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How does voice matter? Evidence from the ultimatum game

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Qiyan Ong ,
Yohanes E. Riyanto  and
Steven M. Sheffrin
Qiyan Ong*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Nanyang Technological University, 14 Nanyang Drive, Singapore 637332, Singapore Economic Growth Centre, Nanyang Technological University, 14 Nanyang Drive, Singapore 637332, Singapore
Yohanes E. Riyanto*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Nanyang Technological University, 14 Nanyang Drive, Singapore 637332, Singapore
Steven M. Sheffrin*
Affiliation:
Murphy Institute, Tulane University, 108 Tilton Hall, New Orleans, LA 70115, USA
*
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
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Abstract

Prior research has demonstrated that the ability to express one’s views or “voice” matters in social and economic interactions, but little is known of the mechanisms through which voice operates. Using an experimental approach based on the ultimatum game with the strategy method, we explore four potential channels for voice that encompass and expand on prior work: the knowledge effect of voice, the value expressive (or inherent value) of voice, the expectation effect of voice, and the procedural fairness effects of voice. Our results show strong effects through the value expressive and expectation channel, but not through either the knowledge channel or procedural fairness. In our view, voice is powerful because people like to express their views and they are disappointed when their views did not make a difference in their outcomes.

Keywords

FairnessExpectation channelProcedural fairnessStrategy methodUltimatum gameValue expressive channelVoice

JEL classification

D30: General C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior
Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 15 , Issue 4 , December 2012 , pp. 604 - 621
Copyright
Copyright © 2012 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article (doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-012-9316-x) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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