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Altruistic behavior in a representative dictator experiment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Jeffrey Carpenter ,
Cristina Connolly  and
Caitlin Knowles Myers
Jeffrey Carpenter*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Middlebury College, 601 Warner, Middlebury, VT 05753, USA
Cristina Connolly*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Middlebury College, 601 Warner, Middlebury, VT 05753, USA
Caitlin Knowles Myers*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Middlebury College, 502E Warner, Middlebury, VT 05753, USA
*
e-mail: [email protected]
e-mail: [email protected]
e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

We conduct a representative dictator game in which students and random members of the community choose both what charity to support and how much to donate to the charity. We find systematic differences between the choices of students and community members. Community members are much more likely to write in their own charity, community members donate significantly more ($17), on average, and community members are much more likely (32%) to donate the entire $100 endowment. Based on this evidence, it does not appear that student behavior is very representative in the context of the charitable donations and the dictator game.

Keywords

AltruismDictator gameField experimentRepresentativeness

JEL classification

D64: Altruism • Philanthropy • Intergenerational Transfers C93: Field Experiments C72: Noncooperative Games
Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 11 , Issue 3: Field experiments in economics with applications to the economics of charity , September 2008 , pp. 282 - 298
Copyright
Copyright © 2008 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-007-9193-x) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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