This paper discusses how we are to understand claims to the effect that something is good relative to a person. It is argued that goodness relative to should not be equated with good for as the latter is a relational value notion and the former is a value theoretical notion. It is argued further that good relative to a person should be understood as good from the perspective or the point of view of the person. But this analysis of the notion ‘good relative to’ leaves open questions about the full nature of relative goodness. For that, a positive proposal about what it is for something to be good relative to a person's point of view is needed. One such proposal is put forward on which the relevant perspective is determined or fixed in terms of the pro and con attitudes of the individual person.

The paper examines the role of self-deception in Descartes' Meditations. It claims that although Descartes sees self-deception as the origin of our false judgments, he consciously uses it for his searching for truth. He finds that self-deception is a very productive tool in our searching for truth, since it expands our ability to free ourselves from our old certainties; logical thinking enables us to doubt our certainties but only self-deception enables us to really suspend them.

Descartes, then, proposes a logical-psychological method in first person for philosophical investigation, in which self-deception plays a crucial role. The Cogito should be understood accordingly as a first psychological truth rather than a first philosophical truth. Nevertheless, it is a crucial step in Descartes' philosophical investigation and exposes the relations between the logical aspect and the psychological aspect of philosophical thinking.

Many moral philosophers tend to construe the aims of ethics as the interpretation and critique of ‘common-sense morality’. This approach is defended by Henry Sidgwick in his influential The Methods of Ethics and presented as a development of a basically Socratic idea of philosophical method. However, Sidgwick's focus on our general beliefs about right and wrong action drew attention away from the Socratic insistence on treating beliefs as one expression of our wider dispositions.

Understanding the historical contingency of Sidgwick's approach to ethics can help us reflect on whether there are other ways in which modern ethics can be Socratic.

One strand of recent philosophical attention to Marcel Proust's novel À la Recherche du Temps Perdu, exemplified by Martha Nussbaum and Rae Langton, claims that romantic love is depicted in the text as self-regarding and solipsistic. I aim to challenge this reading. First, I demonstrate that the text contains a different view, overlooked by these recent interpreters, according to which love is directed at the partially knowable reality of another. Second, I argue that a better explanation for Proust's narrator's ultimate renunciation of romantic love appeals not to his impossible epistemic standard for knowledge of another person, but to his demanding evaluative standard for the permanence of love. This interpretation takes into account the broader scope of the novel, connecting with its larger themes of lost time and the desire for stability, and is more charitable, connecting to familiar worries about transience and constancy in loving relationships.

I argue that once we prioritize epistemic dependence and cast scepticism in those terms, rather than in modal terms, it is clear that skeptical arguments are no good. Skeptical arguments necessarily make dogmatic assumptions about what makes for knowledge or justification, or about what makes for lack of knowledge or justification. A dogmatist asserts an epistemic dependence relation at some level or other that something makes for knowledge or justification. But the skeptical assertion that something makes for the lack of knowledge or the lack of justification is then asserted dogmatically by the skeptic, and asserting that is as dogmatic as a non-skeptical assertion. Even if it is then said that both positive and negative epistemic views are not justified then we have a negative meta-epistemic dogmatic assertion. Wherever we draw the line, epistemic making relations are assumed. Both skeptical assertions and skeptical arguments assume such dependence claims. Dogmatism is our fate.

There has been public outcry from philosophers and others at the prospect of the closure of Heythrop College, University of London; yet the nature and history of Heythrop remain little known. It is apt and timely, therefore, as its likely dissolution approaches, to provide a brief account of its origins and development up to and including the period of its entry into London University under the leadership of the most famous modern historian of philosophy Frederick Copleston. Following on from this, the idea of a distinctive Jesuit intellectual tradition, and more specifically of the Jesuit contribution to philosophy, is explored.

The central aim of this paper is to revive and refine an idea inspired by Plato, and to show how it can be developed into a plausible contemporary theory on which factive knowledge is secure true belief. In so doing, I disentangle two Platonic (or at least inspired by Plato) ideas: that knowledge is secure true belief, and that knowledge is true belief secured by a logos. I defend the former but not the latter. My defence involves distinguishing between alethic and doxastic security, and arguing for understanding factive knowledge in terms of both.

This paper is a response to the suggestion that processes provide a better framework for interpreting science, biological science especially, than do substances. The philosopher of substance is ill-prepared, it has been suggested, for the question ‘how a combination of processes can maintain the appearance of stability and persistence in an entity that is fundamentally only a temporary eddy in a flux of change’. In response, I defend a plural ontology of process, activity, event and continuant, and show how a sortalist philosophy of substance that makes Hilary Putnam's distinction of ‘realism’ from ‘metaphysical realism’ can treat disputed questions concerning the identity and individuation of colonial siphonophores, slime moulds and plant-colonies.