In the first of our three pieces responding to Richard Dawkins's The God Delusion, David Benatar suggests that Dawkins is preaching ‘the gospel of secular optimism’.

Around 1998, internet postings began appearing under the alias ‘Timetravel_0’. This alias was later replaced by ‘John Titor’, and it's as such I'll designate the posts' author(s). Remarkably, Titor claimed to have time-travelled from 2036 on a mission to retrieve an IBM 5100 in 1975. Titor refrained from public appearances and any evidence for his story remains web-bound but before closing shop c. March 24th 2001, he described various future events, e.g.:

Mark Piper introduces the best-known and perhaps most powerful of all the arguments against the existence of God.

In Harrison and Tanner's (2011) ‘Better Not to Have Children’, it's argued that having children is immoral as well as detrimental to one's well-being. In this article, I argue against those claims and defend the position that, for most people, having children is morally permissible and greatly enhances their well-being.

It is my contention that what is generally construed as the Euthyphro Dilemma as a reason to deny that moral facts are based on theological facts is one of the worst arguments proposed in philosophy of religion or ethical theory, and that Socrates, the character of the dialogue who poses the dilemma, was both morally bankrupt in his challenge to Euthyphro, but more importantly here, ought to have lost the argument hands down. But in any dialogue, the author controls what people say. Plato was able to easily give Socrates the victory by writing the ending of the story himself, where Euthyphro, believing that piety is what the gods approve of, loses the argument abysmally. The version of events presented here is different. This time, Euthyphro is permitted to offer a reasonable defence of his position, and he has the benefit of having been able to read all that has been said on the Euthyphro dilemma over the last couple of millennia, and especially the last fifty years. Under such circumstances, Socrates does not stand a chance. We arrive at our scene, the steps of the Dunedin High Court, in Dunedin, New Zealand, on a cool mid-winter July morning.

Beenfeldt assesses Dennett's approach to the philosophical problem of consciousness.

Toot. Pass gas. Break wind. Cut the cheese. Float an air biscuit. Burp from behind. Blow the brown horn. The backfire, bant, bucksnort, booty bomb, colon cologne, drifter, fanny bubble, gasser, gurgler, moon beam, nether belch, pants puffer, pooh tune, rip-snort, sphincter whistle, thunder dumpling, tush tickler, and trouser cough. These are synonyms for a bodily function that is as natural as breathing, eating, or sleeping. Yet unlike other physiological functions, the ‘flatus’ is a source of endless humor – perhaps more so than any other subject in human experience. But why are farts funny? That is a question that is both serious and philosophically interesting.

Recent events in the Middle East once again focused attention on the Israel/Palestine issue. In the following article, adapted from his recent book, Ted Honderich controversially defends the Palestinians' moral right to engage in terrorism.

It is claimed that the universe appears to be fine-tuned so as to admit the development of life. In this article Rodney Holder examines the evidence for fine-tuning and the chief rival explanation to design, namely the existence of a ‘multiverse’.

It is often thought that the first question of morality is ‘Why be moral?’, but since it is often thought that morality opposes our happiness, it is best to start with the question, ‘Why not be immoral?’. An answer is given: being immoral is self-disrespecting, and self-respect is necessary for happiness.

James Warren responds to Sandis's preceding article.

This article analyses some familiar arguments both for, and against, same-sex civil marriage. I argue that it is not enough to defend gay marriage by a simple appeal to equality, unless one addresses the view that same-sex marriage would be contrary to the objective nature and purpose of marriage. I illustrate the ways in which a stand-off is reached in discussions of this particular matter. I also suggest that there is a mystery about what the ‘upgrade’ from a faithful relationship to marriage amounts to, but that part of the answer is that marriage embodies a state-recognized social transition. This is underpinned by the interest that society has in marriage, largely owing to its facilitating a stable environment for children. However, I suggest that marriage also properly functions as a way to uphold commitment and love, and conclude that that there is no good reason not to uphold – through marriage – those things in same-sex relationships. But I concede that religious organisations with theological objections to same-sex marriage should not be obliged to conduct gay weddings.

This essay takes a hard look at the current state of much academic (mainly analytic) philosophy and sets out to diagnose where things have gone wrong. It offers a sharply critical assessment of the prevailing narrowness, cliquishness, linguistic inertness, like-mindedness, intellectual caution, misplaced scientism, over-specialisation, guild mentality, lack of creative or inventive flair, and above all the self-perpetuating structures of privilege and patronage that have worked to produce this depressing situation. On the constructive side I suggest how a belated encounter with developments beyond its cultural-professional horizons – including certain aspects of ‘continental’ philosophy – might bring large (and reciprocal) benefits. I also offer some tentative ideas as to what ‘creativity’ could or should mean as applied to philosophical thinking and writing.

What explains our moral intuitions?

Many claim that belief in God is like belief in Santa Claus – it's an irrational belief that people justify with irrational arguments because they cherish it and because it comforts them. In this dialogue, true believers ‘have it out’ regarding whether either of their beliefs – belief in God, or belief in Santa – is rational, and a direct parallel between the reasoning of the two sides is demonstrated. Many important arguments regarding theistic belief are discussed in some form. The article is intended for use in an introduction to philosophy, or an introductory philosophy of religion course, as a humorous way to foster discussion and expose students to criticisms of theistic arguments, and to consider the possibility that theistic belief is no better than belief in the existence of Santa Claus. Act One.

Many philosophers maintain that a being's moral status depends on its capacities, for example, whether the being is rational or sentient. In the notorious ‘argument from marginal cases’, animal rights advocates make use of this received view by arguing that because infants and the severely cognitively disabled have no more capacities than many animals, animals have status equivalent to humans and are entitled to equal moral consideration. But although capacities may be relevant to moral status, they do not determine it. Ultimately, we need to consider the objectives of morality in determining what obligations we have towards any group of beings, whether they are aliens, humans, or animals.

Michael Hauskeller discusses a famous thought-experiment that appears to show that we actually want far more then merely to feel happy.

The following argument presents a refutation of the existence of God under a certain description, which, it will be maintained, is the only description that most traditional monotheists could accept. Therefore, either God, as defined by traditional monotheism, does not exist or something that might be called ‘God’ exists, but would not be acceptable to monotheism as truly being God. Either way, God does not exist.1

We often hear that certain mental disorders are disorders of the brain, but it is not clear what this claim amounts to. Does it mean that they are like classic brain diseases such as brain cancer? I argue that this is not the case for most mental disorders. Neither does the claim that all mental disorders are brain disorders follow from a materialist world-view. The only plausible way of understanding mental disorders as brain disorders is a fairly modest one, where we label brain differences we find in mental illness as pathological based on their link to mental dysfunction. How many mental disorders will turn out to be brain disorders on this understanding is an empirical question.