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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2024
In this paper, I defend Gareth Moore from the charge that he espoused some kind of crypto-atheism in Believing in God. I do so by examining the case against Gareth outlined in Howard Robinson's New Blackfriars article “Gareth Moore's Radical Wittgensteinianism”. I examine both the directly textual arguments Robinson presents, as well as his claim that Gareth adhered to a kind of “radical Wittgensteinianism” that involves, among other things, a commitment to materialism. More importantly, I emphasize the true integrity of Believing in God. By this I mean two things: like any worthwhile exercise in philosophy, the book has to be read as forming an integral whole. This requires both an appreciation of Gareth's philosophical and religious motives in writing it and a sense of how it hangs together as a “seamless garment”. In addition, I mean the forthrightness of Gareth's efforts to be faithful to Christianity, not a Christianity of mere – or as he puts it “empty” – belief, but a Christianity that is to be lived out truthfully in thought, word, and deed.
1 Moore, Gareth Believing in God: A Philosophical Essay (Edinburgh, T&T Clark, 1988).Google Scholar
2 “The book presents one of the most masterly analyses of ‘belief in God’ in the philosophy of religion.” (‘Senses and Sensibilities’ p. 346 New Blackfriars Vol. 84 No. 989/990 (July, 2003), pp. 346-353.Google Scholar
3 Robinson's, Howard ‘Gareth Moore's Radical Wittgensteinianism’, New Blackfriars Vol. 84 No. 989/990 (July, 2003), pp. 353-360.Google Scholar
4 Flew, Antony ‘Theology and Falsification’ in Flew and MacIntyre (eds.) New Essays in Philosophical Theology (London, SCM Press, 1955), pp. 96-99.Google Scholar
5 See chapters four, five, and six.
6 It might be recalled that the real Freddie Ayer, who was indeed an empiricist and a materialist, after having undergone what is called a ‘near-death experience’ towards the end of his life, said that the whole thing had “weakened” his “inflexible attitude” towards the belief that there is no afterlife. Talk about being unable to escape the prison house of language.
7 Moore, Gareth ‘A Scene with Cranes: Engagement and Truth in Religion’ Philosophical Investigations, 17 (1994), pp. 1-13.CrossRefGoogle Scholar