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Introduction to the special issue in honor of Professor Charles R. Plott

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Lata Gangadharan ,
Charles N. Noussair Open the ORCID record for Charles N. Noussair [Opens in a new window]  and
Marie-Claire Villeval
Lata Gangadharan
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Monash University, Clayton, Australia
Charles N. Noussair*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics and Economic Science Laboratory, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA
Marie-Claire Villeval
Affiliation:
GATE, CNRS and the University of Lyon, Lyon, France
*
cnoussair@email.arizona.edu
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Abstract

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Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 22 , Issue 3: Special Issue in Honor of Charles R. Plott , September 2019 , pp. 577 - 584
Copyright
Copyright © 2019 Economic Science Association

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