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The Evolution of Cooperation in the Centipede Game with Finite Populations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Rory Smead
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Abstract

The partial cooperation displayed by subjects in the Centipede Game deviates radically from the predictions of traditional game theory. Even standard, infinite population, evolutionary settings have failed to provide an explanation for this behavior. However, recent work in finite population evolutionary models has shown that such settings can produce radically different results from the standard models. This paper examines the evolution of partial cooperation in finite populations. The results reveal a new possible explanation that is not open to the standard models and gives us reason to be cautious when employing these otherwise helpful idealizations.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 75 , Issue 2 , April 2008 , pp. 157 - 177
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I would like to thank Brian Skyrms, Kevin Zollman, Michael McBride, two anonymous referees, and the members of the Social Dynamics Seminar at UCI for their helpful feedback on this paper. Generous financial support was provided by the School of Social Sciences at UCI.

References

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