations and locations associated with the Federal Government—including the military— . . . to reveal insights . . . that threaten national security.”Footnote 24 They could use data “to track and build profiles on United States individuals, including Federal employees and contractors, for illicit purposes, including blackmail and espionage.”Footnote 25 And they could use data “to collect information on activists, academics, journalists, dissidents, political figures, or members of non-governmental organizations or marginalized communities in order to intimidate such persons; curb dissent or political opposition; otherwise limit freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly, or association; or enable other forms of suppression of civil liberties.”Footnote 26 “Buying data through data brokers is currently legal in the United States,” a senior administration official commented, “and that reflects a gap in our national security tool kit that we're working to fill.”Footnote 27

The new Department of Justice regulations implementing the order limit commercial transactions involving bulk U.S. sensitive personal data or government-related data.Footnote 28 U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in data brokerage transactions with a “country of concern” or a “covered person” that involves any access to such data.Footnote 29 “Countries of concern” include China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela.Footnote 30 A “covered person” is a non-U.S. individual who is primarily a resident of a country of concern, is an employee or contractor of a covered entity, or is a person designated as such by the attorney general.Footnote 31 A “covered person” is also a non-U.S. entity that is organized or has its principal place of business in a country of concern or is more than 50 percent owned by a country of concern or covered persons.Footnote 32 Other transactions—those involving vendor agreements, employment agreements, and investment agreements—are restricted, that is they are prohibited unless the U.S. person complies with U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency-issued security requirements and has developed and implemented a data compliance program and conducted an audit.Footnote 33 Certain types of transactions that might otherwise have been prohibited or restricted are exempted (such as those pertaining to scientific research), and applications for licenses can be made.Footnote 34 Civil and criminal penalties apply to violations.Footnote 35

Sensitive to the significance of these new prohibitions and restrictions on data transactions, the executive order reiterated the United States’ continued commitment to “supporting a vibrant, global economy by promoting cross-border data flows required to enable international commerce and trade; and facilitating open investment.”Footnote 36 The order made clear that it did “not authorize the imposition of generalized data localization requirements.”Footnote 37 It also clarified that it did “not broadly prohibit United States persons from conducting commercial transactions . . . with entities and individuals” from countries of concern or “impose measures aimed at a broader decoupling of the substantial consumer, economic, scientific, and trade relationships that the United States has with other countries.”Footnote 38

Though the new rule is consistent with the new Trump administration's stance on China, its future is unclear.Footnote 39

References

1 See Preventing Access to U.S. Sensitive Personal Data and Government-Related Data by Countries of Concern or Covered Persons, 90 Fed. Reg. 1636 (Jan. 8, 2025) [hereinafter Final Rule]. The regulations implement an executive order. See Preventing Access to Americans’ Bulk Sensitive Personal Data and United States Government-Related Data by Countries of Concern, Exec. Order 14117, 89 Fed. Reg. 15421 (Feb. 28, 2024) [hereinafter Executive Order].

2 See Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Security Requirements for Restricted Transactions (Jan. 2025), at https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2025-01/Security_Requirements_for_Restricted_Transaction-EO_14117_Implementation508.pdf [https://perma.cc/BD4V-CUTB].

3 On the U.S. government's collection of the personal data of Americans, see, for example, Byron Tau, Andrew Mollica, Patience Haggin & Dustin Volz, How Ads on Your Phone Can Aid Government Surveillance, Wall St. J. (Oct. 13, 2023), at https://www.wsj.com/tech/cybersecurity/how-ads-on-your-phone-can-aid-government-surveillance-943bde04; Byron Tau & Dustin Volz, U.S. Spy Agencies Buy Vast Quantities of Americans’ Personal Data, U.S. Says, Wall St. J. (June 12, 2023), at https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-spy-agencies-buy-vast-quantities-of-americans-personal-data-report-says-f47ec3ad; and Byron Tau & Michelle Hackman, Federal Agencies Use Cellphone Location Data for Immigration Enforcement, Wall St. J. (Feb. 7, 2020), at https://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-agencies-use-cellphone-location-data-for-immigration-enforcement-11581078600. See generally Office of the Director of National Intelligence Senior Advisory Group Panel on Commercially Available Information, Report to the Director of National Intelligence (Jan. 27, 2022), at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ODNI-Declassified-Report-on-CAI-January2022.pdf [https://perma.cc/26S8-4EBW].

