The ‘selling arrangement’ is a judicial device which removes national law from thescrutiny of European Community law relating to the free movement of goods. National provisions affecting the marketing of products may fall for consideration as ‘selling arrangements’ where the treatment of the domestic and imported goods has been even handed. Measures relating to the substance of the goods remain subject to Community law rules on the free movement of goods. The prime example of the selling arrangement is the advertisement, but in the years since creation, other areas of national activity with respect to the free movement of goods have been enveloped inthe selling arrangement. Certain measures which have related to the conduct of business may also fall for similar treatment as selling arrangements. A recent development would appear tomean that the concept of the selling arrangement may apply where the obligation imposed by the national measure has beenidentified as being general, as opposed to specific in nature. Were this to be so, the selling arrangement would have the potential to break free of the traditional boundaries established for itunder Criminal Proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard.1

Currently there is no clear understanding of the meaning of ‘slavery’ in modern international law. While generally it is accepted that the authoritative definition of slavery is provided by Article 1 of the Slavery Convention 1926, in recent times slavery has been understood in such a wide variety of ways that effectively it is a meaningless term. This paper reflects on this interpretation problem and aims to redress this balance by reclaiming the core meaning of the legal definition. It applies property law perspectives to explain the conception of ownership invoked by Article 1, to argue that it remains relevant and to explore how it might be applied in identifying modern cases of slavery.

The relationship between the global and the local is one of critical importance to all regions of the world. In the resolution of the tension between the irresistible surge of globalisation and the undeniable facts of society as it actually exists in the various localities which together comprise the very world which is presumably the object or the subject-matter of globalisation, law lies at the forefront. It is, one might say, the very intellectual battlefield which we have selected for the resolution of the major problem facing human society at the turn of the century. The purpose of this article is therefore to investigate, in a somewhat narrative fashion the relationship between the global and the local in the context of law in South East Asia. The topic is clearly too large to be dealt with in a short space with the rigour and articulation it really deserves, but it is hoped that the approach adopted will provide some kind of a frame of reference for regarding, studying, and hopefully improving, the law in the South East Asian region; and will perhaps focus a pencil of light on the problems of the global and the local in this particular regional context.

A rule of customary international law is binding upon all States. One controversial question is whether a State should be permitted not to be bound by such a rule in the event that it objected to it in the early stage of its formation and did so constantly thereafter. This is the theory of the ‘persistent objector’. Articles recently published about the theory focus on its specific application in different areas of international law, including international investment law,1 international humanitarian law2 and human rights law.3 The present article intends to examine the concept of persistent objector in general international law.4

Can a person who has agreed to an out-of-court settlement for a certain offence in country A still be prosecuted for the same offence in country B? What if a person is found guilty of theft in country C and is subsequently prosecuted in respect of the same facts, but under the charge of swindling in country D? Suppose two persons are suspected of having set up a money-laundering scheme, which involves financial transactions in several countries. Can the offenders still be prosecuted in one country concerned, after they have been acquitted for moneylaundering in one of the other countries?

Not many decisions of the Court of Justice have stirred such an intensive academic debate in Germany1 as the Court's well-known Centros judgment,2 dealing with a Danish couple that had registered a private limited company in England and had then applied to register a branch in Denmark. The Danish authorities refused a registration for the reason that under Danish law a ‘foreign limited company’ which does not transact business in its state of incorporation has to fulfil certain requirements of Danish company law, in particular the paying-up of the minimum capital fixed at DKK 200.000. The competent Danish Court referred the question to the Court of Justice whether the Danish regulation was compatible with Article 52 (now Article 43) ECT in conjunction with Article 58 (now Article 48) ECT.

The ongoing development of diverse maritime autonomous vehicles for varied ocean activities—ranging from scientific research, security surveillance, transportation of goods, military purposes and commission of crimes—is prompting greater consideration of how existing legal frameworks accommodate these vehicles. This article brings together the core legal issues, as well as current developments in relation to commercial shipping, the law of naval warfare, and maritime security. This article captures how these issues are now being addressed and what other legal questions will likely emerge as the newest technology impacts on one of the oldest bodies of international law.

