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Step Returns in Threshold Public Goods: A Meta- and Experimental Analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Rachel T. A. Croson  and
Melanie Beth Marks
Rachel T. A. Croson
Affiliation:
Operations and Information Management, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104
Melanie Beth Marks
Affiliation:
School of Business and Economics, Longwood College, Farmville, Virginia 23909
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Abstract

One important determinant of voluntary contributions to public goods is the value of the public good relative to that of the forgone private good. Isaac, Walker and Thomas (1984) formalized this relation in the Marginal Per Capita Return (MPCR) and demonstrated its influence on the provision of linear public goods. This paper develops a parallel concept, in the context of a threshold public good, the Step Return (SR). After providing a meta-analysis of the effect of SR in previous experiments, we compare contributions in threshold public goods games with low, medium and high SRs. Results show that subjects respond to the SR in this setting just as they respond to the MPCR in the linear public goods setting: higher SRs lead to more contributions.

Keywords

threshold public goodprovision point mechanismexperimentmeta-analysisC9C7H4
Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 2 , Issue 3 , March 2000 , pp. 239 - 259
Copyright
Copyright © 1999 Economic Science Association

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