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Fairness considerations in joint venture formation
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2025
Abstract
Using a series of laboratory experiments in the context of bilateral bargaining over whether and how to engage in a joint venture, this paper shows that fairness concerns result in failures to undertake profitable joint production opportunities. We find that framing an opportunity as an employment relationship rather than as a partnership significantly reduces these inefficiencies and increases subjects’ welfare. Consistent with the theoretical model developed in the paper, text analysis and a follow-up experiment demonstrate that the lower likelihood of an efficient outcome in the partnership frame is driven primarily by a concern for fairness generated by the perceived social relationship associated with partnerships, and not by differences in the economic structure, cognition, subject motivation, or changes in relative bargaining power.
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- Copyright © 2019 Economic Science Association
Footnotes
Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-019-09626-x) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
The authors are grateful to Quinn Lewis for excellent research assistance, and to Mitch Hoffman and Charles Sprenger, and participants in seminars at the Harvard Business School, University of Toronto, Ryerson University, and the National University of Singapore for valuable feedback. We gratefully acknowledge funding support from UC San Diego Academic Senate and SSHRC Insight Grant No. 502502.