This article concerns the relationship between the thought of Karl Marx and the fate of law, and the rule of law, in the communist states of the Soviet Union and east and central Europe. It takes the rule of law to be primarily an attempt to institutionalize restraint on power through law, and it takes it to be realized to a far greater extent in Western liberal democracies than in once-communist states. It argues that Marx's thought offered no support for such institutionalization of restraint, but, on the contrary, considerable support to the repressive, ideological and purely instrumental uses of law and the rejection and destruction of the rule of law, which were characteristic of communism.

The political effectiveness of legal expertise in the United States has rested on the ability of a peak association to present itself as representing the opinion of the profession as a whole. It has also relied on a broad epistemology in which lawyers claim to know the right thing to do. However, the effectiveness and placement of such expertise is a comparative issue. This article argues that organizations other than peak associations can muster the support required for legitimacy in the modem state. The legal profession's epistemology could lead it to narrow rather than broaden its claims in order to effectively claim expertise in something. The ability of the central state to shape a profession's mandate and to reject its advice will also influence the deployment of legal expertise. The article explores these issues in the context of the reform of administrative law in England and Wales. In England and Wales, an expertise-based commission mimicked the processes expected of a peak association. In anticipation of rejection by the central administration, it constrained rather than broadened its policy recommendations.