Hostname: page-component-7b9c58cd5d-hxdxx Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-03-15T16:14:54.806Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Nash as an Organizing Principle in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

R. Mark Isaac  and
James M. Walker
R. Mark Isaac
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Arizona
James M. Walker
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Experiments are reported that add to the growing literature on the voluntary provision of public goods. Information conditions are manipulated to address whether early findings of above-equilibrium contributions to a public good are a result of complete information regarding the symmetry of the game. No significant information effect was found. Further, by examining designs with an interior Nash equilibrium, this research suggests that the nonzero contributions observed in the previous dominant strategy environments, where the prediction was a zero level of provision of the public good, were not simply transitional errors as the system converged to a boundary equilibrium.

Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 1 , Issue 3 , December 1998 , pp. 191 - 206
Copyright
Copyright © 1998 Economic Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Andreoni, James. (1993). “An Experimental Test of the Public Goods Crowding-Out Hypothesis.” American Economic Review. 83(5), 1317–1327.Google Scholar
Andreoni, James. (1995). “Cooperation in Public Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion.” American Economic Review. 85, 891–904.Google Scholar
Benoit, J. and Krishna, V. (1987). “Nash Equilibria in Finitely Repeated Games.” Internationaljournal of Game Theory. 16, 197–204.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chan, K., Mestelman, S., Moir, R., and Muller, A. (1996). “The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods under Varying Income Distributions.” Canadian Journal of Economics. 29(1), 54–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Croson, Rachel. (1998). “Theories of Altruism and Reciprocity: Evidence from Linear Public Goods Games.” Working Paper.Google Scholar
Fisher, Joseph, Isaac, Mark, Schatzberg, Jeffrey, and Walker, James. (1995). “Heterogenous Demand for Public Goods: Effects on the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism.” Public Choice. 85(3/4), 249–266.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Isaac, R. Mark, McCue, Kevin, and Plott, Charles. (1985). “Public Goods Provision in an Experimental Environment.” Journal of Public Economics. 26, 1–74.Google Scholar
Isaac, R. Mark and Walker, James. (1988). “Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. 103, 179–200.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Isaac, R. Mark and Walker, James. (1991). “On the Suboptimaility of Voluntary Public Goods Provision: Further Experimental Evidence.” Research in Experimental Economics. 4, 211–221.Google Scholar
Isaac, R. Mark, Walker, James, and Thomas, Susan. (1984). “Divergent Evidence on Free Riding: An Experimental Examination of Some Possible Explanations.” Public Choice. 43, 113–149.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Isaac, R. Mark, Walker, James, and Williams, Arlington. (1994). “Group Size and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence Utilizing Large Groups.” Journal of Public Economics. 54(1), 1–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Keser, Claudia. (1996). “Voluntary Contributions to a Public Good When Partial Contribution is a Dominant Strategy.” Economics Letters. 50(3), 359–366.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Laury, Susan and Holt, Charles. (forthcoming). “Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Results with Interior Nash Equilibria.” Handbook of Experimental Economic Results.Google Scholar
Laury, Susan, Walker, James, and Williams, Arlington. (1995). “Anonymity and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods.” (with S. Laury and A. Williams). Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 27, 365–380.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Laury, Susan, Walker, James, and Williams, Arlington. (1998). “The Voluntary Provision of a Pure Public Good with Diminishing Marginal Returns.” Public Choice, forthcoming.Google Scholar
Ledyard, J. (1995). “Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research.” In Kagel, John and Roth, Alvin (eds.), The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Marks, Melanie and Croson, Rachel. (1998). “Alternative Rebate Rules in the Provision of a Threshold Public Good: An Experimental Investigation.” Journal of Public Economics. 67, 195–200.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Offerman, Theo, Sonnemans, Joseph, and Schram, Arthur. (1996). “Value Orientations, Expectations and Voluntary Contributions in Public Goods.” Economic Journal. 106(437), 817–845.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Palfrey, Thomas and Prisbrey, Jeffrey. (1997). “Anomalous Behavior in Linear Public Goods Experiments: How Much and Why?.” American Economic Review. 87(5), 829–846.Google Scholar
Sefton, Martin and Steinberg, Richard. (1996). “Reward Structures in Public Good Experiments.” Journal of Public Economics. 61(2), 263–287.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
van Dijk, F., Sonnemans, J., and van Winden, F. (1997). “Social Ties in a Public Good Experiment.” Working Paper, University of Amsterdam.Google Scholar