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Strength of the Social Dilemma in a Public Goods Experiment: An Exploration of the Error Hypothesis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Marc Willinger  and
Anthony Ziegelmeyer
Marc Willinger*
Affiliation:
Institut Universitaire de France, BETA-Theme—Université Louis Pasteur, 61, avenue de la Forêt Noire, F-67085 Strasbourg Cedex, France
Anthony Ziegelmeyer
Affiliation:
BETA-Theme—Université Louis Pasteur, 61, avenue de la Forêt Noire, F-67085 Strasbourg Cedex, France
*
email: [email protected]
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Abstract

We present the results of an experiment on voluntary contributions to a public good with a unique dominant strategy equilibrium in the interior of the strategy space. The treatment variable is the equilibrium contribution level. By increasing the equilibrium contribution level, we reduce the “strength” of the social dilemma. Though we observe that the average level of contribution rises with the equilibrium contribution level, the average rate of over-contribution is not affected in a systematic way. Over-contribution is statistically significant only at the lower level of equilibrium contribution but not at the higher levels. We show that the Anderson et al. (1998, Journal of Public Economics. 70, 297-323) logit equilibrium model which combines altruism and decision errors fits quite well our laboratory data.

Keywords

experimental economicspublic goodsinterior equilibriaaltruismdecision errorlogit equilibrium

JEL classification

H41: Public Goods C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior C72: Noncooperative Games
Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 4 , Issue 2 , October 2001 , pp. 131 - 144
Copyright
Copyright © 2001 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

*

To whom correspondence should be addressed.

References

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