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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 15 April 2025
How do subsidiaries sell initiatives to their headquarters? Multilayer decision-makers at corporate headquarters, with divergent interests and power, can overly complicate the acceptance process. We present a multi-case study to explore how subsidiaries of a Chinese multinational enterprise convince top management teams and department heads at their corporate headquarters to engage in foreign investments. Building on a micropolitical perspective, we develop a process model of subsidiary micropolitical strategy adoption consisting of (a) political tension retrieval regarding divergent interests and power at corporate headquarters around specific initiatives, (b) selective coalition building whose interests and power are aligned with the initiatives, and (c) a transitive relation leveraging strategy based on the ties of allied headquarters' managers. We further reveal the interplay between corporate motivations (i.e., market seeking vs. strategic asset seeking) and specific micropolitical activities adopted by subsidiary managers. We enhance the understanding of micropolitics in subsidiary initiatives by underscoring how to strategically manage differences among multilayer actors at corporate headquarters. Additionally, we reveal a political view of foreign investment decision-making in addition to rationality.
子公司如何向总部推销倡议?企业总部的多层次决策者由于利益和权力的差异,可能会使子公司倡议接受过程变得过于复杂。我们通过多案例研究探讨中国跨国公司子公司如何说服总部的高层管理团队和部门负责人批准子公司发起的对外投资倡议。本文建立了一个子公司微观政治策略采纳过程模型,包括:(a) 首先,为推销倡议,子公司管理者识别、分析企业总部的内部利益和权力差异,即政治张力检索,(b) 进而,建立选择性联盟,确保联盟对象的利益和权力与倡议一致,以及 (c) 最后,基于与总部管理者间的盟友关系,所采取的传递性杠杆策略。本文进一步揭示了企业不同海外投资动机(市场寻求与战略资产寻求)对子公司管理者所采用的特定微观政治活动的影响。通过强调如何战略性地管理企业总部多层次参与者之间的差异,增强了对子公司为推销倡议所采取微观政治活动的理解。此外,相较于传统的基于风险、收益的理性对外投资决策研究,本研究揭示了从微观政治视角分析对外投资决策的重要意义。