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An experiment in the role of identity in fostering coordination

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Abraham Aldama Open the ORCID record for Abraham Aldama [Opens in a new window] ,
Daniel Draganoff  and
Gantavya Pahwa
Abraham Aldama*
Affiliation:
Vote Rev, New York, NY, USA
Daniel Draganoff
Affiliation:
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
Gantavya Pahwa
Affiliation:
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
*
[email protected]
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Abstract

Coordination problems arise in many economic, political, and social situations. Many times, authorities and institutions are created to solve these coordination problems. However, the success of these institutions depends on whether people are willing to follow their prescriptions. Using a behavioral experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk we analyze whether an authority can aid in solving hawk-dove coordination games and whether its success depends on a shared identity by the players. The authority is represented in our experiment by a randomizing device that recommends actions to players to implement a socially efficient correlated equilibrium. In the game, players are better off following the recommendations if they believe others will do as well. We investigate whether people are more likely to follow recommendations when they have a shared identity. We find that the device's success is not driven by group membership, but rather by the content of its recommendations.

Keywords

CoordinationInstitutionsIdentityCorrelated equilibriumExperiment

JEL classification

D91: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡ C72: Noncooperative Games
Type
Original Paper
Information
Journal of the Economic Science Association , Volume 10 , Issue 2: Special Issue: Behavioral and Experimental Economics for Innovative Policy-Making (Articles 1 to 3) , December 2024 , pp. 294 - 309
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Economic Science Association 2024.

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