Hostname: page-component-7b9c58cd5d-hpxsc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-03-16T13:13:17.444Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Reluctant donors and their reactions to social information

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

David Klinowski
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This paper examines how image concerns affect the way giving behavior responds to social information. Subjects in the laboratory decide first whether they wish to donate part of their earnings to a charity, and then, conditional on opting in, decide how much to donate. They receive information on the size of a previous donation either before or after opting in, which allows one to examine the effect of the social information on the extensive and intensive margins of giving separately, and thus distinguish self-image concerns from potential alternative mechanisms. Information on a large previous donation caused subjects to opt out, but when shown only after opt-in, the same information caused subjects to increase donation amounts and did not lead to $0 donations. As further evidence of the influence of image concerns, the reaction to the social information was found to be correlated with a preference for quietly exiting a dictator game, and with scoring high on neuroticism. The results have implications for the inferences we draw about donor motives and welfare based on changes in giving in response to social information.

Keywords

Charitable givingReluctant altruismSocial informationMoral wiggle room

JEL classification

D64: Altruism • Philanthropy • Intergenerational Transfers H41: Public Goods C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior L31: Nonprofit Institutions • NGOs • Social Entrepreneurship D80: General D91: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 24 , Issue 2 , June 2021 , pp. 515 - 535
Copyright
Copyright © 2020 Economic Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-020-09670-y) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

