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Testament of A Recovering Eliminativist

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Andrew Melnyk
Andrew Melnyk*
Affiliation:
University of Missouri-Columbia
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Abstract

If physicalism is true (e.g., if every event is a fundamental-physical event), then it looks as if there is a fundamental-physical explanation of everything. If so, then what is to become of special scientific explanations? They seem to be excluded by the fundamental-physical ones, and indeed to be excellent candidates for elimination. I argue that, if physicalism is true, there probably is a fundamental-physical explanation of everything, but that nevertheless there can perfectly well be special scientific explanations as well, notwithstanding eliminativist scruples concerning overdetermination and Ockham's Razor.

Type
Causation and Explanation
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 63 , Issue S3: Supplement. Proceedings of the 1996 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers Sep., 1996. , 1996 , pp. S185 - S193
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1996

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Footnotes

†

Thanks to Robert Johnson, Peter Markie, and Paul Weirich for comments on an earlier draft; also to Carol C. Gould who, upon hearing my then eliminativist views in an interview, asked me if I had seen anyone about it.

‡

Department of Philosophy, 438 General Classroom Building, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO 65211.

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