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Measuring Motivations for the Reciprocal Responses Observed in a Simple Dilemma Game

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Gary E. Bolton ,
Jordi Brandts  and
Axel Ockenfels
Gary E. Bolton*
Affiliation:
Department of Management Science and Information Systems, 310 Beam, Penn State University, University Park, PA 16802, USA
Jordi Brandts*
Affiliation:
Institut d'Anàlisi Economica (CSIC), Campus UAB, 08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain
Axel Ockenfels*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Magdeburg, Postfach 4120 D-39016 Magdeburg, Germany
*
email: [email protected]
email: [email protected]
email: [email protected]
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Abstract

A reciprocal action is an action meant to have a similar influence on another's payoff as another's action has on one's own. One hypothesis asserts that reciprocal action is triggered by the reciprocator's belief that another's action was good or ill intended. The other hypothesis says that the reciprocator is simply acting to implement fixed preferences over payoff allocations. We report on an experiment that allows us to study both positive (reward) and negative (punishment) reciprocal action in a single framework. Knowing the preferences for payoff allocations is sufficient to account for nearly all the reciprocal action we observe in our experiment.

Keywords

experimental economicsreciprocitymotivationsdilemma game

JEL classification

D63: Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior C90: General
Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 1 , Issue 3 , December 1998 , pp. 207 - 219
Copyright
Copyright © 1998 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

*

Axel Ockenfels, Univ. of Magdeburg, Faculty of Econ. & Mgnt., Postfach 4120, D-39016 Magdeburg, Germany.

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