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The Demand and Supply of False Consciousness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 January 2025

Brian Kogelmann
Brian Kogelmann*
Affiliation:
John Chambers College of Business and Economics, West Virginia University
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Why do oppressive social and political systems persist for as long as they do? Critical theorists posit that the oppressed are in the grip of ideology or false consciousness, leading them voluntarily to accept their servitude. An objection to this explanation points out that we have no account of how the ruling class’s ideology comes to dominate. One common reply says that the ruling class’s ideology comes to dominate because they control major organizations such as schools, churches, and news agencies. This response is seriously flawed, I argue. I then explore an alternative, neglected answer: The ruling class’s ideology dominates because believing it is good for the oppressed. After sketching some details, I explore the implications of this account for critical theory as a research program.

Keywords

ideologyfalse consciousnessideology critiquecritical theorypropagandaorigin puzzlepersistent oppressionmotivated reasoningconfirmation biasJon Elster
Type
Research Article
Information
Social Philosophy and Policy , Volume 41 , Issue 1 , Summer 2024 , pp. 203 - 222
Copyright
© 2025 Social Philosophy & Policy Foundation. Printed in the USA

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64 How might one deny this claim? There are two ways. First, one could deny the welfarist framework. For instance, one could argue that ideology critique makes members of G better off because it is objectively better to hold true beliefs over false beliefs, even if these true beliefs make one subjectively worse off. Second, one could embrace the welfarist framework, but argue that members of G would prefer to believe O over R in an oppressive system, even if believing R is good for their self-esteem and nurtures adaptive motivations. This may be because, for example, learning the truth about R and coming to believe O gives them a feeling of intellectual maturity or even superiority; these positive feelings outweigh the negatives associated with believing O in an oppressive system.