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Social status and prosocial behavior

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Jin Di Zheng Open the ORCID record for Jin Di Zheng [Opens in a new window] ,
Arthur Schram  and
Tianle Song Open the ORCID record for Tianle Song [Opens in a new window]
Jin Di Zheng*
Affiliation:
School of Economics, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, China
Arthur Schram*
Affiliation:
CREED, Amsterdam School of Economics, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Tianle Song*
Affiliation:
Wenlan School of Business, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan, China
*
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
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Abstract

This paper studies the effects of social status—a socially recognized ranking of individuals—on prosocial behavior. We use a laboratory experiment and propose a theory to address this issue. In a one-shot game, two players, whose social status is either earned or randomly assigned, jointly make effort contributions to a project. Player 1 first suggests an effort level for each player to player 2 who then determines the actual effort levels. Deviation from the proposal is costly. We find causal evidence that high-status players are less selfish than their low-status counterparts. In particular, high-status players 2 provide relatively more effort, ceteris paribus, than those with low status. The experimental results and theoretical framework suggest that a high social ranking yields more social behavior and that this can be attributed to the sense of responsibility that it gives.

Keywords

Randomly generated statusEarned statusProsocialLaboratory experiment

JEL classification

D63: Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement A14: Sociology of Economics C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior
Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 26 , Issue 5 , November 2023 , pp. 1085 - 1114
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Economic Science Association 2023.

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Footnotes

Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-023-09810-0.

“... rank among our equals, is, perhaps, the strongest of all our desires.”

—Smith 1759.

A correction to this article is available online at https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-023-09819-5.

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