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A Common Pool Resource Game with Sequential Decisions and Experimental Evidence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Lluis Bru ,
Susana Cabrera ,
C. Monica Capra  and
Rosario Gomez
Lluis Bru
Affiliation:
University of Málaga, Spain
Susana Cabrera
Affiliation:
University of Málaga, Spain
C. Monica Capra*
Affiliation:
Washington and Lee University, Lexington, VA 24450, USA
Rosario Gomez
Affiliation:
University of Málaga, Spain
*
email: [email protected]
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Abstract

We describe a common pool resource game in which players choose how much of the stock to extract in a sequential manner. There are two choices and one represents taking a larger proportion of the stock than the other. After a player makes a choice, the remaining stock grows at a constant rate. We consider a game with a finite number of alternating moves. It is shown that changes in the larger proportion of the stock that the players are allowed to take and the growth rate affect equilibrium, but have little effect on behavior in the laboratory. In addition to observing more cooperation than predicted, we observe that parameters that are strategically irrelevant affect behavior. The results of this research might help policy makers in developing adequate policies to prevent overexploitation of some natural renewable resources.

Keywords

laboratory experimentscommon pool resourcesgames

JEL classification

C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior C73: Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games
Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 6 , Issue 1 , June 2003 , pp. 91 - 114
Copyright
Copyright © 2003 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

*

Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.

References

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