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Individual and Group Behavior in the Ultimatum Game: Are Groups More “Rational” Players?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Gary Bornstein
Affiliation:
The Center for the Study of Rationality and Interactive Decisiion Theory and the Department of Psychology, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Ilan Yaniv
Affiliation:
The Center for the Study of Rationality and Interactive Decisiion Theory and the Department of Psychology, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Abstract

This article reports two experiments that compared the standard ultimatum game played by individuals with the same game played by three-person groups. In the group treatment, the members of the allocating group conducted a brief, face-to-face discussion in order to decide, as a group, on a proposed division, whereas the members of recipient group held a discussion on whether to accept or reject the proposal. If the proposal was accepted, each group member received an equal share of his group's payoff (the pie inthe group condition was three times that in the individual condition). In both experiments, groups offered less than individuals. But as indicated by the low rejection rate in both treatments, groups were also willing to accept less.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1998 Economic Science Association

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