Hostname: page-component-7b9c58cd5d-dkgms Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-03-17T07:35:30.721Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

How effectively do people learn from a variety of different opinions?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Andrew Healy
Andrew Healy*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Loyola Marymount University, 1 LMU Drive, University Hall 4229, Los Angeles, CA 90045, USA
*
e-mail: [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This paper presents experimental evidence about how effectively individuals learn from information coming from heterogeneous sources. In the experiment, Thai subjects observed information that came from Americans and from other Thais that they could use to help them answer a series of questions. Despite listening too little to either group, subjects demonstrated a significant amount of statistical sophistication in how they weighed observed American information relative to observed Thai information. The data indicate that subjects understood that outside information has extra value because people from the same group tend to make the same kinds of mistakes. The results illustrate the importance of forming diverse groups to solve problems.

Keywords

Information aggregationLearningExperimental economics

JEL classification

C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior D83: Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness
Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 12 , Issue 4 , December 2009 , pp. 386 - 416
Copyright
Copyright © Economic Science Association 2009

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-009-9220-1) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

References

Anderson, L., & Holt, C. (1997). Information cascades in the laboratory. American Economic Review, 87, 847–862.Google Scholar
Austen-Smith, D., & Banks, J. (1996). Information aggregation, rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem. American Political Science Review, 90, 34–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Camerer, C., & Lovallo, D. (1999). Overconfidence and excess entry: an experimental approach. American Economic Review, 89, 306–318.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Duflo, E., & Saez, E. (2003). The role of information and social interactions in retirement plan decisions: evidence from a randomized experiment. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, 815–842.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Feddersen, T., & Pesendorfer, W. (1997). Voting behavior and information aggregation in elections with private information. Econometrica, 65, 1029–1058.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Forsythe, R., & Lundholm, R. (1990). Information aggregation in an experimental market. Econometrica, 58, 309–347.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Foster, A., & Rosenzweig, M. (1995). Learning by doing and learning from others: human capital and technical change in agriculture. Journal of Political Economy, 103, 1176–1209.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gigerenzer, G., Hoffrage, U., & Kleinbolting, H. (1991). Probabilistic mental models: a Brunswikian theory of confidence. Psychological Review, 98, 506–528.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Goeree, J., Palfrey, T., Rogers, B., & McKelvey, R. (2007). Self-correcting information cascades. Review of Economic Studies, 74, 733–762.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Granovetter, M. (1973). The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology, 78, 1360–1380.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hellwig, M. F. (1980). On the aggregation of information in competitive markets. Journal of Economic Theory, 22, 477–498.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hoelzl, E., & Rustichini, A. (2005). Overconfident: do you put your money on it? Economic Journal, 115, 305–318.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Iyengar, R., & Schotter, A. (2008). Learning under supervision: an experimental study. Experimental Economics, 11, 154–173.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Janis, I. L. (1972). Victims of groupthink: A psychological study of foreign policy decisions and fiascoes. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.Google Scholar
Kraemer, C., Noth, M., & Weber, M. (2006). Information aggregation with costly information and random ordering: experimental evidence. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 59, 423–432.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lohmann, S. (1994). Information aggregation through costly political action. American Economic Review, 84, 518–530.Google Scholar
Miguel, E., & Kremer, M. (2004). Worms: identifying impacts on education and health in the presence of treatment externalities. Econometrica, 72, 159–217.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Munshi, K. (2004). Social learning in a heterogeneous population: technology diffusion in the Indian Green Revolution. Journal of Development Economics, 73, 185–213.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Munshi, K., & Myaux, J. (2006). Social norms and the fertility transition. Journal of Development Economics, 80, 1–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pesendorfer, W., & Swinkels, J. (1997). The loser's curse and information aggregation in common value auctions. Econometrica, 65, 1247–1281.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pesendoifer, W., & Swinkels, J. (2000). Efficiency and information aggregation in auctions. American Economic Review, 90, 499–525.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Piketty, T. (1999). The information-aggregation approach to political institutions. European Economic Review, 43, 791–800.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Plott, C., & Sunder, S. (1988). Rational expectations and the aggregation of diverse information in laboratory security markets. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 56, 1085–1118.Google Scholar
Putnam, R. (2000). Bowling alone. New York: Simon & Schuster.Google Scholar
Schotter, A. (2003). Decision making with naive advice. American Economic Review, 93, 196–201.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schotter, A., & Sopher, B. (2003). Social learning and coordination conventions in intergenerational games: An experimental study. Journal of Political Economy, 111, 498–529.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schotter, A., & Sopher, B. (2006). Advice and behavior in intergenerational ultimatum games: An experimental approach. Games and Economic Behavior, 58, 365–393.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Surowiecki, J. (2004). The wisdom of crowds. New York: Doubleday.Google Scholar
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and biases. Science, 185, 1124–1131.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Supplementary material: File

Healy supplementary material

Online Appendix
Download Healy supplementary material(File)
File 599.2 KB