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Communication and coordination in the laboratory collective resistance game

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Timothy N. Cason  and
Vai-Lam Mui
Timothy N. Cason*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Krannert School of Management, Purdue University, 403 W. State St., West Lafayette, IN 47907-2056, USA
Vai-Lam Mui*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Monash University, P.O. Box 11E, Clayton, Victoria 3800, Australia
*
e-mail: [email protected]
e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

This paper presents a laboratory collective resistance (CR) game to study how different forms of non-binding communication among responders can help coordinate their collective resistance against a leader who transgresses against them. Contrary to the predictions of analysis based on purely self-regarding preferences, we find that non-binding communication about intended resistance increases the incidence of no transgression even in the one-shot laboratory CR game. In particular, we find that the incidence of no transgression increases from 7 percent with no communication up to 25-37 percent depending on whether communication occurs before or after the leader's transgression decision. Responders’ messages are different when the leaders can observe them, and the leaders use the observed messages to target specific responders for transgression.

Keywords

CommunicationCheap talkCollective resistanceLaboratory experimentSocial preferences

JEL classification

D74: Conflict • Conflict Resolution • Alliances • Revolutions C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 10 , Issue 3: Special issue of Experimental Economics in honor of Raymond C. Battalio: Coordination Games , September 2007 , pp. 251 - 267
Copyright
Copyright © 2007 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article (http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-007-9181-1) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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Supplementary material: File

Appendix: Instructions (Ex Post Communication Treatment)

Cason and Mui supplementary material
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