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The sustainability of the commons: giving and receiving

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Nuria Osés-Eraso  and
Montserrat Viladrich-Grau
Nuria Osés-Eraso*
Affiliation:
Departamento de Economía, Universidad Pública de Navarra, Campus Arrosadia, Pamplona 31006, Spain
Montserrat Viladrich-Grau*
Affiliation:
Department of Business Administration (AEGERN), Universitat de Lleida, ETSEA, Rovira Roure 191, Lleida 25198, Spain
*
e-mail: [email protected]
e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

This paper analyzes the use of a cost-free reward mechanism in the exploitation of a common property resource. We implement an experimental study involving a two-stages game where agents first decide resource appropriation and then have the opportunity to distribute cost-free bestowals. We observe that subjects link the two activities in such a way that appropriation determines the distribution of bestowals which in turn contributes maintaining low appropriation levels, thus avoiding the destruction of the common resource. Not all the potential bestowals are distributed, however.

Keywords

Common property resourceAppropriationBestowalsDonorsRecipientsScarcityEarly extinction

JEL classification

C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior Q20: General
Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 14 , Issue 4 , November 2011 , pp. 458 - 481
Copyright
Copyright © 2011 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Financial support by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology (project ECO2009-12836) is gratefully acknowledged. Montserrat Viladrich-Grau acknowledges the support of the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics Research Network and of the Government of Catalonia. We thank Frederic Udina, Jordi Brandts, Emilio Domínguez, Jorge Nieto and members of SEED research group for helpful comments and discussions. We also thank the helpful comments of two anonymous referees.

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