Prosopographic analysis of BoE profiles

Our prosopographic analysis looks at the professional characteristics and experiences of BoE leadership and research staff. We rely on two career indicators: last diploma when joining the Bank and professional experience prior to and after working for the Bank (i.e., ex ante and ex post employment).

A first result stemming from our prosopographical analysis is the increasing proportion of research employees hired at the Bank who hold a PhD (Figure 1). This rise began in the early 1990s; the proportion stabilized in the early 2000s, and then it accelerated again from 2010 onwards. Based on the location of the last degree, internationalization has increased since the late 1980s, with an increasing share of BoE researchers educated in continental Europe or North America. Yet, those having UK diplomas remained the majority until recently (OA, Figure 1). The profiles of the Bank leadership display similar temporal patterns in terms of level of education (see Table 2), albeit with a higher share of UK diplomas (OA, Table 1).

Figure 1. Share of hired PhDs.

Table 2. Ratio of individuals with a PhD diploma in leadership positions at the Bank of England.

The ex ante and ex post employment of our staff sample further enriches the picture. Before the mid-1990s, individuals with an academic position before joining the Bank constituted the largest group (Figure 2). However, after this date, the share of this group declined.Footnote ⁶ Academic hires were substituted by staff coming from other central banks and international organizations: in recent years, these groups represent around a third of the researchers entering the BoE.Footnote ⁷ The trend is less pronounced among those departing the Bank. Over the period of our analysis, approximately one quarter of departing BoE employees secured positions in academia, although there was a slight decrease in the number of BoE employees joining an academic institution around the financial crisis (OA, Figure 2). The proportion is similar for departures to other central banks or international organizations. Finally, the private sector, especially financial firms, provides job opportunities for around one fourth of employees leaving the Bank.

Figure 2. Last employment of research staff when arriving at the Bank of England.

The BoE leadership displays a different pattern than the staff. A long career within the Bank (or in other UK public institutions) remains the norm for finding one’s way up the ladder. For those who had built a career outside the Bank, their employment had been mostly UK-based, either for large British corporations or for the UK affiliates of multinational banks (see also Table 3). Academic careers prior to joining the Bank (which characterize a large proportion of external MPC members; see Table 4) are more international than non-academic profiles.Footnote ⁸ Finally, ex ante careers in other central banks or international organizations are overall much less common among BoE leadership than among BoE staff (Figure 2 and Table 3).

Table 3. Ex ante leadership positions.

Table 4. Ex ante positions of external MPC members, 1997-2019.

Note: Individuals may have occupied different types of position before joining the Bank. In this case, we count every type of position as 1. Thus, the sum of positions is greater than the number of individuals in this period in our database.

Publishing practices

We analyze three types of research publications: the articles from the BoE’s different working papers series; the research articles appearing in the Bank’s Quarterly Bulletin; and the articles published in peer-reviewed journals by at least one BoE-affiliated author.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, we observe that the BoE staff, outside of publishing relatively many working papers (Figure 3), published more in peer-reviewed journals than other central banks, excluding the Federal Reserve (Table 5). A significant part of these articles was published in the most prestigious US-based international journals in economics (the ‘Top 5’). From the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, the number of BoE publications in peer-reviewed journals was relatively low compared to the previous period (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Publications by the Bank of England.

Table 5. Average proportion of publications by central banks in academic journals.

Note: See online appendix for details.

In the early 2000s, publication indicators were on the rise again: the number of working papers and articles published in peer-reviewed journals increased, and a larger share of articles was published in the Top 5, in comparison to other central banks (OA, Figure 4). Moreover, the BoE became (again) one of the most prolific central banks in terms of publications in all economic journals – although the recently established ECB was out of reach (Table 5). We also observe a new trend: the proportion of peer-reviewed articles written with authors affiliated to non-UK institutions increased after the mid-2000s, overtaking collaborations with UK institutions (OA, Figure 5). While almost no peer-reviewed articles were co-authored with other central banks’ authors before 2000, the proportion of such articles increased steadily thereafter.