4 See, e.g., Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community 26 (Feb. 6, 2023), at https://www.odni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2023-Unclassified-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/TD3B-QF9E]; National Counterintelligence & Security Center, China's Collection of Genomic and Other Healthcare Data from America: Risks to Privacy and U.S. Economic and National Security (Feb. 2021), at https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/SafeguardingOurFuture/NCSC_China_Genomics_Fact_Sheet_2021revision20210203.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ETC-4J7Z].

5 CFIUS's concern with the data security consequences of Chinese investments in U.S. businesses is longstanding, resulting for example in the aborted merger of MoneyGram and Ant Financial in 2018. See Ana Swanson & Paul Mozur, MoneyGram and Ant Financial Call Off Merger, Citing Regulatory Concerns, N.Y. Times (Jan. 2, 2018), at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/02/business/moneygram-ant-financial-china-cfius.html. Congress expanded CFIUS jurisdiction over investments involving sensitive personal data in the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act. See 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4)(B)(iii)(III). President Biden's executive order on CFIUS specifically directed the review of transactions pertaining to sensitive data. See Ensuring Robust Consideration of Evolving National Security Risks by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, Exec. Order 14083, Sec. 3(c), 87 Fed. Reg. 57369 (Sept. 15, 2022). CFIUS, most famously, recommended that Chinese-owned ByteDance be required to divest its interest in TikTok. President Donald J. Trump endorsed that recommendation, resulting in litigation and settlement negotiations that continued during the Biden administration. In 2024, Congress enacted a law that would require divestment. See Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, Pub. L. 118-50, Div. H, 138 Stat. 895, 955 (Apr. 24, 2024). The Supreme Court found the statute constitutional. See TikTok v. Garland, Nos. 24-656 & 24-257 (Jan. 17, 2025). President Trump, however, upon re-entering office, ordered the attorney general not to enforce the law for seventy-five days. See Application of Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act to TikTok, Exec. Order 14166, 90 Fed. Reg. 8611 (Jan. 20, 2025).

6 See, e.g., Protecting Americans’ Sensitive Data from Foreign Adversaries, Exec. Order 14034, 86 Fed. Reg. 31423 (June 9, 2021); Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain; Connected Software Applications, 88 Fed. Reg. 39353 (June 16, 2023); Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain: Connected Vehicles, 90 Fed. Reg. 5360 (Jan. 16, 2025); Protecting Americans’ Data from Foreign Adversaries Act, Pub. L. 118-50, Div. I, 138 Stat. 895, 960 (Apr. 24, 2024).

7 See, e.g., National Counterintelligence & Security Center, National Counterintelligence Strategy 2024, at 13 (Aug. 1, 2024), at https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/features/NCSC_CI_Strategy-pages-20240730.pdf [https://perma.cc/73GJ-FEFR].

10 See U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Global Cross-Border Privacy Rules Declaration (Apr. 2022), at https://www.commerce.gov/global-cross-border-privacy-rules-declaration [https://perma.cc/3TPG-SAKN].

11 See Agreement Between the United States of America and Japan Concerning Digital Trade, Arts. 11–12, TIAS 20-101.1 (Oct. 7, 2019); Agreement Between the United States of America, the United Mexican States, and Canada, Arts. 19.11–19.12 (Nov. 30, 2018).

12 See Communication from the United States, WTO Doc. INF/ECOM/6 (Mar. 25, 2019).

13 See David Lawder, US Drops Digital Trade Demands at WTO to Allow Room for Stronger Tech Regulation, Reuters (Oct. 25, 2023), at https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-drops-digital-trade-demands-wto-allow-room-stronger-tech-regulation-2023-10-25.

15 See David Lawder, U.S. Suspends Indo-Pacific Talks on Key Aspects of Digital Trade – Lawmakers, Reuters (Nov. 8, 2023), at https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/us-suspends-indo-pacific-talks-key-aspects-digital-trade-lawmakers-2023-11-08.