References

Allcott, H (2011). Social norms and energy consumption. Journal of Public Economics, 95(9), 1082–1095. 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.03.003CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Alpizar, F, Carlsson, F, & Johansson-Stenman, O (2008). Anonymity, reciprocity, and conformity: Evidence from voluntary contributions to a national park in Costa Rica. Journal of Public Economics, 92(5), 1047–1060. 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.11.004CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Andreoni, J, Payne, AA Auerbach, AJ, Chetty, R, Feldstein, M, & Saez, E (2013). Charitable Giving. Handbook of public economics, Amsterdam: North Holland.Google Scholar
Andreoni, J, Rao, JM, & Trachtman, H (2017). Avoiding the ask: A field experiment on altruism, empathy, and charitable giving. Journal of Political Economy, 125(3), 625–653. 10.1086/691703CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Andreoni, J, & Scholz, K (1998). An econometric analysis of charitable giving with interdependent preferences. Economic Inquiry, 36(3), 410–428. 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1998.tb01723.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Argo, N, Klinowski, D, Krishnamurti, T, & Smith, S (2020). The completion effect in charitable crowdfunding. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 172, 17–32. 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.01.025CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bardsley, N (2008). Dictator game giving: Altruism or artefact?. Experimental Economics, 11(2), 122–133. 10.1007/s10683-007-9172-2CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bénabou, R., Falk, A., & Tirole, J. (2018). Eliciting moral preferences. In Working paper.Google Scholar
Bergstrom, T, Blume, L, & Varian, HR (1986). On the private provision of public goods. Journal of Public Economics, 29, 25–49. 10.1016/0047-2727(86)90024-1CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bernheim, DB (1994). A theory of conformity. Journal of Political Economy, 102(5), 841–877. 10.1086/261957CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bohnet, I, & Zeckhauser, R (2004). Social comparisons in ultimatum bargaining. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 106(3), 495–510. 10.1111/j.0347-0520.2004.00376.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Broberg, T, Ellingsen, T, & Johannesson, M (2007). Is generosity involuntary?. Economics Letters, 94(1), 32–37. 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.07.006CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Byrne, KA, Silasi-Mansat, CD, & Worthy, DA (2015). Who chokes under pressure? The Big Five personality traits and decision-making under pressure. Personality and Individual Differences, 74, 22–28. 10.1016/j.paid.2014.10.009CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Camerer, C (2003). Behavioral game theory, Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Cason, TN, & Mui, V-L (1998). Social influence in the sequential dictator game. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 42, 248–265. 10.1006/jmps.1998.1213CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Castillo, M, Petrie, R, & Wardell, C (2014). Fundraising through online social networks: A field experiment on peer-to-peer solicitation. Journal of Public Economics, 114, 29–35. 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.01.002CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Castillo, M., Petrie, R., & Wardell, C. (2017). Friends asking friends for charity: The importance of gifts and audiences. In Working paper..Google Scholar
Cialdini, RB, & Schroeder, DA (1976). Increasing compliance by legitimizing paltry contributions: When even a penny helps. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34(4), 599–604. 10.1037/0022-3514.34.4.599CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Coffman, LC, Featherstone, CR, & Kessler, JB (2017). Can social information affect what job you choose and keep?. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 9(1), 96–117.Google Scholar
Cragg, JG (1971). Some statistical models for limited dependent variables with application to the demand for durable goods. Econometrica, 39(5), 829–844. 10.2307/1909582CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dana, J, Cain, DM, & Dawes, RM (2006). What you don’t know won’t hurt me: Costly (but quiet) exit in dictator games. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 100(2), 193–201. 10.1016/j.obhdp.2005.10.001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dana, J, Weber, RA, & Kuang, JX (2007). Exploiting moral wiggle room: Experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness. Economic Theory, 33(1), 67–80. 10.1007/s00199-006-0153-zCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dariel, A, & Nikiforakis, N (2014). Cooperators and reciprocators: A within-subject analysis of prosocial behavior. Economics Letters, 122(2), 163–166. 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.10.033CrossRefGoogle Scholar
De Quidt, J., Vesterlund, L., & Wilson, A. J. (2019). Experimenter demand effects. In Schram, A., Ule, A. (Eds.) The handbook of research methods and applications in experimental economics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
DellaVigna, S, List, JA, & Malmendier, U (2012). Testing altruism and social pressure in charitable giving. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(1), 1–56. 10.1093/qje/qjr050CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Eckel, CC, & Grossman, PJ (2003). Rebate versus matching: Does how we subsidize charitable contributions matter?. Journal of Public Economics, 87(3), 681–701. 10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00094-9CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Exley, CL (2016). Excusing selfishness in charitable giving: The role of risk. Review of Economic Studies, 83(2), 587–628. 10.1093/restud/rdv051CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Exley, C. L., & Kessler, J. B. (2019). Motivated errors. In Working paper.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Exley, CL, & Petrie, R (2018). The impact of a surprise donation ask. Journal of Public Economics, 158, 152–167. 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.12.015CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Feiler, L (2014). Testing models of information avoidance with binary choice dictator games. Journal of Economic Psychology, 45, 253–267. 10.1016/j.joep.2014.10.003CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fischbacher, U (2007). z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experimental Economics, 10(2), 171–178. 10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fischbacher, U, Gächter, S, & Fehr, E (2001). Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment. Economics Letters, 71(3), 397–404. 10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00394-9CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Frey, BS, & Meier, S (2004). Social comparisons and pro-social behavior: Testing “conditional cooperation” in a field experiment. American Economic Review, 94(5), 1717–1722. 10.1257/0002828043052187CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gill, D, & Prowse, V (2012). A structural analysis of disappointment aversion in a real effort competition. American Economic Review, 102(1), 469–503. 10.1257/aer.102.1.469CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gino, F, Norton, MI, & Weber, RA (2016). Motivated Bayesians: Feeling moral while acting egoistically. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 30(3), 189–212. 10.1257/jep.30.3.189CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grossman, Z (2014). Strategic ignorance and the robustness of social preferences. Management Science, 60(11), 2659–2665. 10.1287/mnsc.2014.1989CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grossman, Z, & van der Weele, JJ (2017). Self-image and willful ignorance in social decisions. Journal of the European Economics Association, 15(1), 173–217. 10.1093/jeea/jvw001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haisley, EC, & Weber, RA (2010). Self-serving interpretations of ambiguity in other-regarding behavior. Games and Economic Behavior, 68(2), 614–625. 10.1016/j.geb.2009.08.002CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hallsworth, M, List, JA, Metcalfe, RD, & Vlaev, I (2017). The behavioralist as tax collector: Using natural field experiments to enhance tax compliance. Journal of Public Economics, 148, 14–31. 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.02.003CrossRefGoogle Scholar