However, with the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-2009, the rhythm of publications decreased and then started to grow again with a large increase of the number of working papers after 2014.

Discursive practices

To investigate quantitatively the scientific dimension of BoE communication, we examine BoE leadership’s speeches.

First, we consider the references made in speeches to articles published in research journals and to the publications of the Bank (i.e., staff working papers and articles published in the Bank’s Quarterly Bulletin). This referencing indicator allows us to detect a formal use of academic codes, that is, a reference in a bibliography or in a footnote. Second, we build a lexical indicator that helps us to spot more informal ways of referring to science, consisting in mentioning concepts, theories, and the like in the main body of the text. Both sets of indicators are further disaggregated and sorted by the speaker’s position within the Bank (Governor; Deputy Governor; MPC internal members; MPC external members), and by the speech’s audience (finance and banking professionals; business sectors; other central bankers and international organizations; academics).Footnote ⁹

Overall, since the 1990s, we observe an increase in the share of BoE speeches citing research (Figure 4). In the 1980s, there was a plain and simple absence of reference to any research work in speeches made by BoE leadership (for any role, and to any audience); conversely, in recent years, more than half of the speeches contain explicit mention to research publications. This trend is similar both for the citations of BoE research and for the citations of other articles in peer-reviewed journals.Footnote ¹⁰ Moreover, since the early 1990s, there is an increased lexical proximity between BoE speeches and language of ‘macroeconomic theory’ and ‘econometrics’ (Figure 5).

Figure 4. Proportion of BoE speeches with references to research publications.

Figure 5. Evolution of language indices in BoE speeches.

Speeches made by Governors display a slow rise of scientific references (see OA, Figure 7).Footnote ¹¹ By contrast, speeches by members of the MPC (both internal and external) display on average a higher share of references to research (Figure 6). The results of our word embedding analysis confirm this pattern: when considering the proximity of speeches with lexical fields, we observe that Governors are less likely to use the language of econometrics or macroeconomic theory (OA, Figures 9 and 10). In short, we observe, over the whole period, that the higher the position of the speaker, the less references to or mention of science. However, we can observe clearly the impact on our indicators of the arrival of Governors with a more significant background in economics: the first years of King’s governorship and then those of Carney’s are characterized by more references to scientific research and a discourse closer to scientific rhetoric.

Figure 6. Distribution of annual proportions of speeches citing references, 1997-2019.

The audience also matters. Over the studied period, the main audience of the Bank was the private business sector (OA, Figure 6). However, it appears that speeches addressed to this audience are much less likely to contain references to published research or to use a scientific language than in speeches addressed to academics and other central banks (right-hand panel of Figure 6 and OA, Figures 9 and 11).

Finally, with the GFC period, the ascending trends observed for the previous two decades stopped. The share of speeches citing scientific publications decreased, on average, during the crisis and its immediate aftermath. Similarly, the proximity with the lexical fields of ‘econometrics’ and ‘macroeconomic theory’ has significantly decreased.

Hybrid professional profiles

A necessary characteristic of contributory scientization is a specialized workforce actually able to contribute to the relevant science. Our data unambiguously indicate that this condition has been increasingly met by the BoE, with rising proportions of researchers and policymakers holding a PhD (see Figure 1 for researchers), most frequently in economics.Footnote ¹² The BoE follows in this respect a global trend among central banks (Marcussen, Reference Marcussen, Dyson and Marcussen2009: 379; Lebaron and Dogan, Reference Lebaron and Dogan2016). This professionalization of central banks’ staff is exemplified by the rising level of qualifications required according to BoE job advertisements, published in The Economist and other periodicals. For instance, before the mid-1990s, BoE job ads did not mention graduate studies as a job requirement. From the mid-1990s, these advertisements started indicating post-graduate studies in economics as a job requirement (see e.g., The Economist, May 20, 1995). Furthermore, in the 2010s, the Bank actively pursued the hiring of PhDs by developing two specific recruitment programs (see Bank of England, 2016: 18, 21).Footnote ¹³

