Hostname: page-component-7b9c58cd5d-hpxsc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-03-15T16:04:12.940Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Heterogeneity, Coordination and the Provision of Best-Shot Public Goods

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Todd L. Cherry ,
Stephen J. Cotten  and
Stephan Kroll
Todd L. Cherry*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Appalachian State University, Boone, NC 28608-2051, USA CICERO Center for International Climate and Environmental Research-Oslo, P.O. Box 1129 Blindern, 0318 Oslo, Norway
Stephen J. Cotten
Affiliation:
Department of Economics and Finance, University of Houston-Clear Lake, Houston, TX 77058, USA
Stephan Kroll
Affiliation:
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO 80523, USA
*
e-mail: [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

In a best-shot public good, where the provision level is determined by the highest contribution instead of the sum of all contributions, there is potential for waste and underprovision due to coordination failure. These failures are exacerbated when agents are identical because there is no focal point to guide coordination. In most real-world best-shot public-good situations, however, heterogeneity exists in the ability to contribute and the benefits received from the good. With such differences, shared expectations might emerge to improve coordination and increase efficiency. Using laboratory experiments, we find significant behavioral responses to heterogeneity that improve efficiency, but not always from increased coordination.

Keywords

Best-shot public goodsCoordination problemEndowment heterogeneityReturn heterogeneityExperiment

JEL classification

D01: Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles H41: Public Goods C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior C72: Noncooperative Games
Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 16 , Issue 4 , December 2013 , pp. 497 - 510
Copyright
Copyright © 2013 Economic Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Bilodeau, M., Childs, J., & Mestelman, S. (2004). Volunteering a public service: an experimental investigation. Journal of Public Economics, 88, 2839–2855. 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.02.001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bliss, C., & Nalebuff, B. (1984). Dragon-slaying and ballroom dancing: the private supply of a public good. Journal of Public Economics, 25, 1–12. 10.1016/0047-2727(84)90041-0CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brandts, J., & Cooper, D. J. Fatás, E. (2011). Stand by me: help, heterogeneity, and commitment in experimental coordination games. Working paper.Google Scholar
Camerer, C. F. (2003). Behavioral game theory: experiments in strategic interaction, Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Crawford, V. P., Gneezy, U., & Rottenstreich, Y. (2008). The power of focal points is limited: even minute payoff asymmetry yield large coordination failures. The American Economic Review, 98, 1443–1458. 10.1257/aer.98.4.1443CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Deck, C., & Nikiforakis, N. (2012). Perfect and omperfect real-times monitoring in a minimum-effort game. Experimental Economics, 15(1), 71–88. 10.1007/s10683-011-9289-1CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Diekmann, A. (1985). Volunteer’s dilemma. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 29, 605–610. 10.1177/0022002785029004003CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Engelmann, D., & Grimm, V. (2012). Mechanisms for Efficient Voting with Private Information about Preferences. Economic Journal, 122(563), 1010–1041. 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2012.02515.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fischbacher, U. (2007). Z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experimental Economics, 10, 171–178. 10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goeree, J. K., & Holt, C. Smith, A. M. (2005). An experimental examination of the volunteer’s dilemma. Unpublished working paper.Google Scholar
Harrison, G. W., & Hirshleifer, J. (1989). An experimental evaluation of weakest link/best shot models of public goods. Journal of Political Economy, 97(1), 201–225. 10.1086/261598CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Healy, A. J., & Pate, J. G. (2012). Cost asymmetry and uncertainty in an experimental volunteer’s dilemma. Working paper.Google Scholar
Hirshleifer, J. (1983). From weakest-link to best-shot: the voluntary provision of public goods. Public Choice, 41, 371–386. 10.1007/BF00141070CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hörisch, H., & Kirchkamp, O. (2010). Less fighting than expected—experiments with wars of attrition and all-pay auctions. Public Choice, 144, 347–367. 10.1007/s11127-009-9523-yCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Holzinger, K. (2001). Aggregation technology of common goods and its strategic consequences: global warming, biodiversity, and siting conflicts. European Journal of Political Research, 40, 117–138.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kaplan, T. R., & Ruffle, B. J. (2012). Which way to cooperate. Economic Journal, 122(563), 1042–1068. 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02485.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kroll, S., Cherry, T. L., & Shogren, J. F. (2007). The impact of endowment heterogeneity and origin on contributions in best-shot public good games. Experimental Economics, 10, 411–428. 10.1007/s10683-006-9144-yCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mehta, J., Starmer, C., & Sugden, R. (1994). The nature of salience: an experimental investigation of pure coordination games. The American Economic Review, 84(3), 658–673.Google Scholar
Rubinstein, A., Tversky, A., Heller, D. Albers, W., Guth, W., Hammerstein, P., Moldovanu, B., & van Damme, E. (1996). Naïve strategies competitive games. Understanding strategic interaction—essays honor of Reinhard Selton, Berlin: Springer 394–402.Google Scholar
Sandler, T. (2006). Regional public goods and international organizations. Review of International Organizations, 1, 5–25. 10.1007/s11558-006-6604-2CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Schelling, T. (1960). The strategy of conflict, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Sheremeta, R. M. (2011). Perfect-substitutes, best-shot and weakest-link contests between groups. The Korean Economic Review, 27, 5–32.Google Scholar
Straub, P. (1995). Risk dominance and coordination failures in static games. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 35(4), 339–363. 10.1016/1062-9769(95)90048-9CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Van Huyck, J. B., Battalio, R. C., & Beil, R. O. (1990). Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure. The American Economic Review, 80(1), 234–248.Google Scholar