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Are social preferences related to market performance?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Andreas Leibbrandt*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Monash University, Clayton 3800, Victoria, Australia

Abstract

This paper combines laboratory with field data from professional sellers to study whether social preferences are related to performance in open-air markets. The data show that sellers who are more pro-social in a laboratory experiment are also more successful in natural markets: They achieve higher prices for similar quality, have superior trade relations and better abilities to signal trustworthiness to buyers. These findings suggest that social preferences play a significant role for outcomes in natural markets.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 2012 Economic Science Association

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