Another feature of our ideal type is the external network of the workforce. The increasing internationalization of the research staff at the BoE resulted from an explicit hiring strategy, decided in the mid-1990s. This strategy was notably supported by Mervyn King, then chief economist of the Bank: ‘[King] said we will not constrain ourselves to hire Britons and [that we will] open to the international market and to PhDs’ (Interview, Charles Bean).Footnote ¹⁴ However, this internationalization was relatively slow: more than half of new BoE researchers were still UK-educated at the end of our period (OA, Figure 1). The prevalence of UK nationals is even stronger for BoE leadership. Looking at the professional trajectories of BoE staff, they remain diverse, with proportions of transitions from and to non-academic organizations that either increase or fluctuate without a clear trend (see Figure 2 and OA, Figure 2).

In short, there is some truth to saying that ‘academia and central banking are forging ever closer links’ (Marcussen, Reference Marcussen, Christensen and Lægreid2006: 93), especially because advanced specialized training has become an almost prerequisite for researchers and policymakers. However, the case of the BoE shows that, through time, professional links with academia can weaken in some respects (e.g., ex ante employment) or fluctuate with no clear direction in other respects (e.g., ex post employment). Indeed, the BoE maintains substantial links to other types of organizations – such as other central banks, international organizations, and financial firms. No steamroller of scientization is changing this fact. The BoE community – with ties to academia, finance, international organizations and the public sector – is part of a hybrid epistemic community, quite distant from the sociological characteristics that our ideal type of contributory scientization would entail.

The profiles of MPC external members further illustrate this hybridity. The 1998 Bank of England Act (Section 13-4) states that any person who ‘has knowledge or experience which is likely to be relevant to the Committee’s functions’ is qualified to sit in the MPC. Knowledge is thus at par with experience. Indeed, professional experience in the private sector is the most frequent qualification for external MPC members, with fewer external members holding academic positions (Table 4). When looking at the career of external MPC members, we observe that most of them have been economists in large banks (Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank, Morgan Stanley, NatWest, Citigroup, …), asset management funds, large UK corporations (British Petroleum, British Airways, …), or the Confederation of British Industries (a fifth of the external MPC members served as economists there).Footnote ¹⁵ These observations are overall consistent with Lebaron and Dogan (Reference Lebaron and Dogan2016), who distinguish four central bankers’ profiles: ‘academics’, ‘insiders’, ‘bureaucratic and political profiles’, and ‘private financiers’. The last two categories clearly do not belong to the epistemic community of academia, and they are not endangered species within the BoE.

Types of research output

We saw that the BoE has a growing army of PhDs, but we should not be too hasty in concluding that this trend necessarily translates into contributory scientization. Indeed, for much of the period, recruiting highly skilled economists was primarily justified by the need for policy analysis; thus, the indicator should be interpreted as a sign of policymaking scientization.

This need for technical skills was felt especially strongly starting in 1992, when the Bank was entrusted with the task of publishing the quarterly Inflation Report (James, Reference James2020). The report had to present inflation forecasts and assess how monetary policy would achieve the recently established inflation target (Elgie and Thompson, Reference Elgie and Thompson1998: 4). To fulfill this new objective, the Bank underwent a significant restructuring process (Acosta et al., Reference Acosta, Claveau, Cherrier, Fontan, Goutsmedt and Sergi2024). During the internal debates regarding this reorganization, Mervyn King, the newly appointed Chief Economist, argued, in a memorandum titled ‘The Analytical Functions [of the Bank]’ addressed to the Deputy Governor:

Moreover, King considered that, to perform its functions, the Bank had to adopt models that aligned with the prevailing standards of academic macroeconomics in the US (Goutsmedt et al., Reference Goutsmedt, Sergi, Cherrier, Claveau, Fontan and Acosta2024). This change required economic PhDs, who could master advanced knowledge to build and use these models, but the primary aim was not to contribute to science. Rather, the principal objective lay in the practical application of these models for policy, a textbook case of policymaking scientization.

