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Why do people tell the truth? Experimental evidence for pure lie aversion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Raúl López-Pérez  and
Eli Spiegelman
Raúl López-Pérez*
Affiliation:
Department of Economic Analysis, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Cantoblanco, 28049 Madrid, Spain
Eli Spiegelman*
Affiliation:
Departement des Sciences Économiques, Université de Québec a Montréal, Montréal, Canada Department of Economics and Political Science, Vanier College, St-Laurent, Canada
*
e-mail: [email protected]
e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

A recent experimental literature shows that truth-telling is not always motivated by pecuniary motives, and several alternative motivations have been proposed. However, their relative importance in any given context is still not totally clear. This paper investigates the relevance of pure lie aversion, that is, a dislike for lies independent of their consequences. We propose a very simple design where other motives considered in the literature predict zero truth-telling, whereas pure lie aversion predicts a non-zero rate. Thus we interpret the finding that more than a third of the subjects tell the truth as evidence for pure lie aversion. Our design also prevents confounds with another motivation (a desire to act as others expect us to act) not frequently considered but consistent with much existing evidence. We also observe that subjects who tell the truth are more likely to believe that others will tell the truth as well.

Keywords

CommunicationHonestyGuilt aversionLie aversionNorms

JEL classification

D64: Altruism • Philanthropy • Intergenerational Transfers C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior C70: General
Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 16 , Issue 3 , September 2013 , pp. 233 - 247
Copyright
Copyright © 2012 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article (doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-012-9324-x) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

We are indebted to Matthieu Chemin, Joan Crespo, Bruno Deffains, Claude Fluet, Sean Horan, Hubert Kiss, Pierre Laserre, and Marc Vorsatz for helpful comments. We also gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education through the research project ECO2008-00510, and helpful research assistance by Sayoko Aketa and David Sánchez. Eli Spiegelman thanks Claude Fluet for guidance, encouragement and support.

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