Hostname: page-component-669899f699-chc8l Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-04-27T11:04:53.207Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 May 2009

Duncan Pritchard
Duncan Pritchard
Affiliation:
Edinburgh University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
Image of the first page of this content. For PDF version, please use the ‘Save PDF’ preceeding this image.'
Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 64 , July 2009 , pp. 19 - 43
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2009

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Achinstein, P. (1983) The Nature of Explanation, Oxford University Press, Oxford.Google Scholar
Brogaard, B. (2007) “I Know. Therefore, I Understand”, typescript.Google Scholar
Chisholm, R. (1977) Theory of Knowledge (2nd Ed.), Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.Google Scholar
Elgin, C. (1996) Considered Judgement, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Elgin, C. (2004) “True Enough”, Philosophical Issues 14, 113–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Elgin, C. (Forthcoming). “Is Understanding Factive?”, Epistemic Value, (eds.) Haddock, A., Millar, A. & Pritchard, D. H., Oxford University Press, Oxford.Google Scholar
Greco, J. (1999) “Agent Reliabilism”, Philosophical Perspectives 13, 273–96.Google Scholar
Greco, J. (2000) Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Greco, J. (2002) “Knowledge as Credit for True Belief”, Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, (eds.) DePaul, M. & Zagzebski, L., Oxford University Press, Oxford.Google Scholar
Greco, J. (2007) “The Nature of Ability and the Purpose of Knowledge”, typescript.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Greco, J. (Forthcominga) “The Value Problem”, in The Value of Knowledge, (eds.) Haddock, A., Millar, A., & Pritchard, D. H., Oxford University Press, Oxford.Google Scholar
Greco, J. (Forthcomingb) “What's Wrong With Contextualism?”, The Philosophical Quarterly.Google Scholar
Grimm, S. (2006) “Is Understanding a Species of Knowledge?”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57, 515–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kitcher, P. (2002) “Scientific Knowledge”, in Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, (ed.) Moser, P., Oxford University Press, Oxford.Google Scholar
Kvanvig, J. (2003) The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kvanvig, J. (Forthcoming) “Responses”, in The Value of Knowledge, (eds.) Haddock, A., Millar, A., & Pritchard, D. H., Oxford University Press, Oxford.Google Scholar
Lackey, J. (2007) “Why We Don't Deserve Credit for Everything We Know”, Synthese 156.Google Scholar
Lipton, P. (2004) Inference to the Best Explanation, Routledge, London.Google Scholar
Pritchard, D. H. (2002). “Resurrecting the Moorean Response to the Sceptic”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10, 283–307.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pritchard, D. H. (2005) Epistemic Luck, Oxford University Press, Oxford.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pritchard, D. H. (2006) “Knowledge, Luck and Lotteries”, in New Waves in Epistemology, (eds.) Hendricks, V. F. & Pritchard, D. H., Palgrave Macmillan, London.Google Scholar
Pritchard, D. H. (2007 a) “Anti-Luck Epistemology”, Synthese 156.Google Scholar
Pritchard, D. H. (2007 b) “Recent Work on Epistemic Value”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 44, 85–110.Google Scholar
Pritchard, D. H. (2007 c) “Sosa On Epistemic Value”, 2nd On-Line Philosophy Conference, http://experimentalphilosophy.typepad.com/2nd_annual_online_philoso/2007/05/ernest_sosa.htmlGoogle Scholar
Pritchard, D. H. (2007 d) “The Value of Knowledge”, typescript.Google Scholar
Pritchard, D. H. (Forthcominga). “A Defence of Quasi-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony”, Philosophica.Google Scholar
Pritchard, D. H. (Forthcomingb) “Greco on Knowledge: Virtues, Contexts, Achievements”, The Philosophical Quarterly.Google Scholar
Pritchard, D. H. (Forthcomingc) “Knowing the Answer, Understanding and Epistemic Value”, Grazer Philosophische Studien.Google Scholar
Rabinowicz, W., & Roennow-Rasmussen, T. (1999) “A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and For its Own Sake”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100, 33–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rabinowicz, W., & Roennow-Rasmussen, T. (2003) “Tropic of Value”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66, 389–403.Google Scholar
Riggs, W. (Forthcoming) “Getting the Meno Requirement Right”, in Epistemic Value, (eds.) Haddock, A., Millar, A. & Pritchard, D. H., Oxford University Press, Oxford.Google Scholar
Salmon, W. (1989) “Four Decades of Scientific Explanation”, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13.Google Scholar
Sartwell, C. (1992) “Why Knowledge is Merely True Belief”, Journal of Philosophy, 89, 167–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sosa, E. (1988) “Beyond Skepticism, to the Best of our Knowledge”, Mind 97, 153–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sosa, E. (1991) Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sosa, E. (1999) “How to Defeat Opposition to Moore”, Philosophical Perspectives 13, 141–54.Google Scholar
Sosa, E. (2007) A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stich, S. (1990) The Fragmentation of Reason, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
Unger, P. (1968) “An Analysis of Factual Knowledge”, Journal of Philosophy 65, 157–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williamson, T. (2000) Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford University Press, Oxford.Google Scholar
Woodward, J. (2003) Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation, Oxford University Press, Oxford.Google Scholar
Zagzebski, L. (1996) Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zagzebski, L. (1999) “What is Knowledge?”, in The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, (eds.) Greco, J. & Sosa, E., 92–116, Blackwell, Oxford.Google Scholar
Zagzebski, L. (2001) “Recovering Understanding”, in Knowledge, Truth and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility and Virtue, (ed.) Steup, M., Oxford University Press, Oxford.Google Scholar
Zagzebski, L. (2003) “The Search for the Source of the Epistemic Good”, Metaphilosophy 34, 12–28; and reprinted in Moral and Epistemic Virtues, (eds.) M. S. Brady & D. H. Pritchard, 13–28, Blackwell, Oxford (2003).CrossRefGoogle Scholar