16 See, e.g., Letter from Elizabeth Warren and Eleven Other Members of Congress to President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (Nov. 6, 2023), at https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FINAL%20Letter%20to%20Biden%20in%20Support%20of%20USTR%20Digital%20Trade%20Work.pdf [https://perma.cc/AP2X-GEBL]; U.S. Senate Committee on Finance Press Release, Wyden Statement on Ambassador Tai's Decision to Abandon Digital Trade Leadership to China at WTO (Oct. 25, 2023), at https://www.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/wyden-statement-on-ambassador-tais-decision-to-abandon-digital-trade-leadership-to-china-at-wto [https://perma.cc/6BS4-EEXA]; Senator Mike Crapo Press Release, Crapo and Colleagues Condemn Biden Administration's Decision to Cede U.S. Digital Leadership to China (Oct. 26, 2023), at https://www.crapo.senate.gov/media/newsreleases/crapo-and-colleagues-condemn-biden-administrations-decision-to-cede-us-digital-leadership-to-china [https://perma.cc/35N8-2NKP]; U.S. Chamber of Commerce Press Release, U.S. Chamber and Other Associations Letter to NSC/NEC on Digital Trade (Nov. 7, 2023), at https://www.uschamber.com/international/trade-agreements/u-s-chamber-and-other-associations-letter-to-nsc-nec-on-digital-trade [https://perma.cc/KY4X-HAC4].

17 See Council on Foreign Relations, C. Peter McColough Series on International Economics with Katherine Tai (Feb. 12, 2024), at https://www.cfr.org/event/c-peter-mccolough-series-international-economics-katherine-tai-0 [https://perma.cc/NT64-9MQS].

18 Id.

19 Id.

20 See Executive Order, supra note 1. The order was founded on the president's constitutional authority and that provided by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. § 1701, et seq.

21 Executive Order, supra note 1, Sec. 1.

22 Id., pmbl.

23 Id.

24 Id.

25 Id., Sec. 1.

26 Id.

27 Dustin Volz & Lingling Wei, U.S. Limits Sales of Americans’ Personal Data to China, Other Adversaries, Wall St. J. (Feb. 28, 2024), at https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/u-s-to-limit-sales-of-americans-personal-data-to-china-other-adversaries-e82a3ca5.

28 Final Rule, supra note 1, at 1639. “Government-related data” includes as certain geolocation data for any location within any area that's identified in a list included in the regulation. See id. at 1712 (adding 28 C.F.R. § 202.222(a)). It also includes sensitive personal data that is linked or linkable to current or recent former U.S. government employees or contractors, or former senior officials. See id. “U.S. sensitive personal data” is defined as “covered personal identifiers, precise geolocation data, biometric identifiers, human ‘omic data, personal health data, personal financial data, or any combination thereof.” See id. at 1716 (adding 28 C.F.R. § 202.249).The definition of the adjective “bulk” is based on exceeding a certain threshold, which varies by data category. See id. at 1708 (adding 28 C.F.R. § 202.205).

29 See id. at 1717 (adding 28 C.F.R. § 202.301). It also prohibited human ‘omic data transactions, transactions with non-covered persons that lack restrictions on subsequent transactions, and evading or directing prohibited transactions. See id. at 1718–19 (adding 28 C.F.R. §§ 202.303–202.305).

30 See id at 1725 (adding 28 CFR § 202.601(a)).

31 See id. at 1708–09 (adding 28 C.F.R. § 202.211); see also id. at 1725 (adding 28 C.F.R. § 202.701).

32 See id.

33 See id. at 1719, 1728 (adding 28 C.F.R. §§ 202.401, 202.1001, 202.1002).

34 See id. at 1721 (adding 28 C.F.R. §§ 202.506, 220.507).

35 See id. at 1730 (adding 28 C.F.R. § 202.1301). The penalties are those that apply under Section 206 of IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. § 1705.

36 Executive Order, supra note 1, Sec. 1.

37 Id.

38 Id.

39 President Trump's regulatory freeze memorandum directed all federal departments and agencies to consider postponing rules, like the bulk sensitive data regulations, that were published in the Federal Register but not yet in effect. See Regulatory Freeze Pending Review, para. 3, 90 Fed. Reg. 8249 (Jan. 20, 2025). The Executive Order, supra note 1, that serves as the legal basis for the regulations was not among the orders rescinded by President Trump upon assuming office. See Initial Rescissions of Harmful Executive Orders and Actions, Exec. Order 14148, 90 Fed. Reg. 8237 (Jan. 20, 2025).