Hostname: page-component-69cd664f8f-96srj Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-03-12T22:07:50.946Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Understanding decision processes in guessing games: a protocol analysis approach

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 January 2025

C. Mónica Capra Open the ORCID record for C. Mónica Capra [Opens in a new window]
C. Mónica Capra*
Affiliation:
Claremont Graduate University, Claremont, USA
*
e-mail: [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Protocol analysis, in the form of concurrent verbal ‘thinking aloud’ reports, is a method of collecting and analyzing data about cognitive processes. This approach can help economists in evaluating competing theories of behavior and in categorizing heterogeneity of thinking patterns. As a proof of concept, I tested this method in the context of a guessing game. I found that concurrent think aloud protocols can inform us about individual’s thought processes without affecting decisions. The method allowed me to identify game theoretic thinking and heterogeneous approaches to unravelling the guessing game. The think aloud protocol is inexpensive and scalable, and it is a useful tool for identifying empirical regularities regarding decision processes.

Keywords

Protocol analysisProcess dataGuessing games

JEL classification

C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior D91: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡ C81: Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Microeconomic Data • Data Access
Type
Original Paper
Information
Journal of the Economic Science Association , Volume 5 , Issue 1: Special Issue: Choice-Process Data in Experimental Economics , August 2019 , pp. 123 - 135
Copyright
Copyright © Economic Science Association 2019

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-019-00074-0) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