A further step in the development of research at the Bank was the transition to operational independence in 1997, and the consecutive creation of the MPC, whose mission was to take operational decisions (notably setting the Bank rate). Staff economists were swiftly integrated into MPC pre-meetings, where they provided statistical and econometric analysis (including model-based forecast), and analysis on specific topics commissioned by MPC members (Acosta et al., Reference Acosta, Claveau, Cherrier, Fontan, Goutsmedt and Sergi2024). Highly skilled economists were needed, but primarily for policy analysis, not to contribute to economic science.Footnote ¹⁶ One of the former Executive Director of the Bank characterized as follows this tension between academic credentials and the pressing need for producing forecasts and analysis in the early days of the MPC:

A staff economist also recalls this prevailing tension experienced during the 2000s:

In short, we see that, in this case, the level of qualification of researchers is not a particularly good indicator of contributory scientization. For most of our period, the Bank’s leadership expected qualified economists to use their specialized skills predominantly for supporting internal policy work (policymaking scientization), and not for engaging with academic activities such as publications in peer-reviewed journals.

This state of affairs changed in 2014. Following a significant change in leadership, notably with the appointment of the new Governor Mark Carney, the Bank developed a ‘Strategic Plan’ which was intended to transform several aspects of the institution. This included the reorganization of research, with two explicit objectives: ‘increase the Bank’s external profile and influence’ and ‘inform policy development’ (Bank of England Independent Evaluation Office, 2019).Footnote ¹⁷ With regards to these objectives, the Research Hub was created. BoE staff can apply internally for a short (six months) research leave to this new unit. During their time there, they can focus on their research, as they are relieved from their duties related to internal policy work. According to the staff, this reorganization contributed to clarify the distinction between policy analysis and (scientific) research:

Audience and language

Marcussen posits that central bankers’ communication is couched in a ‘techno-speak’, that is, the ‘discourse of science’. In the new age of central banking, ‘scientific breakthrough’ has purportedly emerged as the ‘major nodal points in central bank rhetoric’, with central bankers primarily communicating through ‘a common language: econometrics’ (Marcussen, Reference Marcussen, Christensen and Lægreid2006: 85–6). It is undeniable that BoE officials have exhibited an increasing proclivity towards adopting the language of science. Recent speeches display a greater proximity with the vocabulary associated with econometrics and macroeconomic theory (Figure 5).

Upon closer analysis of the BoE’s communication practices, it becomes apparent that its leadership modulates the technical and scientific aspects of its language to cater to diverse audiences. Over the period under consideration, the Bank primarily oriented its official communications towards the private business sectors, without any notable increase in the proportion of speeches addressed to an academic audience (OA, Figure 6). Although scientists typically communicate primarily with their ‘scientific peer groups’ (Marcussen, Reference Marcussen, Christensen and Lægreid2006: Table 3.1), the BoE leadership did not exhibit this tendency. The reason should be obvious: according to the received view, ‘the advantages of a sound monetary policy are largely dependent upon the policy’s being understood and relied upon by the private sector in arranging its affairs’. (Woodford, Reference Woodford2003: 4) Consequently, BoE officials keep themselves busy by speaking before multiple audiences outside their supposed epistemic community.

Furthermore, speeches have a distinctive flavor depending on the audience. In general, the use of scientific references and terminology is less predominant when addressing a non-academic audience (Figure 6 and OA, Figure 9). This points to a reinterpretation of discursive strategies. When attempting to project credibility toward non-peers, central bankers do not double down on science speak. They go in exactly the opposite direction. In other words, although the language of science has permeated their epistemic community, BoE officials recognize that achieving their policy goals is not best served by cluttering their speeches with jargon and explicit reference to the scientific literature. This was eventually put forth by the Bank itself in an effort to simplify its communication with the public (Haldane and McMahon, Reference Haldane and McMahon2018).

