Anglo-Burmese relations during Mindon Min's reign (1853–1878) fluctuated between settlement and unsettlement, between friendly gestures and frustrated hopes. By the early 1870's the Burmese ruler had given up dreams of regaining territories captured by the British in the second war, and was busy preserving the independence of his truncated kingdom. However, a Burmese mission failed to secure either direct relations with the British Government or diplomatic support from other European powers. All this while British commercial interests clamoured for the implementation of the Anglo-Burmese treaties of 1862 and 1867, and for the investigation of new trade routes via Burma to China.

This paper derives from a larger study of the nature of Japan's relations with colonial South and Southeast Asia in the period between the Russo-Japanese War and the Pacific War. By means of a detailed examination of a single facet of Japanese-Philippine relations, it is hoped that a greater insight may be gained into the often convolute processes of the interactions between, on the one hand, the dominant Asian power of the inter-war period, and on the other hand, colonial entities and personalities still beholden to Western European or North American rulers. However, two caveats need to be put forward about this essay: (1) the case of the Philippines was unique in colonial Asia since the United States had fully committed itself to a policy of withdrawal, thus facilitating contacts between the local ruling elite and Japanese diplomats; (2) despite pre-war and wartime propaganda to the contrary, the principal concern of Japan in all its dealings with colonial South and Southeast Asia before the Pacific War was economic. In the prior instance, therefore, the paragraphs that follow will demonstrate an apparently remarkable degree of freedom of action on the part of the Filipinos in authority under the Commonwealth Administration (1935–46) in spite of the continuing legal responsibility of the United States for Philippine foreign affairs under the provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie (Independence) Act of 1934. The second caveat will be evidenced by the unstinting and continuous attention of Japanese diplomats to the development of ever closer economic ties between the Philippines and Japan.

The growth of British interest and activity in areas east of the Bay of Bengal during the latter half of the eighteenth century has often been explained as a response o t the problems posed by the expanding China trade. The drain of specie from Europe and India to Canton, so the argument goes, rendered necessary the establishment of a commercial emporium to the east of India which would attract Chinese products, notably tea, in exchange for Indian textiles, saltpetre, opium and cotton, and spices from the Malay archipelago.1 Such an entrepot would also free the trade from the vexatious customs and restrictions which applied increasingly at Canton after 1757. Yet it is the central argument of this article that the rival interests and behaviour of other Europeans in areas beyond India provided a significant inducement for intervention.

By any measure, Trương Định (1820–64) was one of the leading figures of nineteenth-century Vietnamese resistance to French colonialism. As such, he has received a good deal of scholarly attention in Vietnam, France, the United States, and elsewhere. This article analyses the anti-colonial movement led by Trương Định in southern Vietnam during the years 1859–64, focusing on the questions of Trương Định's relationship to the Vietnamese imperial government at Huế and his motivation for continuing the anti-French struggle after Huế had made peace with France in 1862. Its organization is as follows: first, the historical context is summarized; second, Trương Định's resistance movement and its relationship to the Huế court are analyzed; third, various explanations of Trươg Định's motivation are considered and my own hypothesis is offered.

The descendants of Bugis mercenary forces that liberated Riau from east Sumatran invaders became an integral part of the local Malay community by the mid-nineteenth century. At that time Raja Ali Haji and Haji Ibrahim, two Malay authors of Bugis descent, wrote various tracts to legitimise their presence in Riau and to facilitate Bugis integration into the Malay community, but may have led to continuing divisions along ethnic lines in later years.

During the 1970 decade the Indonesian economy grew at unprecedented high rates after a long period of relative stagnation. It is commonly assumed that this significant improvement in growth performance is largely explained by the rapid growth of oil exports from 1971 to 1978, during which period petroleum's share in total export earnings rose from 39 per cent to 64 per cent. During this period, petroleum exports (in dollar value) rose at an average annual rate of 43 per cent, compared to 30 per cent for non-petroleum exports. Thus, even during the period of rapid petroleum export earnings growth, other exports also grew at a rate far above their long-term trend.

Sir Winston Churchill's doctor has recalled the “stupefying” effect which the fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942 had upon his patient. Britain's wartime leader, Lord Moran suggests, knew that the surrender was “something more than a reverse. I think he wondered if it were a portent”. The spectre of one of the worst defeats in British military history was to return to haunt Churchill in later years. His torment was, perhaps, not solely portentous but also recollective for in the years 1924–29 Churchill himself, while serving in Stanley Baldwin's second government, had played the major role in delaying the building and defence of the Singapore naval base and in disparaging its associated strategy.

At the end of World War II, American Office of Strategic Service (OSS) officers in Bangkok were dismayed to discover that, contrary to their expectations, the Thai showed little animosity toward the Japanese. The OSS unit reported in August 1945 that ‘there has been very little in the way of hostile reaction’. Japanese accounts confirm this, with a Foreign Ministry study, for example, concluding: ‘The general attitude of Thai officials and citizens toward Japan just after the war's end was relatively sympathetic….’