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Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History: A Re-examination

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Andreas Ortmann ,
John Fitzgerald  and
Carl Boeing
Andreas Ortmann*
Affiliation:
Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Lentzeallee 94, 14195 Berlin, Germany
John Fitzgerald
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Bowdoin College, Brunswick, ME 04011, USA
Carl Boeing
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Bowdoin College, Brunswick, ME 04011, USA
*
email: [email protected]; [email protected]
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Abstract

Berg et al. (Games and Economic Behavior, 10, pp. 122-142, 1995) study trust and reciprocity in an investment setting. They find significant amounts of trust and reciprocity and conclude that trust is a guiding behavioral instinct (a “primitive” in their terminology). We modify the way information is presented to participants and, through a questionnaire, prompt strategic reasoning. To our surprise, none of our various treatments led to a reduction in the amount invested. Previously reported experimental results to the contrary did not survive replication. Our results suggest that those by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe are rather robust to changes in information presentation and strategic reasoning prompts. We discuss the implications of these findings.

Keywords

experimental economicstrustreciprocityinformation presentationprompting strategic reasoningexperimental designexperimental implementation

JEL classification

C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior C72: Noncooperative Games
Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 3 , Issue 1 , June 2000 , pp. 81 - 100
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

*

Please send all correspondence to 9 Jordan Avenue, Brunswick, ME 04011, USA (if writing from the USA) or the Berlin address (if writing from elsewhere).

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