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Comparative Learning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 October 2023

Benjamin Eva
Benjamin Eva*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Duke University, Durham, NC
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

This article concerns the diachronic rationality norms for comparative confidence judgments, that is, judgments of the form “I am at least as confident in $p$ as I am in $q$.” Specifically, it identifies, characterizes, and evaluates an intuitively compelling learning rule called comparative conditionalization that specifies how agents should revise their comparative confidence judgments in the face of novel evidence.

Type
Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 91 , Issue 1 , January 2024 , pp. 1 - 17
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association

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