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Introduction to the special issue in honor of Professor Charles R. Plott
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2025
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- Type
- Original Paper
- Information
- Experimental Economics , Volume 22 , Issue 3: Special Issue in Honor of Charles R. Plott , September 2019 , pp. 577 - 584
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2019 Economic Science Association
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