John, O. P., Donahue, E. M., & Kentle, R. L., (1991). The big five inventory—versions 4a and 54. University of California, Berkeley, Institute of Personality and Social Research.Google Scholar
Kamdar, A., Levitt, S. D., List, J. A., Mullaney, B., & Syverson, C. (2015). Once and done: Leveraging behavioral economics to increase charitable contributions. In Working paper..Google Scholar
Karlan, D, & List, JA (2007). Does price matter in charitable giving? Evidence from a large-scale natural field experiment. American Economic Review, 97(5), 1774–1793. 10.1257/aer.97.5.1774CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Keser, C, & van Winden, F (2000). Conditional cooperation and voluntary contributions to public goods. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 102(1), 23–39. 10.1111/1467-9442.00182CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kessler, JB (2017). Announcements of support and public good provision. American Economic Review, 107(12), 3760–3787. 10.1257/aer.20130711CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Klinowski, D (2018). Gender differences in giving in the dictator game: The role of reluctant altruism. Journal of the Economic Science Association, 4(2), 110–122. 10.1007/s40881-018-0058-1CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krupka, EL, & Croson, RTA (2016). The differential impact of social norms cues on charitable contributions. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 128, 149–158. 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.05.005CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Larson, T, & Capra, MC (2009). Exploiting moral wiggle room: Illusory preference for fairness? A comment. Judgement and Decision Making, 4(6), 467–474.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lazear, EP, Malmendier, U, & Weber, RA (2012). Sorting in experiments with application to social preferences. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 4(1), 136–163.Google Scholar
Linardi, S, & McConnell, MA (2011). No excuses for good behavior: Volunteering and the social environment. Journal of Public Economics, 95, 445–454. 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.06.020CrossRefGoogle Scholar
List, JA (2007). On the interpretation of giving in dictator games. Journal of Political Economy, 115(3), 482–493. 10.1086/519249CrossRefGoogle Scholar
List, JA, & Lucking-Reiley, D (2002). The effects of seed money and refunds on charitable giving: Experimental evidence from a university capital campaign. Journal of Political Economy, 110(1), 215–233. 10.1086/324392CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Martin, R, & Randal, J (2008). How is donation behavior affected by the donations of others?. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 67(1), 228–238. 10.1016/j.jebo.2007.08.001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Matthey, A, & Regner, T (2011). Do I really want to know? A cognitive dissonance-based explanation of other-regarding behavior. Games, 2(1), 114–135. 10.3390/g2010114CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Meer, J (2011). Brother, can you spare a dime: Peer pressure in charitable solicitation. Journal of Public Economics, 95(7), 926–941. 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.11.026CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Merritt, AC, Effron, DA, & Monin, B (2010). Moral self-licensing: When being good frees us to be bad. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 4(5), 344–357. 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2010.00263.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Muris, P, Roelofs, J, Rassin, E, Franken, I, & Mayer, B (2005). Mediating effects of rumination and worry o the links between neuroticism, anxiety and depression. Personality and Individual Differences, 39, 1105–1111. 10.1016/j.paid.2005.04.005CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ottoni-Wilhelm, M, & Bekkers, R (2010). Helping behavior, dispositional empathic concern, and the principle of care. Social Psychology Quarterly, 73(1), 11–32. 10.1177/0190272510361435CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Potters, J, Sefton, M, & Vesterlund, L (2007). Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: An experimental study. Economic Theory, 33(1), 169–182. 10.1007/s00199-006-0186-3CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rabin, M (1993). Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. American Economic Review, 83(5), 1281–1302.Google Scholar
Regner, T (2018). Reciprocity under moral wiggle room: Is it a preference or a constraint?. Experimental Economics, 21(4), 779–792. 10.1007/s10683-017-9551-2CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Romano, R, & Yildirim, H (2001). Why charities announce donations: A positive perspective. Journal of Public Economics, 81(3), 423–447. 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00078-5CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sachdeva, S, Iliev, R, & Medin, DL (2009). Sinning saints and saintly sinners: The paradox of moral self-regulation. Psychological Science, 20(4), 523–528. 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02326.xCrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Samek, AS, & Sheremeta, RM (2014). Recognizing contributors: An experiment on public goods. Experimental Economics, 17(4), 673–690. 10.1007/s10683-013-9389-1Google Scholar
Serra-Garcia, M., & Szech, N. (2019). The (in)elasticity of moral ignorance. In Working paper..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shang, J, & Croson, R (2009). A field experiment in charitable contribution: The impact of social information on the voluntary provision of public goods. Economic Journal, 119(540), 1422–1439. 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02267.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, S, Windmeijer, F, & Wright, E (2015). Peer effects in charitable giving: Evidence from the (running) field. Economic Journal, 125(585), 1053–1171. 10.1111/ecoj.12114CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sugden, R (1984). Reciprocity: The supply of public goods through voluntary contributions. Economic Journal, 94(376), 772–787. 10.2307/2232294CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Trachtman, H, Steinkruger, A, Wood, M, Andreoni, J, Murphy, JJ, & Rao, JM (2015). Fair weather avoidance: Unpacking the costs and benefits of “avoiding the ask”. Journal of the Economic Science Association, 1(1), 8–14. 10.1007/s40881-015-0006-2CrossRefGoogle Scholar
van der Weele, JJ, Kulisa, J, Kosfeld, M, & Friebel, G (2014). Resisting moral wiggle room: How robust is reciprocal behavior?. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6(3), 256–264.Google Scholar
Varian, HR (1994). Sequential contributions to public goods. Journal of Public Economics, 53(2), 165–186. 10.1016/0047-2727(94)90019-1CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vesterlund, L (2003). The informational value of sequential fundraising. Journal of Public Economics, 87(3), 627–657. 10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00187-6CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vesterlund, L., 2006. Why do people give? In The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook, Second Edition, eds. Steinberg, R., and Powell, E., Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Vesterlund, L Kagel, JH, & Roth, AE (2016). Using experimental methods to understand why and how we give to charity. The handbook of experimental economics, Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Zhong, C, & Liljenquist, K (2006). Washing away your sins: Threatened morality and physical cleansing. Science, 313(5792), 1451–1452. 10.1126/science.1130726CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Supplementary material: File

Klinowski supplementary material

Appendix to: Reluctant donors and their reactions to social information
Download Klinowski supplementary material(File)
File 2.6 MB