In sum, the contrast between the BoE and our ideal type illustrates that there are tensions between the legitimizing and contributory dimensions of the scientization process both in terms of who to speak to and how to speak to them.

The hesitant path of scientization

Following Marcussen’s work, the literature depicts the scientization of central banks as being on a steady upward path. We have already noted that central banks face tradeoffs in their quest to become genuine contributors to the relevant science. Consequently, we should anticipate that the process of contributory scientization may not always be a forward progression. Depending on the central banks’ response to the fluctuating challenges and advantages inherent in this endeavor, contributory scientization will sometimes experience regression. It is exactly what we find in the recent history of the BoE.

The evolution of scientific publications is arguably the most direct indicator of a central bank’s contributory scientization. Scholars have compiled various characteristics such as the creation of working paper series, the number of working papers, the positions in RePEc rankings and the foundation of self-funded scientific journals (Marcussen, Reference Marcussen, Dyson and Marcussen2009: 379; Mudge and Vauchez, Reference Mudge and Vauchez2016: 157–8).Footnote ¹⁸ Yet, increasing publications and citations in peer-reviewed journals are probably the surest sign of contributory scientization (Claveau and Dion, Reference Claveau and Dion2018). In 1978, the BoE initiated its first working paper series, the Bank of England Discussion Papers, which was renamed Staff Working Papers in 1991.Footnote ¹⁹ The initial goal for this series was to facilitate ‘wider circulation to research’ deemed too ‘exploratory’ or ‘technical’ for publication in the Quarterly Bulletin (Threadgold, Reference Threadgold1978: ii; Bank of England, 1979: 26). Until that point, the Bulletin had been the main BoE outlet for economic analysis produced within the Bank. A few years after the Discussion Papers, the Technical Series was introduced to ‘give wider circulation to econometric research work predominantly in connection with revising and updating the various Bank models and to invite comment upon it’ (Davis, Reference Davis1982: i).

This early bout of contributory scientization corresponds to a specific momentum for economic research at the Bank. Under the leadership of Chief Economist John Flemming (1984-1991), the Bank developed substantially its research activities. During this period, the Bank considered it important that the economic staff displayed ‘very serious technical expertise in econometrics’ (Interview, staff economist 7). This technical proficiency played a twofold role. Firstly, this technical expertise contributed to the development of the Bank’s macroeconometric forecasting model, which in turn provided scientific justifications for the Bank to resist political pressures from the Treasury (Goutsmedt et al., Reference Goutsmedt, Sergi, Cherrier, Claveau, Fontan and Acosta2024: 4–9). Second, for this technical expertise to be deemed serious, the Bank decided to showcase it, for instance by supporting the publication costs of a working paper series. During this period, economic research remained relatively separated from policy routines (Acosta et al., Reference Acosta, Claveau, Cherrier, Fontan, Goutsmedt and Sergi2024), which seems to have favorably positioned BoE researchers to make scientific contributions (see Figure 3 and Table 5).Footnote ²⁰ More specifically, the BoE staff was internationally renowned in the field of econometrics, notably for their contribution to time series analysis and innovative techniques in estimating and simulating forward-looking macroeconometric models (Acosta et al., Reference Acosta, Claveau, Cherrier, Fontan, Goutsmedt and Sergi2024). In short, the high level of research publications seems to reflect a deliberate strategy to promote contributory scientization in order to achieve legitimizing scientization, with scant progress in policymaking scientization in the period. Indeed, advanced econometric modeling did not inform policy at the Bank, but rather helped it in the credibility struggle with the Treasury.