References

Agranov, M., Caplin, A., Tergiman, C. (2015). Naive play and the process of choice in guessing games. Journal of the Economic Science Association, 1(2), 146–157. 10.1007/s40881-015-0003-5CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bosch-Domenech, A., Montalvo, J. G., Nagel, R., Satorra, A. (2002). One, two, (three), infinity: Newspaper and lab beauty-contest experiments. American Economic Review, 92(5), 1687–1701. 10.1257/000282802762024737CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brandts, J., Cooper, D., Rott, C., Schram, A., Ule, A. (2019). Communication in laboratory experiments Handbook of research methods and applications in experimental economics, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.Google Scholar
Brown, T. C. (2005). Loss aversion without the endowment effect, and other explanations for the WTA–WTP disparity. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 57(3), 367–379. 10.1016/j.jebo.2003.10.010CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bühren, C., Frank, B., Krabel, S., Werner, A. (2012). Decision-making in competitive framings—Strategic behavior of chess players in mini-ultimatum game chess puzzles. Economics Letters, 115(3), 356–358. 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.080CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Burchardi, K. B., Penczynski, S. (2014). Out of your mind: Eliciting individual reasoning in one shot games. Games and Economic Behavior, 84, 39–57. 10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.005CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., Feng Kao, C. (1984). The efficient assessment of need for cognition. Journal of Personality Assessment, 48(3), 306–307. 10.1207/s15327752jpa4803_13CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Camerer, C. F., Ho, T. H., Chong, J. K. (2004). A cognitive hierarchy model of games. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(3), 861–898. 10.1162/0033553041502225CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chou, E., McConnell, M., Nagel, R., Plott, C. R. (2009). The control of game form recognition in experiments: Understanding dominant strategy failures in a simple two person “guessing” game. Experimental Economics, 12(2), 159–179. 10.1007/s10683-008-9206-4CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cooper, D. J., Kagel, J. (2005). Are two heads better than one? Team versus individual play in signaling games. American Economic Review, 95(3), 477–509. 10.1257/0002828054201431CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cooper, D. J., Kagel, J. (2016). A failure to communicate: An experimental investigation of the effects of advice on strategic play. European Economic Review, 82, 24–45. 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2015.10.008CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Costa-Gomes, M. A., Crawford, V. P. (2006). Cognition and behavior in two-person guessing games: An experimental study. American Economic Review, 96(5), 1737–1768. 10.1257/aer.96.5.1737CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Duffy, J., Nagel, R. (1997). On the robustness of behavior in experimental beauty-contest games. Economic Journal, 107, 1684–1700. 10.1111/j.1468-0297.1997.tb00075.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Earl, E., Friesen, L., Shadforth, C. (2019). Elusive optima: A process tracing analysis of procedural rationality in mobile phone connection plan choices. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 161, 303–322. 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.021CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ericsson, K. A., Simon, H. A. (1980). Verbal reports as data. Psychological Review, 87(3), 215–251. 10.1037/0033-295X.87.3.215CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ericsson, K. A., Simon, H. A. (1993). Protocol analysis: Verbal reports as data, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fox, M. C., Ericsson, K. A., Best, R. (2011). Do procedures for verbal reporting of thinking have to be reactive? A meta-analysis and recommendations for best reporting methods. Psychological Bulletin, 137(2), 316–344. 10.1037/a0021663CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Frederick, S. (2005). Cognitive reflection and decision making. Journal of Economic perspectives, 19(4), 25–42. 10.1257/089533005775196732CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grosskopf, B., Nagel, R. (2008). The two-person beauty contest. Games and Economic Behavior, 62(1), 93–99. 10.1016/j.geb.2007.03.004CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Highhouse, S. (1994). A verbal protocol analysis of choice under ambiguity. Journal of Economic Psychology, 15(4), 621–635. 10.1016/0167-4870(94)90014-0CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ho, T.-H., Camerer, C. F., Weigelt, K. (1998). Iterated dominance and iterated best response in experimental ‘p-beauty contests’. American Economic Review, 88, 947–969.Google Scholar
Johnson, P. E., Durán, A. S., Hassebrock, F., Moller, J., Prietula, M., Feltovich, P. J., Swanson, D. B. (1981). Expertise and error in diagnostic reasoning. Cognitive Science, 5(3), 235–283. 10.1207/s15516709cog0503_3Google Scholar
Larkin, J., McDermott, J., Simon, D. P., Simon, H. A. (1980). Expert and novice performance in solving physics problems. Science, 208(4450), 1335–1342. 10.1126/science.208.4450.1335CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Nagel, R. (1995). Experimental results on interactive competitive guessing. The American Economic Review, 85, 1313–1326.Google Scholar
Nisbett, R. E., Wilson, T. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports and mental processes. Psychological Review, 84, 231–259. 10.1037/0033-295X.84.3.231CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Penczynski, S. P. (2018). Using machine learning for communication classification. Experimental Economics, 10.1007/s10683-018-09600-zGoogle Scholar
Ranyard, R., Hinkley, L., Williamson, J., Mchugh, S. (2006). The role of mental accounting in consumer credit decision processes. Journal of Economic Psychology, 27, 571–588. 10.1016/j.joep.2005.11.001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ranyard, R., Svenson, O., Schulte-Mecklenbeck, M., Kühberger, A., Ranyard, R. (2011). Verbal data and decision process analysis A handbook of process tracing methods for decision research: A critical review and user’s guide, New York: Taylor & Francis 115–130.Google Scholar
Russo, E. J., Johnson, E. J., Stephens, D. L. (1989). The validity of verbal protocols. Memory and Cognition, 17, 759–769. 10.3758/BF03202637CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Ryan, M., Watson, V., Entwistle, V. (2009). Rationalising the ‘irrational’: A think aloud study of discrete choice experiment responses. Health Economics, 18(3), 321–336. 10.1002/hec.1369CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Schkade, D., Payne, J. (1994). How People respond to contingent valuation questions: A verbal protocol analysis of willingness to pay for an environmental regulation. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 26, 88–109. 10.1006/jeem.1994.1006CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, R. D. (2007). The relationship between reliability and size of willingness-to-pay values: A qualitative insight. Health Economics, 16(2), 211–216. 10.1002/hec.1155CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Stahl, D. O. (1996). Boundedly Rational rule learning in a guessing game. Games and Economic Behavior, 16(2), 303–330. 10.1006/game.1996.0088CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stahl, D. O., Wilson, P. W. (1995). On players’ models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence. Games and Economic Behavior, 10(1), 218–254. 10.1006/game.1995.1031CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Turner, M., Engle, R. W. (1989). Is working memory capacity task dependent? Journal of Memory and Language, 28(2), 127–154. 10.1016/0749-596X(89)90040-5CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Unsworth, N., Heitz, R. P., Schrock, J. C., Engel, R. (2005). An automated version of the operation span task. Behavior Research Methods, 37(4), 498–505. 10.3758/BF03192720CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Weber, R. A. (2003). ‘Learning’ with no feedback in a competitive guessing game. Games and Economic Behavior, 44(1), 134–144. 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00002-2CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Supplementary material: File

Capra supplementary material

Capra supplementary material
Download Capra supplementary material(File)
File 2.3 MB