What are the local political, economic, and social conditions of the communities that sent insurrectionists to the US Capitol in support of Donald Trump? Using a new dataset of the home counties of individuals charged for the Capitol insurrection, we tested two prominent theories of electoral populism and support for populist leaders like Donald Trump—demographic change and manufacturing decline—and whether they also explain violent populism. We also examined the effects of local political conditions. We find that white population decline is a stronger predictor of violent populism and that counties that voted for Trump were less likely to fight for Trump. The effect of white population decline is even greater in counties whose US House Representative rejected the 2020 election results. These findings suggest scholars should resist assuming violent populism is merely an extension of electoral populism, and solutions to one will not necessarily remedy the other.

The authors of this article advocate a new curriculum that can be applied to American government, introduction to political science, and state and local government courses. For the past half-century, high school and college general-education requirements have deemphasized civics, government, and political science. In response to the corresponding decrease in the nation’s civic health, this proposal is based on three principles. First, teaching citizenship is different than teaching civics. Second, citizenship is taught most effectively by engagement in the “real world,” with students completing projects that take them step by step through the policy-change process. Finally, the education and preparation of future high school government teachers needs to change to encourage them to teach their students the rights, responsibilities, and competencies of active citizenship.

What undergirds the association between religious and political conservatism and “group-serving pronatalism”; that is, support for childbearing to advance social or political goals rather than for personal fulfillment? Although recent research suggests that Christian nationalism—reflecting a desire to formally privilege conservative Christian values and identity—strongly accounts for the link, previous studies have not inquired about specific group-serving reasons to have children. Analyses of nationally representative data affirm Christian nationalism (measured in two ways) as the strongest predictor of support for group-serving pronatalism; specifically, support for having children to reverse the nation’s declining fertility, perpetuate one’s religious or racial heritage, and secure influence for one’s political group. These associations are weakly or inconsistently moderated by indicators of traditionalism, conservatism, and race. Findings affirm support for having children to advance national, religious, racial, or political goals corresponds strongly with a desire to privilege a Christian national identity and social order.

Jean Jacques Rousseau wrote that “Man is born free, but is everywhere in chains.” Whereas the former claim of the quote is contestable and gendered, the latter part is empirically true from slavery to economic exploitation and widespread oppression that occurs to this day. Nevertheless, history shows that rarely will people take up weapons and rebel against the powerful. We have found that students often do not understand why this should be the case, given the rights that all people deserve. We use the Peasant Game exercise in class to shine a light on why most people, most of the time, endure repression and choose not to rebel. The game is played in turns with some students as lords, who decide how “food” will be apportioned, and other students as peasants, who produce the food. We discuss how power differentials occur and the difference they make. Students who play the game come away with a better understanding of why many people decide not to fight back against oppression—even if it is the right thing to do.

Military service in World War II produced a generation of Democrats. This finding results from an examination of Gallup polls (1945–1953) that probed both party identification and wartime service. The 1944 election afforded soldiers an opportunity to vote for their commander in chief, and they did so by a large margin for Franklin D. Roosevelt—a Democrat. A vote under these circumstances is bound to leave lifelong marks on a cohort in its impressionable years, which was the life stage of many World War II soldiers. Further tests rule out the possibility that the Democratic tendency of soldiers was simply the result of their youthful age, lower socioeconomic status, urban background, union membership, race, or Southern region—all of which predict partisanship. Neither did the return to civilian life erode the Democratic edge of veterans. GI Joe is an unsung hero of what is widely known as the New Deal realignment.

This article introduces the writing metaphor and examines why political scientists should consider developing one to describe their own writing process. Drawing on the author's experience with writing accountability groups, it defines the components of the writing metaphor, provides an example, and discusses its advantages and disadvantages. The article argues that the writing metaphor can clarify scholars' implicit assumptions about the act of writing and the writing product and reveal unexpected information about their work habits and thinking process. By doing so, the writing metaphor can increase scholars' productivity and may ultimately enhance their writing experience.

Studies investigating gender gaps in the doctoral training of political science students have focused so far overwhelmingly on the US context. Although important research within this context has made strides in identifying the persistent challenges to women’s incorporation in political methodology, much remains unknown about whether women and men have different experiences in methods training during their PhD programs. We contribute to this debate by analyzing data from an original survey on the methods-training experiences of political science PhD students at different European universities. We assess whether gender gaps exist with respect to PhD students’ methods training and confidence in employing methods skills. Our findings show that women cover significantly fewer methods courses in their doctoral training. When women do participate in methods training, they show levels of method employment similar to their male colleagues. We discuss the implications of these findings in the context of European doctoral training.