This first phase came to an end in the early 1990s, with an especially marked drop for publications in peer-reviewed journals, despite the rise of hired PhDs. This reversal of the trend for scientific output reflects a reorientation of research efforts toward policy analysis – thus, the drop in publications whilst the level of qualification of the workforce increases (cf. supra) signals a prevalence of policymaking scientization. The view that research had to cater to the needs of the policy process was heralded by a few key Bank executives (notably Mervyn King, then Charles Bean). They considered as paramount that the Bank did not attempt to mimic academic publishing practices, which they considered as inappropriate with respect to the Bank’s missions:

As a result, publishing in peer-reviewed journals was generally seen as ‘an optional extra’ to policy work, as recalled by a newly recruited PhD economist at the time:

Although indicators suggest that contributory scientization at the BoE was on the rise again in the early 2000s, the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-2009 interrupted the process. In the aftermath of the crisis, reconfiguring policy analysis took precedence over publishing articles in scientific journals. As a former Executive recalls: ‘Before the crisis, of course there was more time to do research. Then, obviously the urgency of the situation required to stop that’. (Interview, Executive 1)

This trend at the BoE during this period is at odds with other central banks, such as the ECB, where scientific publications increased during this period (OA, Figure 4; see also Mudge and Vauchez, Reference Mudge and Vauchez2016). This divergence is probably the result of different organizational structures for research. The ECB devotes an entire administrative unit, with its own full-time staff, to scientific research. At the BoE, no such research department existed. As a staff economist during the crisis explains:

At the BoE, the financial crisis did not only reverse the trend for scientific publications (Figure 3), it also impacted speeches. Indeed, we detect that, in the aftermath of the crisis, the BoE leadership had a smaller propensity to cite scientific research and to use scientific jargon in their speeches (see Figures 4 and 5). Since much was in flux in the world of central bankers at the time, many factors might explain this reduction in ‘science speak’, including the fact that economic science temporarily became a less reliable ally in the quest for credibility and policy effectiveness (see below for more on that).

To sum up this section, the recent history of the BoE teaches us that the process of contributory scientization sometimes goes in reverse and that this is related to a tension with the two other dimensions of scientization. In particular, depending on external circumstances, the internal organizational structure and the views of the leadership, a central bank can reallocate its resources between policy analysis and scientific research. In the 1990s, priority was given to policymaking scientization while legitimacy issues challenged the dynamics of contributory scientization in the 2000s.

Scientization as a locus of controversy

In the literature on the scientization of central banks, Marcussen and other scholars argue that this process insulates organizations from external criticisms: Who would dare challenge a scientized organization? Indeed, legitimizing scientization is a well-worn credibility-enhancing strategy. However, the recent history of the BoE demonstrates that the appeal to science for legitimacy can also generate controversies both inside and outside the Bank.

First, when the Bank became independent in 1997, the Monetary Policy Committee became the central body for monetary policymaking. The composition of the MPC includes nine members, four of whom are not BoE employees. The advanced qualifications in economics of some external MPC members (as well as, for some of them, their professional experience in academia), often led them to challenge publicly how policymaking scientization proceeded at the Bank.

Facing the refusal of Mervyn King to disclose details about BoE modeling and forecasting, external MPC members voiced their concerns in the Financial Times (Interview, Executive 3). The BoE did not shy away from the controversy by dismissing outside criticism. On the contrary, it fostered internal debates, by equipping its external MPC members with personal staff (James, Reference James2020: 438). These resources allowed them ‘to write their speeches and scrutinize internal forecasts’ (staff economist 11). While, in the past, there was a strong degree of bricolage involved in working with the BoE forecasting models, the MPC scrutiny forced BoE economists to address academic criticisms and provide more explanations about their modeling choices, thus engaging in contributory scientization (Goutsmedt et al., Reference Goutsmedt, Sergi, Cherrier, Claveau, Fontan and Acosta2024).