This article discusses the importance of the recently concluded Paris Rulebook, the extent to which it limits national discretion, instils discipline and generates ambition and accountability, and the challenges that lie ahead in implementing the 2015 Paris Agreement. It discusses, in particular, the rules on mitigation, transparency, the global stocktake and the implementation and compliance mechanism, in order to highlight the choices Parties made on three overarching issues that have long bedevilled the climate change regime—prescriptiveness (the level of detail of the rules), legal bindingness (the extent to which particular rules are legally binding) and differentiation (the extent to which particular rules accommodate differences between Parties or apply uniformly to all Parties).

This article seeks to present an integrated conception of sustainable development, with particular emphasis on the contribution of international human rights law and theory. Part II considers a structural conception of sustainable development. Part III considers parallels between sustainable development and self-determination. Part IV provides some general reflections on international environmental law and international human rights law in terms of analogous concepts, principles and systems. What similarities are there and what differences? Part V considers the progress made towards recognition of a “human right to the environment”. Part VI considers how international environmental claims could be brought within the existing international human rights complaint systems. Part VII analyses the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the Lopez Ostra case (1994), the leading case on environmental claims to have reached that Court.

The development of international organisations and the increasing significance of their role in a wide range of fields, has put at issue the adequacy of the rules governing their operation, with regard to the needs of modern justice. In particular, the question of the scope of the immunity from jurisdiction of international organisations is the subject of some debate, as the multiplication of disputes involving international organisations has led courts to address this topic with increasing frequency.1

The purpose of this article is to address two related false assumptions, or myths. The first is an assumption of public international law. It is the myth that the history of international law is one of progressive expansion, of increasing concern in public international law with matters traditionally considered private or internal to States, and that this expansion is a relatively recent phenomenon.1 The second is an assumption of private international law. It is the myth that private international law is not actually international, as it is essentially and necessarily a part of the domestic law of States.2 These assumptions, taken together, constitute the myth that public and private international law are discrete, distinct disciplines, with independent, parallel histories. This article addresses these myths through an analysis of the role played by international law theory in the history of private international law.

“Perhaps the greatest difficulty the civilians have in accepting the trust is caused by what I have come to regard as an English peculiarity logically detachable from the trust, namely, the distinction between the legal and the equitable estate. In Scots law, which, even if it did not invent and develop the trust for itself but took it over from England—the point is doubtful—has accepted it without inhibitions or reservations, no such distinction has ever been known. There the trustee becomes owner and the beneficiary acquires a contractual right against him.”1

International tribunals and legal scholars have been considering the relationship between International Humanitarian Law (‘IHL’) and International Human Rights Law (‘IHRL’) for a number of years.1 The International Court of Justice famously or infamously (depending on your perspective) considered their relationship in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion in 1996.2 The Court concluded that while IHRL did apply in times of armed conflict, when it came to the prohibition of arbitrarily taking human life in Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, the content of that prohibition had to be found in the lex specialis of IHL.

Pluralism is a main feature of Nigeria as a country. There is ethnic pluralism.1 The pre-colonial Nigeria comprised of over 250 nation states embracing over 500 ethnic and linguistic groups.2 These ethnic groups spread across the three main geographical units in the country, namely, the north, the west, and the east. The north was dominated by the Hausa-Fulani and the Kanuri peoples, the west by the Yoruba speaking tribes, and the east by the Igbos.

Is legal transplant possible? The stark bipolarity of a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer attracted by such a question is much less interesting and revealing than the question: what shapes the life of legal transplants? The answer to the latter question is contingent on a wide range of variables triggered by the particular transplant; the result can occupy any point along the spectrum from faithful replication to outright rejection. This case study of the transplant of the English doctrine of undue influence into Singaporean law asks why the Singaporean courts have applied the doctrine in family guarantee cases to such divergent effect, when they profess to apply the same law. The answer owes less to grand theories than to a careful examination of the nature of the transplanted law and the relationship between the formal and informal legal orders of the originating and the recipient society raised by the particular transplant.