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Why do people keep their promises? A further investigation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Steven Schwartz*
Affiliation:
School of Management, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY 13902, USA
Eric Spires
Affiliation:
Fisher College of Business, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210, USA
Rick Young
Affiliation:
Fisher College of Business, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210, USA

Abstract

Two rationales have emerged for why individuals keep their promises: (a) an emotional commitment to keep actions and words consistent, a commitment rationale and (b) avoidance of guilt due to not meeting the expectations of the promisee, an expectations rationale. We propose a new dichotomy with clearer distinctions between rationales: (1) an internal consistency rationale, which is the desire to keep actions and words consistent regardless of others’ awareness of the promise and (2) a communication rationale, which captures all aspects of promise keeping that are associated with the promisee having learned of the promise, including but not limited to promisee expectations. Using an experiment that manipulates whether promises are delivered, we find no support for the internal consistency rationale; only delivered promises are relevant. In a second experiment designed to better understand what aspect of promise delivery influences promisor behavior, we manipulate whether the promise is delivered before or after the promisee is able to take a trusting action. We find late-arriving promises are relevant though not as relevant as promises delivered before the promisee chooses whether to take the trusting action. We conclude that implicit contracting does not fully explain promise keeping, because had it done so, late-arriving promises would also be irrelevant.

Type
Original Paper
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-018-9567-2) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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