The presence of academics within the MPC also fostered outsiders’ criticisms. After its first year of existence, the MPC was notably criticized in the Financial Times for its ‘paralysis by analysis’, resulting from each member having a different opinion (James, Reference James2020: 435). The business community also worried that ‘the MPC could have been damagingly dominated by central bankers and academic economists’ and highlighted the importance of other profiles more connected to financial markets and the private sector, such as DeAnne Julius (James, Reference James2020: 437).Footnote ²³ For one of the Bank’s most influential audiences, the push for more policymaking and contributory scientizations was not credibility enhancing.

Second, the 2007-2009 Great Financial Crisis and the main BoE policy to answer it (Quantitative Easing; QE) intensified insider controversy and public scrutiny over the role of science at the Bank. In fact, interviewees recalled that the strong institutional separation between the production of expertise on financial markets and monetary policy precluded the Bank from acting on early signs of financial instability (Interview, staff economist 11 and executive 3). An internal reorganization followed whereby both forms of expertise would be combined to feed the policymaking process.

The implementation of QE also fueled controversies about the use of specific macroeconomic models within the Bank. For example, standard new Keynesian DSGE models were deemed ineffective for formulating policies addressing financial dynamics. The implementation of QE necessitated a return to the utilization of ‘simpler and older economic literature, back at least to Tobin and Brainard in the 1960s and 1970s’ (Interview, staff economist 11; see also Acosta et al., Reference Acosta, Claveau, Cherrier, Fontan, Goutsmedt and Sergi2024). A ‘QE team’ of in-house researchers was set up to propose policy options, but the papers they wrote never made it to the MPC’s deliberation. Instead, the QE plan was decided in about three days by a small group of top executives (Interview, Executive 3). In this episode, up-to-date science was judged to be either irrelevant (DSGE models) or too immature (the research of the QE team) to be an input to policymaking around QE. In these times of crisis and emergency, policymaking imperatives trumped all three dimensions of scientization.

More recently, the issue of QE came back to haunt the BoE. In early 2021, the Economic Affairs Committee of the UK parliament – which notably included Mervyn King, who was governor of the BoE when QE was first implemented – held hearings with experts to gather evidence about the theoretical mechanisms underlying QE (Economic Affairs Committee, 2021). The experts interviewed come from the different audiences to which the BoE answers: academic researchers (e.g., Daniela Gabor, Charles Goodhart, Kenneth Rogoff), former and current central bankers (e.g., Otmar Issing, Peter Praet), consultants from financial market participants (e.g., Blackrock, City UK), financial journalists and NGOs, as well as former MPC and Treasury members (e.g., Edward Balls, Paul Tucker, Adam Posen). The interviews and the final report of the committee zoomed in on the theoretical justifications for implementing QE and academic debates on its effectiveness.

The Parliament critically examined the economic knowledge produced by the BoE. It explicitly challenged potential bias in BoE research, emphasizing that ‘central banks take a more positive view of quantitative easing than independent analysts’ (Economic Affairs Committee, 2021: 19). The resulting report, likewise, noted considerable ‘knowledge gaps’ concerning QE (Economic Affairs Committee, 2021: 19). It pointed out that the Bank’s ‘understanding of quantitative easing’s effects and its transmission mechanisms are far from complete more than a decade on from the policy’s introduction’ (Economic Affairs Committee, 2021: 20). It recommended prioritizing research on the effectiveness of its transmission mechanisms and its macroeconomic effects. Moreover, the report stated that ‘the Bank has not adequately engaged with debate about the tradeoffs created by sustained quantitative easing’. To ensure the existence of a counter expertise, it invited the Treasury ‘to reply to any research that the Bank produces on the distributional effects of quantitative easing’ (Economic Affairs Committee, 2021: 24).

In sum, the process of scientization at the BoE has not neutralized debates on the production of economic knowledge and on monetary policymaking, both inside and outside the Bank. Thus, contributory scientization (as well as policymaking scientization) does not result naturally into a process of legitimizing scientization: scientific credentials and conclusions are actually fertile grounds for controversy.